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
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The Dating of the Historical Buddha
Die Datierung des historischen Buddha

Part 2

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An Attempt to Estimate the Distance in Time between Aśoka and the Buddha in Terms of Doctrinal History

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1

The earliest evidence with regard to Buddhist doctrine (and literature) which can be dated precisely and reliably are the inscriptions of Aśoka, who expressly declares himself a lay follower (*upāsaka*)¹ of Buddhism and specifically addressed himself to the Buddhist Order in two of his edicts.² It is therefore reasonable to reconsider this evidence as to its bearing on the date of the Buddha, in the hope of discovering clues to either a longer or a shorter or even no interval between the origins of Buddhism and the time of Aśoka.³ This is what I am expected to do in this paper, but I am afraid that my attempt is rather unsatisfactory. For, apart from having to admit that my treatment of the subject is far from being exhaustive, what renders the task most difficult is the teasing trickiness of the subject itself which abounds in the unknown or in controversial issues:

(1) Scholars disagree fundamentally on what constituted original Buddhism.

(a) Some scholars, like Frauwallner⁴ or Gombrich,⁵ consider the bulk of the canonical Suttas to be essentially authentic, i.e. to go back to the Buddha himself, at least as far as the substance of their content is concerned. According to this position, significant doctrinal developments started, or at least gained some footing, only at a comparatively late date, in connection with the Abhidharmic systematization of the canonical doctrines and with the rise of dogmatic controversies leading to the splitting up of the Saṅgha into different schools⁶ (Frauwallner⁷ thinks of Vātsīputra's thesis of the exis-

tence of a *pudgala* as the starting point). From this point of view, it would seem to be difficult to estimate the interval separating Aśoka from the Buddha in terms of the measure of doctrinal development; for the assumption of an initial period of dogmatic stagnation (which according to Frauwallner may have covered about 200 years)⁸ would allow for a comparatively early date of the Buddha even if the evidence in the Aśokan inscriptions were found not to testify to any doctrinal development at all. On the other hand, even if doctrinal development were found to be mirrored in the Aśokan inscriptions, this would not exclude a considerably later date of the Buddha either; for the assumption of a long duration of the supposed period of doctrinal stagnation before Aśoka is based not on independent evidence but merely on the fact that the long chronology was taken for granted.

(b) Other scholars, like G. Schopen,⁹ seem to advocate a position of extreme distrust in the reliability of the transmitted Sūtra-piṭakas, tending to regard most of the materials contained in them to represent later developments and not original Buddhism. Stratification of the texts by means of internal criteria is considered to be an extremely difficult if not hopeless enterprise – hopeless at least as regards isolating a layer, or materials, remounting to the very origins of Buddhism. Therefore, recourse has to be taken to external evidence, especially inscriptions. Since, however, the Aśokan inscriptions are the earliest available, the earliest form of the Buddhist doctrine to be retrieved on the basis of reliable evidence would be the one documented by the Aśokan inscriptions, and there would be no safe ground on which a picture of a still earlier, original Buddhism could be built. Thus, to this view, the original Buddhist doctrine with which one might compare the Buddhism of the Aśokan inscriptions in order to estimate the distance of time between the Buddha and Aśoka is inaccessible.¹⁰

(c) A third position maintains that the Sutta materials comprise both early and later elements, and that they should and can be stratified mainly by means of internal criteria. One has, however, to admit that, for the bulk of the pertinent material, so far no sufficiently differentiated and at the

doctrinal positions. But it appears that even in later times the borderlines of the two types of "schools" do not always coincide. Cp. H. Bechert in: *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur*, ed. H. Bechert, 1st pt., Göttingen 1985, 20 ff., esp. 39 ff.

⁷ Frauwallner, *Entstehung*, 121.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 120.

⁹ Schopen 1984, 9 ff. Cp. also Southwold 1983, 112 ff., esp. 115 f. (see also n. 149).

¹⁰ Cp., e.g., Southwold 1983, 118: "... the quest of the historical Buddha is incurably futile"; slightly less categorical: *ib.*, 122 f.; 126. – Southwold backs up his position by referring to Frauwallner's theory that the *Skandhaka* portion of the *Vinayapīṭaka* is the earliest Buddhist literary work so far ascertained, composed before Aśoka but after the Council of Vaiśālī (the distance of which from the Buddha's parinirvāṇa may well be less than traditionally assumed: Bechert, *Lebensz.*, 166). But contrary to what Southwold suggests, Frauwallner's view with regard to the essential authenticity of the Sutta materials and the doctrine of the Buddha was in reality much more optimistic (cp. Frauwallner, *Gesch. d. ind. Phil.*, I, 150 f.; *KlSchr* 704 f.; cp. also R. Gombrich in: *TLS* March 29, 1985, 359).

¹ MRE I (see n. 155, B–D).

² Viz. the "Schism Edict" (Hultzschn 1925, 159 ff.; Bloch 1950, 152 f.; cp. K. R. Norman in: *Buddhist Seminar* [Kyoto, Ōtani Univ.] 46/1987, (1)–(33), with copious bibliography) and the Bhābrā (Calcutta-Bairāt) Inscription (Hultzschn 1925, 172 f.; Bloch 1950, 154 f.; cp. Janert 1972, 144 ff. and 255 ff.; Schneider 1982).

³ Cp. also Schneider 1980, 20.

⁴ Frauwallner, *Entstehung*, 120. On the other hand, Frauwallner, *Gesch. d. ind. Phil.*, II, 211 ff.) holds that the Buddha himself developed aspects of his doctrine during his lifetime. Cp. also Bechert, *Lebensz.*, 164.

⁵ Gombrich 1990.

⁶ In the sense of dogmatic schools, to be distinguished from Vinaya or text schools, even though the latter may in many cases have ended up by assuming their own peculiar set of

same time universally accepted stratification has been achieved. E. g., some scholars¹¹ regard certain verse texts (*Atthakavagga*, etc.) as the oldest strata of the Buddhist scriptures, relegating prose suttas to a somewhat later period. Others, on the contrary, consider prose more genuine¹² (though not necessarily the prose suttas just as they have been transmitted to us), or accept both forms as original¹³ and hence including authentic materials. Apart from such fundamental disagreements, even limited attempts to stratify individual texts or sets of texts or to assess the (relative) age of certain pericopes or formulas tend to remain controversial.

In spite of this discouraging state of affairs, I should think that the third position is basically correct and that detailed stratification of the canonical texts, though fraught with difficulties and pitfalls and probably a task for several generations of scholars, is not altogether impossible. For the time being, we have to be content with working hypotheses. The one I am inclined to adopt is, on the whole and in many details, the view proposed by T. Vetter in his recent book *The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism* (Leiden 1988). Yet, for most of the present paper, a more pragmatic attitude appears sufficient. On the one hand, most if not all scholars will agree that some fundamental elements of the Buddhist Dharma, e. g. the basic moral requirements like abstention from theft, sexual intercourse (/adultery), false speech and killing living beings (including animals), can hardly be regarded to have been missing in the beginning. On the other hand, certain composite or developed doctrinal notions or patterns, especially when occurring side by side with simpler or less developed ones, are not necessarily, to be sure, but at any rate more likely to be not only logically but also chronologically posterior to the latter. Thus, it would seem that at least in some cases Buddhist doctrines or terms occurring or hinted at in the Aśokan inscriptions may with a certain degree of probability be classified as older or later; and accordingly their occurrence would enhance the probability of a larger or smaller distance in time between Aśoka and the Buddha.

(2) Yet, even provided that this is correct, Bechert¹⁴ is right in pointing out that there is no fixed speed for the development of ideas or even of religious practices. This means that even conspicuous developments would render a larger distance in time at best probable, but not necessary, and that little development would, to be sure, favour a smaller distance but would not make it certain.

¹¹ Cp., e. g., H. Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism (A Survey with bibliographical notes)*, 1980, 27; N. Aramaki, "A Text-strata-analytical Interpretation of the Concept *Pañcaskandhas*", in: *Jinbun* 26/1980, 2f.; id., "Genshi-bukkyō-kyōten no seiritsu ni tsuite", in: *Tōyō Gakujutsu Kenkyū* 23. 1/1984, 53 ff.; id., "The Fundamental Truth of Buddhism: *Pratītyasamutpāda*", in: *Machikaneyama Ronsō* 22/1988, 32f.

¹² Thus, e. g., P. Horsch, *Die vedische Gāthā- und Ślokaliteratur*, Bern 1966, 354ff. and 467f.; cp. also Schneider 1980, 162f.

¹³ E. g., Gómbrich 1990, 8.

¹⁴ Bechert, *Lebensz*, 163ff.

(3) Finally, it goes without saying that the Aśokan inscriptions (and other inscriptions as well) are written from a specific point of view, and are not of course a systematic and comprehensive exposition of the Buddhist doctrine and practice of their time. To be sure, inscriptions can furnish us, by what they say, with a *terminus ante quem* for certain features of Buddhism. But we can hardly expect them – not even such donative inscriptions as were authored by "doctrinal specialists"¹⁵ – to contain detailed and comprehensive information on, e. g., meditative practices or dogmatic controversies. Hence, inscriptions, particularly royal inscriptions with primarily political intentions, are not likely to reflect developments which may have taken place in the "higher" sphere of spirituality and doctrinal reflection or speculation.

2

After these general remarks, which may be found superfluous but which should be kept in mind in order to bring down expectations to the realistic, I shall try to discuss (or rediscuss) some concrete issues, though without claiming to be exhaustive.

2.1

I first turn to the Buddhist canonical texts mentioned in the edict of Bhābrā (or Calcutta-Bairāt).¹⁶ According to G. Schopen,¹⁷ only three of these have been identified with anything approaching unanimity, namely *Munigāthā*, *Moneyasūte* and *Upatisapasine*, corresponding to *Suttanipāta* vs. 207–221, 699–723 and 955–975, respectively.¹⁸

¹⁵ Schopen 1984, 23 ff.

¹⁶ Cp. *HBI* 256 ff. (with further references on p. 258, n. 74); Schneider 1980, 159f. (+ n. 108); 1982, 494.

¹⁷ Schopen 1984, 12.

¹⁸ As Schopen's formulation makes clear, there is no perfect unanimity.

(A) As for the *Moneyasūte*, Oldenberg (*KISchr*, 914 + n. 1; similarly Bhattacharya 1948, XI; cp. *HBI* 257) argues that in view of the label *°sūte*, in contrast to *Munigāthā*, it is more probably to be identified as *AN* 3.120 (I 273) than as *Sn* 699–723. *AN* 3.120 teaches three kinds of *moneyya* – *m.* of body, speech and mind (cp. *It* No. 67 and *DN* III 220) – and defines them as (1.) abstention from evil bodily acts (*pāṇātipāta*, etc.), (2.) abstention from evil vocal acts (*musāvāda*, etc.), and (3.) complete liberation of the mind from the *āsavas*. The asymmetric explanation of the third item (which is, in substance, corroborated by the Sarvāstivāda tradition: cp. *SangPar* III 47 (transl. imprecise) = *T* vol. 26, 390a 29ff. and *AKBh* 236, 22ff.) is due to the fact that *moneyya/mauneya* is referred to the state of an arhat (cp. *AKBh* 237, 6f.) and thus distinguished from *soceyya/sauceya* comprising (also) good conduct and attitudes of lower levels (cp. *AN* 3.118–119 = I 271 ff. and *AKBh* 237, 7 ff.). This differentiating interpretation, entailing asymmetry in the case of *moneyya*, may not, to be sure, look original and does not appear to be implied in the verses (*It* Nos. 66–67) quoted, and probably presupposed, by *AN* 3.118–120, and hence these texts may well be of comparatively late origin. Yet, the conceptual materials they use for their definitions do not, as far as I can see, contain any element which would force us to assume a long doctrinal development.

The first two texts describe the virtues of the solitary ascetic, including moral virtues¹⁹ and decent behaviour on the alms-round.²⁰ As far as I can see, they do not contain any element which may be suspected to involve later developments.

The same is also true of the third text, the *Upatisapasine*,²¹ provided that it is rightly identified with the *Sāriputtasutta* of the *Suttanipāta*.²² Yet, in the case of this text one has to note that in the introductory verses the Buddha is said to have descended from the Tusita heaven, which seems to presuppose an advanced stage of development of the Buddha legend. This would agree with A. Bareaux's²³ remarks on the Rummindēi inscription as a less doubtful testimony of a comparatively developed stage of the legend and cult of Śākyamuni, and it would also fit in with Bareaux's²⁴ and Norman's²⁵ interpretation of the Nigālī Sāgar inscription as testifying to a cult of Konākamana as one of the mythic predecessors of Śākyamuni. I for one do not venture on a precise estimate of the period of time required for such developments; they may have taken two centuries, but one century or even less may suffice just as well.

Apart from this, the argument adduced by Oldenberg for the identification of the *Moneyasūte* with *AN* 3.120 rather than with *Sn* 699–725, viz. the designation of the text as *sutta* (in contrast to *Muni-gāthā*), is hardly conclusive; for this variation would seem to be equally explicable by stylistic considerations, since the striking lack of any repetition of genre designations in Aśoka's list of Buddhist scriptures may well be intentional.

(B) For the *Upatisapasine*, Oldenberg (*KISchr.* 912f.) suggests identification with *Vin* I 40 rather than with *Sn* 955ff. The doctrinal content of this text consists in Sāriputta's (= Upatissa's: so actually *T* 1428, 798c19f. and *T* 1421, 110b15; cp. also *CPS* § 28 b.2, etc.) question as to the essence of the Buddhist doctrine and in the famous verse "ye dhammā hetu(p)pabhavā . . ." as Assaji's answer. Hence, this text is concerned with a central element of Buddhist theory, or philosophy. Since – probably – all the other scriptures of Aśoka's list are rather concerned with morality and discipline and not with theoretical issues, an identification of the *Upatisapasine* with *Sn* 955ff. would seem to be more probable. The more so as titles of *Sn* suttas consisting of °*pañha* (Oldenberg, *KISchr.* 914) or °*pucchā* affixed to a proper name are quite frequent. But even if we took Oldenberg's identification for granted, this would not necessarily require the longer chronology. For, to be sure, the verse "ye dhammā hetu(p)pabhavā . . ." seems to presuppose the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*, in a generalized form and as the central tenet of Buddhism, and it may well have taken some time for this doctrine to attain such a form and status. Still, I for one do not see any reason why this process must have taken 200 years or more. Besides, Alsdorf's (*Die Ārya-Strophen des Pāli-Kanon*, Wiesbaden 1967, 76) opinion that the verse (new āryā) belongs to a relatively late stratum of tradition has recently been called into question by Bechert ("Alte Vedhas" im Pāli-Kanon", *NAWG* 1988, 130f.).

¹⁹ Cp., e.g., *Sn* 215f. (abstention from bad deeds), 220 (*ahimsā*), 704 (chastity), 705 (*ahimsā*, based on *ātmaupamyā*).

²⁰ Cp., e.g., *Sn* 217 and 710ff.

²¹ Cp., e.g., *Sn* 967 (abstention from theft and false speech; *mettā*); 971 (decent behaviour on the alms-round).

²² For an alternative view, see n. 18.

²³ See A. Bareaux's contribution in *Symp* IV, 1, pp. 218f.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ See K. R. Norman's contribution in *Symp* IV, 1, pp. 307ff.

Otherwise than G. Schopen, I think that at least one of the remaining titles can be identified with certainty, namely the "Instruction of Rāhula (*Lāghulovāde*) referring to false speech (*musāvāda*)". Oldenberg²⁶ is certainly right in referring to *MN* No. 61 (*Ambalaṭṭhika-Rahulovāda-sutta*), the first part of which is actually concerned with the topic of intentional false speech, which is characterized as something an ascetic should be ashamed of²⁷ and which he should avoid doing even for fun. This does not however mean that what Aśoka refers to was precisely the same text as the received *MN* Sutta, for the first part of this Sutta is followed, in *MN* as well as in the Chinese *Madhyamāgama*,²⁸ by another part not concerned with false speech; but there are also, as already shown by Lamotte,²⁹ parallel versions consisting only of the first part concerned with false speech.³⁰ Thus, Aśoka's reference may well be to a text which only later became a part of *MN* No. 61 and its *Madhyamāgama* parallel. At any rate, since there seems to be no verse sutta corresponding to the label, it must refer to a prose text. For the advocates of the theory that prose suttas are a later stratum of Buddhist literature [see above, § 1 (1.b)], this would imply that there must be a certain distance in time between Aśoka and the Buddha. But from the point of view of content there is no reason to regard the "Instruction of Rāhula on false speech" as a later product, because there is no reason to doubt that the condemnation of false speech was an element of Buddhist spirituality from the very outset, since it is found in every ethicized asceticism³¹ and even rooted in Vedic tradition.³²

In trying to characterize the content of those texts of Aśoka's list which can be identified with a certain degree of probability, one may say that they are all concerned with the general virtues of an ascetic, including morality and discipline,³³ and not with specific issues of doctrine or details of meditative practice. What Aśoka is interested in is that the monks and nuns should

²⁶ *Vin* I, p. XL n. 1; H. Oldenberg, *KISchr.* 911; cp. also *HBI* 257f. Oldenberg points out that Aśoka's wording seems to presuppose that he knew at least one more "instruction of Rāhula", one which dealt with another topic. Actually, *MN* contains another *Rāhulovāda-sutta* (*MN* No. 62; cp. *T* 125, 581c1ff.) which – if we confine ourselves to those topics which are confirmed by both versions – treats the contemplation of the *skandhas* as not self and not mine (*MN*) or as impermanent (*T* 125; cp. *MN* I 424, 32f.) and the practice of *ānāpānasati* (in *T* 125 less elaborate than in *MN*!), with a hint at *asubhā* and the four *appamānas*). None of these practices warrants suspicion of later origin, except, perhaps, the sophisticated pattern of *ānāpānasati* in *MN*, the authenticity of which is, indeed, open to doubt in view of the much simpler pattern in the *T* 125 version.

²⁷ Cp. also *Sn* 967.

²⁸ *T* 26, 436c7ff.

²⁹ E. Lamotte, *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*, vol. II (1949), 813–815 (with further references).

³⁰ *T* 212, 668a6–21; cp. also *T* 211, 599c20–600b9.

³¹ For Jainism cp. A. Mette's contribution to the present symposium in *Symp* IV, 1, pp. 136f.: *musāvāyāo veramaṇaṃ* or *na musā bhaṇati* as an element of *cāujjāma/cātuyāma*.

³² Cp., e.g. H. Lüders, *Varuṇa*, II (Göttingen 1959), 419f.; H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, 1917, 411f.; 422.

³³ Cp. *HBI* 258; Schneider 1980, 160.

take their ascetic life seriously, that they should behave morally and decently, and that lay followers, being admonished, they too, to listen to these texts and keep them in mind,³⁴ should, probably, not only respect the Saṅgha's way of life but also be, to a certain extent, themselves inspired by the ascetic virtues, at least by those concerned with morality.³⁵ It would therefore be natural to expect that the remaining texts of Aśoka's list should likewise refer to such virtues. Since the texts recommended by Aśoka were certainly fairly well-known and popular, it is improbable that no version of them was included in the Pāli canon. Thus, I think Lamotte³⁶ is right in referring the *Vinayasamukase* to a text like *AN I 98 ff.*,³⁷ the *Aliyavasāni* not to a list of noble masters but to the 4 *ariyavaṃsā* (being content with any garment, almsfood and lodging, and being intent on meditation and on abandoning [attachment] (*pahāna*): *AN II 27 f.*), or – less probably – to the 10 *ariyavāsā* (*AN V 29 ff.*),³⁸ and the *Anāgatabhayāni* to a Sūtra like those

³⁴ Bhābrā F: *hevaṃmevā upāsakā cā upāsikā cā*.

³⁵ Actually, the five moral commandments for lay followers give the impression of being a – mitigated – recast of the negatively defined moral virtues of an ascetic: abstention from taking life (of men and animals!), from taking others' property, from (illicit) sexual intercourse, from false speech, etc. Cp. also the eight precepts to be observed by lay people on *uposatha* days, coming still closer to the precepts to be kept by the Saṅgha.

³⁶ *HBI* 256 f.

³⁷ (A) Oldenberg (*KISchr.* 912) thinks of the *Pāṭimokkha*, taking *samukasa* (*samutkarṣa*) in the sense of "essence" and deducing from the expression the existence of a more detailed Vinaya in Aśoka's time. The objection that the *Pāṭimokkha* is not listened to by lay people he dismisses by referring to oversight or imprecision of expression (ib., n. 2). However this may be, the *Pāṭimokkha* is widely acknowledged to be a fairly archaic stratum of Buddhist literature, and hence its mention by Aśoka would not have any chronological implication.

(B) Another view (e.g., Bhattacharya 1948, XI, but with express reserves) takes *Vinayasamukase* to refer to the *Dhammacakkapavattanasutta* (*DhCPS: Vin I 10 ff.*) as the climax of the *Vinaya*. This is not very probable (cp. also Schneider 1980, 160 n. 109). But even if this identification were acceptable, it would hardly be a clue for the long chronology. For even though the *DhCPS* as it stands was probably composed some time after the actual Awakening of the Buddha, and even though it appears to reflect several stages of doctrinal development (cp. Vetter 1988, 7 ff.), there seems to be no reason to assume that any of these stages must postdate the lifetime of the Buddha, and that the composition must have required more than one or even two centuries.

(C) Another interesting possibility is pointed out by R. K. Mookerji (*Asoka*, London 1928, repr. Delhi 1989, 119 n. 1). Mookerji adduces *Vism(W)* III.42 where four texts are mentioned out of which two appear to correspond to texts listed in the Bhābrā Edict, viz. the *Nāḷaka(sutta)* = *Sn 679–723*, which includes the presumable *Moneyasūte*, and the *catupaccaya-santosa-bhāvanāramatā-dīpakaṃ Mahā-ariyavaṃsa(-suttam)* = *AN II 27 f.*, i.e. the presumable *Aliyavasāni* (I for one fail to see how, with Mookerji, the *Rathavinīta(sutta)* can be identified with the *Munigāthā* (*Sn 207 ff.*) rather than with *MN No. 24*). Mookerji suggests that the 4th text of *Vism(W)* III.42, viz. the *Tuvaṭṭaka(sutta)* (*Sn 915–934*), might be the same as Aśoka's *Vinayasamukase*. Hypothetical though this identification is, it would very well fit in with the overall picture since the content and purport of the *Tuvaṭṭakasutta* is in perfect harmony with that of the other *Sn* texts presumably referred to by Aśoka. From the point of view of chronology, an identification of the *Vinayasamukase* with the *Tuvaṭṭakasutta* would not seem to supply any additional clue.

³⁸ Cp. also Oldenberg, *KISchr.* 914.

collected at *AN III 100 ff.*³⁹ Among these latter suttas, each of which discusses 5 future dangers, the last two, referring to the degeneration of the Buddhist Order and to inauthentic suttas composed in an elegant style, may be of later origin. But Aśoka may just as well be referring to one of the versions recommending zealous spiritual practice in view of ordinary dangers like being bitten by poisonous animals which threaten the life of the forest-dwelling monk.⁴⁰

Thus, it would seem that, apart, at the most, from the "Question of Upatissa" – provided this does in fact refer to *Sn 955 ff.* as we have it⁴¹ – , none of the texts recommended by Aśoka can be shown to presuppose any significant doctrinal development.

2.2

Among the doctrinal terms used by Aśoka, two closely related ones,⁴² viz. *palisava* (Gi, Ma, Sh: *paris(r)ava*) and *āsinava*, are particularly interesting and deserve to be investigated with a view to finding out if they entail chronological implications.

2.2.1

Occurrences and meaning of the Pkt. term *parissava* and the corresponding verb *parissavati* in early Jaina sources,⁴³ as well as of its presumable Pāli counterpart *parissaya*⁴⁴ (Buddh. Skt. *parisrava*,⁴⁵ occasionally *parisraya*⁴⁶ [probably, like the Pāli form, a misrendering of Eastern *palissava*]⁴⁷) have been investigated in detail, and compared with Aśoka's use of the term *palisava*,⁴⁸ by N. Aramaki,⁴⁹ who has also proposed a conclusion concerning chronology.

Aramaki is almost certainly right in pointing out that the original meaning of *parisrava* (and its Middle Indic counterparts), as a term in the spiritual

³⁹ Cp. *ibid.*, 911 f.

⁴⁰ Cp. also *Sn 964* (belonging to what may be identified as "Upatissapāṇi": see above).

⁴¹ Or even to *Vin I 40* [see n. 18 (B)].

⁴² See below + ns. 47 and 51, and pp. 125 f. Cp. also *Nidd I 13 f.* (*tatrāsaya ti parissaya*).

⁴³ *Āyār I.4.2.1* (see n. 51) and *Isibh No. 16* (see n. 52).

⁴⁴ See *PTC* and *PTSD* s.v.

⁴⁵ *Uv XIV.13* (Sa.); *YBhū* (ms.) 137b1 (see Enomoto 1989, p. 35 ([40]5b)); *MSV(D) I 11, 11*; *II 185, 3* (= *Uv XIV.13* [Mū.]); *SHT I p. 105* (No. 186 c B3).

⁴⁶ *Uv XIV.13* (ms. *P.M. 500.36*).

⁴⁷ Otherwise *BHSD* s.v. *parisrava* ("perh. by folk-etym. confusion [of *parissaya/parisraya*] with Skt. *parisrava*"). But the fact that the Jaina tradition, too, has *parissava/parissavati* and the semantic closeness to other derivations from the root(s) *sru* (and *snu*) "to flow", like *ās(r)ava* (*āsinava*), show that the term is almost certainly to be derived from *pari-sru*, i.e. that the *v* in Aśoka's *palisava* is not a substitute for *y* (as in the cases adduced by K. R. Norman in *BSOAS* 33/1970, 140 f.; cp. Aramaki 1978, 396 [add.]) but inherited, and that Pa. *parissaya* is a hyperform (cp. Pkt. *aphaya*) indicating an etymological misunderstanding of the term (cp. also *Nidd I 13*).

⁴⁸ *RE X C–D* (see n. 81).

⁴⁹ Aramaki 1978.

practice of ascetics, is close to that of *ās(r)ava* (see § 2.2.2),⁵⁰ as is confirmed by their being expressly equated at *Āyār* I.4.2.1.⁵¹ Basing himself on *Isibh* No. 16⁵² and *Sn* 770,⁵³ he understands *parisrava*, like *āsrava*, in the context of the illustration of *samsāric* existence by means of a ship in the ocean or in a violent river and in danger of being damaged by the flood or by the influx of water unless it is carefully guarded and protected from leakage. The ocean or flood is, of course, *samsāra*, the ship the living (especially human) being or its body,⁵⁴ and the onrushing or intruding waters are the unwholesome factors or substances somehow conceived of as intruding from outside unless this is prevented by mindfulness and guarding the senses.

If I understand Aramaki correctly, he tries to distinguish the two terms by assuming *parisrava* to mean the onrush (and intrusion?) of the flood or unwholesome stuff from the outside, or the stuff itself that rushes at or into a ship or living being, and by taking *ās(r)ava* to refer, as against this, to the completed event of intrusion, or to the stuff that has already intruded.⁵⁵ Such a specification is, perhaps, too narrow in the case of *āsrava* (see § 2.2.2) but as far as *parisrava* is concerned it seems to work fairly well, though it appears that at least at *Isibh* No. 16 emphasis lies on intrusion. For in this passage⁵⁶ *parissavati* would seem to imply that the usual thing is that unwholesome factors – here the “features” (*āyāra*, i.e. *ākāra*) of the sense-objects (*visaya*) – intrude into the sense-faculties whereas in the case of the saint (who is able to ward off such intrusion by guarding his senses) they do not.⁵⁷ If this is true, *pari-sru* would, in this case, have to be understood as having, at least also, the meaning of “to flow through”, which it appears to have in some *RV* passages.⁵⁸ Most occurrences of *parisrava*, however, rather suggest that we should start from the idea of “flowing around or on all sides” or “flowing/rushing [against, or down⁵⁹ upon, or into (a ship, etc.)]

⁵⁰ Cp. also Pa. *avassava* (Skt. *avasrava*), *avassuta*.

⁵¹ *je āsavā te parissavā, je parissavā te āsavā*.

⁵² *jassa khalu bho visayāyārā na parissavanti indiyā vā davehiṃ, se khalu uttame purise*. Tentative translation: “Whose sense[-doors] – so you should note – the features of the objects do not, so to speak (*vā*), flow through (i.e. intrude into) with [their] floods, he indeed is the best person.”

⁵³ ... *maddant' enaṃ parissayā / tato naṃ dukkham anveti, nāvaṃ bhinnam ivodakam*. Cp. also *Sn* 771: ... *tare oghaṃ, nāvāṃ sitvā va* ...

⁵⁴ Cp. *Uttarajjh* 23.73 (Enomoto 1979, 20).

⁵⁵ Aramaki 1978, e.g. 385, 7 f.

⁵⁶ See n. 52.

⁵⁷ The alternative would be to assume that in the case of the saint the unwholesome “features” of the sense-objects do not even attack his sense-faculties, i.e. that his complete disinterestedness causes the objects, too, to change their mode of action and to desist from bothering him. Cp. the reaction of *prakṛti* to *puruṣa* in Sāṅkhya.

⁵⁸ E.g. *RV* IX 113: *indrāyendo pāri srava*. Cp. P.Thieme, *Gedichte aus dem Rig-Veda*, Stuttgart (Reclam) 1964, 44 f.: “Dem Indra ströme, Tropfen! durch [die Seihe]!” Cp. also Pa. *parissāvāna* (Buddh. Skt. *parisrāvāṇa*) “strainer” and *parissāvati* (Skt. *parisrāvayati*) “to strain or filter”, and Skt. (*PW* s.v. *sru* + *pari*) Buddh. Skt. *parisruta* “strained”.

⁵⁹ The aspect of flowing or rushing down could easily be derived from the meaning of

from all sides”.⁶⁰ For, especially in some passages of the *Suttanipāta*, e.g. in the *Kāmasutta* (*Sn* 766–771),⁶¹ the *parissayas* are mainly external things which, just as breakers – or floating objects, etc.? – may crush a ship,⁶² endanger or harrass the ascetic and make suffering invade⁶³ him, just as water intrudes into the broken ship.

Unfortunately, the *Kāmasutta* does not specify what, precisely, the *parissayas* are.⁶⁴ At *Isibh* No. 16, as was pointed out above, the dangerous factors are the “features” (*āyāra*, i.e. *ākāra*) of the sense-objects. The prose explanation seems to understand them as the karmic substance taken in by a person when he reacts emotionally to sensory impressions (i.e. covets or dislikes them).⁶⁵ According to the *Kāmasutta*, too, the *parissayas* succeed in “crushing” the ascetic only if he is greedy for possessions and sensual pleasures. These, or perhaps the karma one commits when hunting after them, may hence be the *parissayas*. Indeed, the juxtaposition of *Dhp* 328 and 330⁶⁶ suggests an equivalence or at least affinity of *parissayas* and evil (*pāpa*) actions. But the *Sāriputtasutta* (*Sn* 955 ff.),⁶⁷ which is the only one to explicitly concretize the *parissayas*, presents a somewhat different picture, taking the concept in a much broader sense. Here, the *parissayas* are, to be sure, stated to consist of agreeable and disagreeable things (*Sn* 968 c), but are more precisely specified as disease, hunger, excessive cold and heat (*Sn* 966), and probably⁶⁸ also include dangerous or troublesome animals and people (*Sn* 964 a–965 b); moreover, they include evil actions like theft, false speech and injuring or killing living beings⁶⁹ (*Sn* 967), and unwholesome mental states like wrath and arrogance (*Sn* 968 a). Thus, they comprise external dangers (*bhaya*) or nuisances⁷⁰ as well as unwholesome actions and mental

“flowing through (a strainer)” since the movement of the strained fluid is naturally downwards.

⁶⁰ Cp. Pa. *palissuta* (*Jā* VI 328, 4 [verse]) “overflowing” (said of a vessel), i.e. “flowing [over and down] on all sides [from inside outwards]”, whereas in the present context the movement would be from outside inwards.

⁶¹ Cp. *YBhū* (ms.) 137 a 5 f. (Enomoto 1989, p. 35). Cp. Aramaki 1978, 387 f.; Enomoto 1979, 32 f. and 41 n. 27.

⁶² Cp. *Sn* 770 b–d (see n. 53).

⁶³ Cp. *ibid.* *anveti*, i.e. *anu* + *ā* + *eti* (see *CPD* s.v.); cp. the explanation as *anvāgacchati* at *YBhū* (ms.) 138 a 2, and the fact that in related contexts we find *anvā(-s)savati* (e.g. *DN* I 70, etc.).

⁶⁴ *Nidd* I explains them in line with the *Sāriputtasutta* (see below); as for the explanation of the *YBhū*, see n. 76.

⁶⁵ *Isibh* No. 16: *maṇuṇṇesu saddesu soya-visaya-pattesu ṇo sajjejjā ... maṇuṇṇesu saddesu ... sajjamaṇe ... pāva-kammaṃ ādāpāe bhavati. ... evaṃ rūvesu gandhesu rasesu phāsesu; evaṃ vivarīsesu ṇo dūsejjā*. Cp. Aramaki 1978, 385.

⁶⁶ Cp. *Uv* XIV. 13 and 15, *PDhp* I. 9 and 11.

⁶⁷ Cp. Aramaki 1979, 388 f.

⁶⁸ Cp. the fact that the items just mentioned are introduced by the text as *aparāṇi parissayāni*, after dangerous animals, etc., called “dangers” (*bhaya*).

⁶⁹ Indicated by its positive counterpart, viz. *mettā* (*Sn* 967 b).

⁷⁰ *upaddava*, cp. *Sn-a* ad *Sn* 42 and 960.

states, which the ascetic must overcome⁷¹ by either enduring⁷² or suppressing⁷³ them.

The *Niddesa*⁷⁴ essentially preserves the concept of *parissaya* as found in the *Sāriputtasutta* and at the same time systematizes it by explicitly distinguishing between ordinary or manifest (*pākaṭa*) *parissayas* – like dangerous or troublesome animals or people, diseases, etc. – and hidden (*paṭicchanna*) ones comprising bad actions (*duccarita*) and unwholesome mental states (*kilesa*) as well as anxiety (*daratha*) and anguish (*pariḷāha*). In later non-Theravāda sources, we find purely psychological explanations of the *parisravas*, viz. as unwholesome volitional or intellectual states of mind (*kleśa*),⁷⁵ or as unwholesome distress or gloominess.⁷⁶

It should, however, be stressed, with Aramaki,⁷⁷ that occurrences of *parissaya/parisrava* in a religious context⁷⁸ are, apart from the *Sn* passages and their parallels and the commentarial passages on them, extremely rare even in the canonical texts, its occurrence in canonical prose being limited to one single compound recurring, in the same context, in three suttas.⁷⁹ These suttas mention, among other things which may trouble ascetics (and most of which are closely related to, or even identical with, items reckoned among the *parissayas* in the *Sāriputtasutta*), *utuparissaya*, i.e. danger or disturbance resulting from weather or climate. Aramaki⁸⁰ regards this use as a later narrowing down of the meaning of the term *parissaya*. At any rate, one may state that the term is, in this passage, actually used only in a special connection, though this may well be casual and need not necessarily exclude its applicability to the other dangers or nuisances as well.

⁷¹ *abhisambhaveyya* (*Sn* 965 c, 968 d; cp. *Dhp* 328 c = *Sn* 45 c: *abhibhuyya*); *saheta* (*Sn* 974; cp. *Sn* 42 c: *parissayānaṃ sahitā*).

⁷² *adhivāsayeyya* (*Sn* 966 b); cp. *bhayānaṃ na bhāye* (964 a), *paradhammikānaṃ ... na santaseyya* (965 a).

⁷³ *vikkhambhaye* (*Sn* 969 b); *vinodayeyya* (967 d; cp. 921 b: *parissayavinayaṃ*).

⁷⁴ E.g., *Nidd I* 12 f. Cp. also *Sn-a* I 88, 17–19 (ad *Sn* 42); II 513, 18 f. (ad *Sn* 770); 572, 15 (ad *Sn* 960: *parissayā = upaddavā*).

⁷⁵ E.g., *Uv Viv* ad XIV. 13 (ed. Balk, I, 487, 12): *kum nas 'dzag pa'i* (to be corrected to *pa ni?*) *ñon mons pa ste*, i.e. **parisravāḥ kleśāḥ*). Cp. already *parissayavinayaṃ* (*Sn* 921 b) beside *yā kāci tanhā ... tāsaṃ vinayā* (*Sn* 916 cd) in the *Tuvaṭakasutta*.

⁷⁶ *YBhū* (ms.) 138 a2 (ad *Sn* 770): *parisravāḥ sokaparidevaduhkhadaurmanasyopāyāsāḥ*. That these forms of distress can be regarded as unwholesome is also testified to by their inclusion into the Mū. version of the list of "minor faults" (*ksudrakavastu*); see Schmithausen in: *StII* 11/12 (1986), 225. – On the other hand, *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (ed. Tatia) 85, 26 f. still uses the word in its old meaning of (mainly concrete and objective) "dangers" or "plagues" (*upadrava*): "Succumbing to *parisravas*" (*Abhidharmasamuccaya*, ed. Pradhan, 72, 11) means being unable to endure being oppressed (see *CPD* s.v. *uppīḷa(na)*; *AKBh-Index* s.v. *utpīḷita*) by gadflies, mosquitoes and other plagues" (*parisravaparikhedo daṃṣamāśakādyupadravotpīḷanāsahanam*).

⁷⁷ Aramaki 1978, 391 f.

⁷⁸ There are a couple of non-terminological occurrences – in the sense of "danger" or "nuisance" – in *Jātaka* prose and *Pv-a* (see *PTSD* s.v.).

⁷⁹ *AN* III 388; *MN* I 10; *DN* III 130.

⁸⁰ Aramaki 1978, 393.

In Aśoka's inscriptions, *parisava* occurs at RE X C–D,⁸¹ where the king states that all his efforts are [ultimately] for the sake of [his subjects' destiny] in the yonder world, viz. that they all may have little (or no) *palisava(s)*, *palisava* being expressly defined as *apuna* (*apunya*), i.e., bad karma in the sense of unwholesome actions and/or demerit entailing undesirable consequences in the yonder world.⁸²

According to Aramaki,⁸³ Aśoka's use of *palisava* is quite close to that of its counterparts in the early Jaina sources and in the early Buddhist verse texts (*Sn*, *Dhp*), but is a kind of lay Buddhist variant of the latter. From the point of view of chronology, Aramaki⁸⁴ regards the use of *parissaya* in *Sn* and *Dhp* as earlier than that of Aśoka, but he takes that of the prose passage(s) to be post-Aśokan, suggesting that most of the canonical Sutta and Vinaya materials may be of post-Aśokan origin. This would certainly favour a short if not very short chronology.

The use of the term *palisava*, extremely rare in later texts, is indeed a strong argument for a short chronology. I also subscribe to Aramaki's suggestion that Aśoka's definition of *palisava* can be taken as a lay Buddhist modification of a term originally belonging to the ascetic tradition. In fact, Aśoka may have selected, from among the *parissayas* of the *Sāriputtasutta* (probably identical with the *Upatisapasine* mentioned by him in his Bhābrā edict: see § 2.1), that element which was most relevant to his *dhamma*, viz. bad actions. Such a selective interpretation of the term *palisava/parissaya* may have been supported by *Dhp* 328 + 330 (juxtaposition of *parissaya* and bad action, suggesting their equivalence: see above).⁸⁵

On the other hand, Aramaki's view that the prose passage mentioning *utuparissaya*, or even most (if not all) prose suttas, are post-Aśokan, does not seem to be a necessary corollary of Aśoka's use of the term *palisava*. Aramaki's conclusion presupposes that the term was current in earliest Buddhism but became obsolete⁸⁶ later on, and that its lack in the prose suttas, or its use in an extremely restricted and marginal sense in a few of them, points to a later origin of these texts, in contrast to Aśoka's employment of the term in a selective but still central meaning.

Yet, Vetter's⁸⁷ theory on the origin of the *Aṭṭhakavagga* and related materials opens up a somewhat different possibility of interpreting the facts. According to Vetter, the nucleus of these materials may stem from some

⁸¹ Text acc. to Er (deviations marked): *aṃ* (Ka) *cu kichi palakamati devānaṃpiye piyadasi lāja, savaṃ taṃ pālātikāye* (Dh, Jg) *vā, kiṃti* (Dh, Jg), *sakale apapalisave siyā* (Dh, Jg: *huveyā*) *ti* (Dh, Jg, Sh). *esa cu palisave e apune*.

⁸² I.e., missing heaven (cp. § 2.3.3).

⁸³ Aramaki 1978, 394.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 394 f.

⁸⁵ At the same time, Aśoka's definition of *palisava* as *apuna*, i.e. bad karma, may well have appealed also to the Jainas, although the very few occurrences of the term in the earliest Jaina sources are hardly sufficient to confirm that the Jainas themselves had been using the term, at Aśoka's time, in a similar sense. Cp. also n. 88.

⁸⁶ Aramaki 1978, 391.

⁸⁷ Vetter 1988, 101 ff.; 1990, 42 ff.

originally independent group of ascetics who were then integrated into the Buddhist Saṅgha, but preserved at least such parts of their literary heritage as were reconcilable with the spirit of Buddhism. In view of the almost exclusive occurrence of the term *parissaya* in precisely these materials, it appears possible that *parissaya* or rather *palissava* was a term of such a group of ascetics and not of earliest Buddhism proper. Such an assumption – which would, by the way, perhaps also explain the striking scarcity of this term in the early Jaina sources⁸⁸ – could explain its almost complete non-occurrence in the bulk of Buddhist literature proper without having to take the latter to be, throughout, chronologically posterior. Likewise, the fact that Aśoka does use the term would, to be sure, not favour a long chronology but would not necessarily imply an extremely short one either; for his use of the term may simply have resulted from predilection for texts like the *Sāriputtasutta* (especially if it is indeed identical with the *Upatisapasine*), and, perhaps, the *Dhammapada*.

As for the one exceptional occurrence of *parissaya* in the Buddhist prose suttas, viz. the passage mentioning “danger or trouble by weather or climate” (*utuparissaya*) as one of the dangers or disturbances a monk is allowed to counteract⁸⁹ by means of clothes, food, lodging or medicine, Aramaki may be right in assuming that it is somehow based on the *Sāriputtasutta* through confining the use of the term *parissaya* to a special case. One may indeed get the impression that even this prose passage has, except for the expression *utuparissaya* which looks somewhat casual, more or less deliberately avoided the term *parissaya*. Significantly enough, by the way, in the exception, viz. *utuparissaya*, *parissaya* refers to an external danger or nuisance. It may indeed well be that originally (i. e., with Vetter’s theory, for the group to which materials like the *Sāriputtasutta* originally belong) it was such external disturbances and dangers that were termed *parissaya/palissava*⁹⁰ – the aim being to remain internally undisturbed by them –, and that unwholesome actions and states of mind were included only somewhat later, perhaps already under Buddhist influence, but that this use of the term

⁸⁸ See above. – It is worth noting that one of the two occurrences is in the paracanonical (*aṅgabāhira*: Schubring 1935, p. 83) *Isibh*, and that in the other (*Āyār* I. 4.2.1) the term is – “inclusivistically”? – equated with the more common term *āsava*. On the other hand, in Jainism most of the items which in the *Sāriputtasutta* are presented as *parissayas* are, as Prof. K. Bruhn kindly reminds me, included among the *parisāhā* (*Āyār* I. 8.8.21 f.; *Uttarajjh* ch. 2; Schubring 1935, 194). I cannot decide whether this term is derivable from *parisrava*, but the similarity of sound is striking. Cp. also the “etymology” of *parissaya* at *Nidd* I 13, etc.: *parisāhantī ti parissayā*.

⁸⁹ See above and n. 79. – In the *Sāriputtasutta*, the ascetic is enjoined to endure this kind of disturbances or dangers and not to be afraid of them (cp. also *Āyār* I. 8.8.8–10!). In two of the three prose suttas using the term *utuparissaya* (see n. 79), this aspect is, to be sure, preserved but only beside that of counteracting them, and in the third passage enduring is not mentioned at all. This may mean a gradual departure of Buddhism from the ideal of the houseless, wandering ascetic (cp. Aramaki 1978, 393), but it may just as well merely indicate a process of gradual assimilation of strict asceticism, as a somewhat heterogeneous element, to the more moderate Buddhist attitude of the Middle Way.

⁹⁰ Cp. also the *āsavas* of *Āyār* I. 8.8.8–10 (see § 2.2.2 and n. 95).

found scarce acceptance among the Buddhists proper, still less than the term as such.

However this may be, I for one find it difficult to determine, on the basis of how the term *parissaya/palissava* is used, the chronological relation between the above-mentioned prose passage and Aśoka. And even if the passage should indeed turn out to be post-Aśokan, this would hardly imply that the same is also true of the other prose suttas, since this would contradict the fairly reliable evidence of Aśoka’s reference to the *Laghulovāda* pointing to a prose sutta (see § 2.1).

Hence, Aśoka’s use of the term *palissava*, though fitting in with a short chronology very well, is nevertheless not an infallible clue to it.

2.2.2

The development of the term *ās(r)ava* in both Jainism and Buddhism has been exhaustively investigated by F. Enomoto.⁹¹ As Enomoto proves by ample evidence, the concept is based on a metaphorical use of the idea of a flood intruding into a broken ship (or, in a few cases, perhaps of a flood rushing against a ship),⁹² the oldest textual witness of such a use being *AV* V. 19.8.⁹³

In Jainism, the concept of *ās(r)ava* (or *aṅhaya*, from **ā-snu*) eventually comes to denote the influx of karmic stuff, especially bad karma, into a person or his soul,⁹⁴ but at *Āyār* I. 8.8.8–10⁹⁵ *āsavā* (pl.) may denote all kinds of

⁹¹ Enomoto 1978; 1979; 1983. – Cp. also Kashiwahara 1978. Kashiwahara rightly thinks that the original meaning of the term *ās(r)ava*, just as that of comparable terms like *yoga*, *ogha*, etc., must have been a concrete metaphor. He thinks that the concrete meanings on which the metaphorical concept of *āsava* is based are *āsava* (“outflow”) “discharge”, “pus”, and *āsava* “spirituous liquor”, i. e. “what makes drunk”. But I think Enomoto’s view is supported by better evidence. As for *āsava* “spirituous liquor”, it can hardly have been the starting point of the metaphorical concept of *ās(r)ava/āsinava/aṅhaya* since unlike the latter it is not derived from *ā-snu* or **ā-snu* but from *ā-su* “to press out” (cp. *CPD* s. v.). – Kashiwahara also mentions the meanings “danger” (*Abhidhānappadīpikā* 968) and “painful feeling” (cp. *MW*: “distress, affliction, pain”), and he suggests that these meanings are not found in the canonical Pāli texts because they came to be overshadowed by the dominating aspect of the *kleśas*. As a matter of fact, however, even in these texts, clear traces of an original, broader range of meaning are still perceptible (see below).

⁹² E. g., *Uttarajjh* 23.70–73 (Enomoto 1979, 20); *Sūy* I. 11.30 (ib., 25); *Viyāh* 1.6 = p. 404, 22 f. (ib., 26 and 40 n. 21); *Isibh* 28.19–20 (ib., 28). At *Uttarajjh* 30.5–6 (ib., 29) the illustration is the inflow of water into a tank when the feeder is not blocked.

⁹³ *tād vai rāstrām āsravati nāvam bhinnām ivodakām / brahmāṅgaṃ yātra hīmsanti tād rāstrām hanti ducchūnā //*

As the subject of the first part, Enomoto (1979, 33) takes the (demonic metamorphosis of the unlawfully slaughtered) cow (of a brahmin) which is the subject of the preceding verse. Besides, he points out that pada b is identical with pada d of *Sn* 770, which states that *dukkha* (→ water) intrudes (*anveti*, which can almost be regarded as m. c. for *anvāssavati*: cp. n. 63) the ascetic (→ ship) when he/(it) has been crushed by the *parissayas* (see § 2.2.1).

⁹⁴ Cp., e. g., Enomoto 1979, 17 and 28 ff.; 1978, 158 f. (§ 3); Schubring 1935, 113; Frauwallner, *Gesch. d. ind. Phil.*, I, 253. Yet, even in later Jaina texts, *ās(r)ava* is not invariably used in precisely this sense. E. g., *Śilāṅka* ad *Āyār* I. 4.2.1 takes *āsava* to mean both the (bad, or injuring) activities (*ārambha*) due to which karma flows in, and the objects (“garlands,

molestation by which an ascetic may be tortured, as, e.g., biting and blood-sucking animals (especially insects), or the pain they inflict.

In Buddhist canonical (and post-canonical) texts, the *ās(r)avas* are often specified as three, viz. [desire for] sensual pleasures (*kāmās(r)ava*), [desire for] existence (*bhavās(r)ava*), and ignorance (*avijjāsava/avidyāsava*),⁹⁶ to which later on a fourth one, viz. (false) views (*diṭṭhāsava/diṭṭyāsava*), is added.⁹⁷ This means that the *ās(r)avas* are understood as evil mental attitudes or states, i.e., in later terminology, as *kleśas*, and often the terms *āsrava* and *kleśa* are even taken to be quasi-synonyms.⁹⁸ Since in the case of these evil mental attitudes or states the metaphor of “influx” makes little sense,⁹⁹ it was exchanged for the metaphor of “outflow” or discharge of a sore¹⁰⁰ (which was also called *ās(r)ava*)¹⁰¹ and other “etymologies”.¹⁰²

women, etc.”) which are the cause or motive of (such actions entailing such an) intake of karma (*karmabandhahetu, karmopādānakāraṇa*). And in Kundakunda’s *Samayasāra* (Śrī Gaṇeśprasād Varṇī Granthamālā vol.20, Benares 1969, ch.4, vs.177) the *āsravas* are even equated with the three unwholesome mental states of desire (*rāga*), aversion (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*), which reminds one of the specifically Buddhist use of the term in the sense of *kāma(rāga)*, *bhava(rāga)* and *avidyā* or in the sense of the *kleśas* in general (cp., e.g., Frauwallner, *Gesch. d. ind. Phil.*, II, 286 f. and 337 n.370).

⁹⁵ *anāhāro tuyattejjā puṭṭho tatth’ ahiyāsae, . . .
samsappagā ya je pāṇā je ya udḍha-m-ahecarā
bhujjante mamsasonīyam na chane na pamajjāe.
pāṇā deham vihimsanti thāṇāo na viubbhame,
āsavehiṃ vicittehiṃ tippamāno hiyāsae.*

In the last line, Jacobi (*Jaina Sutras*, vol. I, 76: “after the *āsravas* have ceased”) follows Śīlāṅka who reads *vivittehiṃ*. However, it is questionable whether *vivitta* can indeed be used in the sense of “ceased” (or “dispersed”). It may well be a secondary attempt to adjust the meaning of *ās(r)ava* to later usage. To be sure, in the following line (*ganthehiṃ vicittehiṃ/vivittehiṃ ānkālassa pārae*) the reading *vicittehiṃ*, too, is not really satisfactory (Schubring, *Worte Mahāvīras*, Göttingen 1926, 114, boldly takes *ganthehiṃ vicittehiṃ* as an abl. separ.: “So gelangt er ans Ende der Lebenszeit, heraus aus den mancherlei Fesselungen.”). Would it be possible that the first pāda (bad metre!) is merely an old gloss on *āsavehiṃ vicittehiṃ* that has crept into the text and was, then, supplemented by another – ready-made – pāda (11b = 25b)? By the way, *PSM* reads *vivitta* in both lines but takes it to have, in this passage only, the meaning *vividha, anekavidha* – a device which the reading *vicittehiṃ* renders unnecessary.

⁹⁶ E.g., *MN* I 23; for further occurrences see *CPD* s.v. ²*āsava* and *PTC* s.v. *avijjāsava*; cp. also, e.g., Frauwallner, *Gesch. d. ind. Phil.*, I, 170; 214 f.

⁹⁷ E.g., *Dhs* 195. Cp. *CPD* s.v. ²*āsava* and *PTC* s.v. *diṭṭhāsava*. In the Suttas, *diṭṭhāsava* occurs only at *DN* II 81, etc. (*Māhāparinibbānasutta*), but only in E^c and C^c, and is hence probably a later element. *MPS* does not mention the *āsravas* at all but has *rāgadveśamoha* instead (e.g., *MPS* 8.6). The notion of *diṭṭyāsava* appears to be missing also in *AKBh* (no such lemma in Hirakawa’s index!); cp. also its absence in the enumeration of *āsravas* at *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (ed. Pradhan) 49, 18 and *YBhū* 169, 16. It is, however, found at *Lalitavistara* 348, 21 f. (see *BHSD* s.v. *āsrava*).

⁹⁸ E.g., *AKBh* 306, 1 ff.; *YBhū* 166, 23 ff. At *Dhs* 195 ff., the *āsravas* are treated along with the *samyojanas*, etc., i.e. as *kleśas*, but still preserve their character as specific *kleśas* (cp. also *YBhū* 168, 12 ff.).

⁹⁹ Cp. Alsdorf 1965, 4.

¹⁰⁰ E.g., *As* p. 48; *AKBh* 308, 15.

¹⁰¹ *AN* I 124, where the simile of the sore emitting discharge (*āsava*), illustrating the mind of a person with evil mental dispositions, contrasts with the diamond as a simile of an

Yet, as Enomoto¹⁰³ has convincingly shown, there is, apart from an unspecific use of the term *ās(r)ava*, a considerable number of passages where the term does not (or not only) refer to evil mental states (i.e. *kleśas*) but is clearly used in a wider or even different sense, and one better fitting in with the original meaning at that.

On the one hand, Enomoto tries to show that in some texts the *ās(r)avas*, or what “flows in” (*āsavati, anvā(s)savati*),¹⁰⁴ are karma, or karmic “stuff”, so to speak, as with the Jains. The examples adduced by him¹⁰⁵ may not be fully satisfactory, for they are only implicit evidence, and even that only on the condition that parallel, but perhaps only apparently parallel concepts are equated. But *Sn* 913a (*pubbāsave hitvā nave akubbaṃ*) can hardly be interpreted otherwise than by taking the *āsavas* as karma (primarily in the sense of karmic stuff or impression).¹⁰⁶

On the other hand, *ās(r)ava* may, in Buddhist texts, too, also denote annoyances, trouble, suffering.¹⁰⁷ E.g., at *MN* I 361 killing living beings is said to entail *āsavā vighātapariḷāhā*,¹⁰⁸ the latter expression being obviously a kind of gloss.¹⁰⁹ As the immediately preceding sentence specifies that killing living beings entails self-reproach, blame from others and, after death, bad rebirth, there is good reason to understand *vighāta-pariḷāha* as “trouble and

arhat free from *āsavas* (i.e. evil mental states, etc.). This sutta may have stimulated taking the *āsravas* (= evil states of mind) as an outflow of the corresponding latent dispositions, or the like. Cp. Enomoto 1983, 23 f.

¹⁰² E.g., *As* p. 48; *AKBh* 308, 15; *Vibhāṣā* (T vol. 27) 244 ab. Cp. Kashiwahara 1978, 657 (below) f.

¹⁰³ Enomoto 1983.

¹⁰⁴ *anu-* may best be taken as indicating that the influx takes place after or in consequence of wrong attitudes or behaviour, lack of vigilance, etc.

¹⁰⁵ *Uv* I. 23–24 (Enomoto’s interpretation being, to be sure, supported by the verse quoted at *Nett* 184, 18–21: cp. Enomoto 1983, 27 n.27), and the “three *vidyās*” (*divyaṃ cakṣus*, etc.: *divyaṃ cakṣus* perceiving living beings being reborn in accordance with their karma, and *āsravakṣayajñāna* realizing one’s liberation through the vanishing of the *āsravas*). Cp. also Buddhaghosa’s interpretation of *AN* II 39 at *Mp* II 183, 17–20 = *Ps* I 61, 30–34.

¹⁰⁶ Cp. the parallel phrase at *AN* II 197 f. (a Buddhist is speaking, but uses the concepts of his Jinist interlocutor): *so navam kammaṃ na karoti, purāṇaṃ ca kammaṃ phussa phussa vyantikaroti*.

¹⁰⁷ Enomoto 1983, 19 ff. Cp. also Schmithausen 1981, 248 f. (ad n. 23); Norman 1990, 28.

¹⁰⁸ Cp. also *AN* II 196; IV 161 and 165 = *Vin* II 202; *AN* III 245 (= *DN* III 240; cp. *Saṅg* V 24): *āsavā vighātapariḷāhā* arising from desire (*kāma*), aversion (*byāpāda*), etc., and in the next sentence referred to by *vedanā*, hence obviously meaning some disagreeable feeling; *MN* I 9 ff. = *AN* III 387 ff. (concrete meaning of *āsavā vighātapariḷāhā* here somewhat ambiguous and, perhaps, fluctuating between suffering, unwholesome distress, and aversion and/or desire).

¹⁰⁹ *Ps* III 40 unconvincingly explains *āsavā* (pl.!) as *avijjāsavo* (Sg.!), but quite reasonably refers *vighāta* and *pariḷāha* not only to the suffering and “burning” involved in the *kleśas* but also to that connected with (karmic) retribution (*vipāka-dukkha, vipāka-pariḷāha*). Similarly *Ps* I 77 and *Mp* III 395: *āsavā* = the four *āsavā, vighāta-pariḷāhā* = the other *kilesā* or their *vipāka* in a future life; *Mp* III 175: *āsavā* = *kilesā, vighāta-pariḷāhā* = *dukkha* and bodily or mental “burning”. Cp. also *Sv* 1032 and *Mp* 321 f.

anguish"¹¹⁰ and *āsava* as denoting, in this passage, something like "trouble, annoyance". Similarly, *Vin* III 21¹¹¹ says that the monastic precepts are proclaimed for the sake of warding off (*saṃvara*) the *āsavas* of the present life (*ditṭhadhammika*) and preventing (*paṭighāta*) those of a future existence (*samparāyika*). The *āsavas* of the present life may of course be evil mental states or evil actions (cp. *Mp* 183, 14–16!), but the *āsavas* of a future existence which are to be prevented by keeping the monastic precepts are more probably bad rebirth or painful experience in a rebirth. This is in fact confirmed by Buddhaghosa,¹¹² who however explains even the *āsavas* belonging to this life as consisting of disagreeable things and experiences like blows, mutilation, dishonour or qualms.¹¹³

As Enomoto¹¹⁴ remarks, Buddhaghosa still knows and even makes explicit all the three different aspects of the concept of *ās(r)ava*, stating that it may mean *kilesa*, *kamma* or *upaddava*.¹¹⁵ On the other hand, these three aspects need not always have been neatly distinguished from each other, just as in the case of the concept *parissaya* which in the *Sāriputtasutta* (*Sn* 955 ff.: see § 2.2.1) comprises all of them side by side.

In view of the explicit equation of *parissayas* and *āsavas* at *Āyār* I.4.2.1 and the fact that at *Āyār* I.8.8.8–10¹¹⁶ the *āsavas* are probably¹¹⁷ dangers or annoyances like biting or stinging insects or other animals, or being bitten or stung by them, it appears that just as in the case of *parissava* so also in the case of *ās(r)ava* the most archaic meaning is "dangers"¹¹⁸ or "disturbances" rushing or intruding upon the ascetic, i.e. the meaning is that of *upadrava*. This aspect would even be an organic continuation of *AV* V.19.8¹¹⁹ where what intrudes – not yet, of course, upon ascetics but upon a country where brahmins are opposed – is a dangerous demon who is more or less equivalent to misfortune (*duccchumā*). It should, however, be added that we cannot, perhaps, presuppose, at this stage, a neat distinction of external and internal causes of distress or pain, nor a neat distinction of these causes and their

¹¹⁰ Cp. *BHSD* s.v. *vighāta*, *paridāgha* (3), and *paridāha*. Cp. also Buddhaghosa's explanation (see n. 109).

¹¹¹ Cp. also *AN* I 98.

¹¹² *Sp* 225: *samparāyikā āsavā nāma . . . samparāye narakādīsū pattabbā dukkhavisesā*. Cp. *Mp* II 164, 1 f. and 183, 23 f. (*apāyādūkkhabhūtā . . . nānappakārā upaddavā*).

¹¹³ *Sp* 225: *ditṭhadhammikā āsavā nāma . . . tasmim yeva attabhāve pattabbā pāpippahāra-dāḍḍappahāra-hatthaccheda-pādaccheda-akīlīti-ayasa-vippaṭisārādayo dukkhavisesā*. Cp. *Mp* II 163, 26 ff. and 183, 23 f.

¹¹⁴ Enomoto 1983, 23 + 28 n. 36.

¹¹⁵ *Mp* II 183, esp. l. 10–13; *Ps*. I 61 f.

¹¹⁶ See n. 95.

¹¹⁷ I.e., if, with Schubring, the reading *vicitteḥim* is preferred, and not *vivitteḥim* (see n. 95). Śīlānka, who has the latter reading, takes the *āsavas* as bad actions or "passions" (*kaṣāya*, ≈ Buddh. *kileśa*) [directed towards (?)] sense-objects.

¹¹⁸ Cp. *AN* I 98, where among several concepts parallel to *āsavā* we find, to be sure, *akusalā dhammā*, but also *bhaya*.

¹¹⁹ See n. 93.

effect, viz. distress or pain itself; at *Āyār* I.8.8.8–10, e.g., the latter meaning would fit the context equally well.¹²⁰

In their adaptation of the concept of *ās(r)ava*, both Jainas and Buddhists have tended, naturally enough, to shift emphasis to those "dangers" and "troubles" which they considered soteriologically relevant. For the Jainas, this means that the term came to refer, primarily,¹²¹ to karma, or to the influx of karmic substance.¹²² In Buddhism, on the other hand, the *ās(r)avas* are, to be sure, occasionally understood as, or at least as including, karma,¹²³ but the predominant tendency is to take them as unwholesome mental attitudes or states (i.e., to put it in later terminology, as *kileśas*). In some passages, however, the concept of *ās(r)ava* has preserved, beside the aspect of being soteriologically dangerous, also that of being uncomfortable or annoying in itself, here and now. This is, e.g., the case when what "flows in" (*ā-sru*) as a consequence of (*anu-*) not guarding one's sense-faculties is greed and displeasure (*domanassa*),¹²⁴ the latter concept comprising both unhappiness or distress and (soteriologically unwholesome) aversion.¹²⁵ Likewise, the occasional glossing of *āsavā* by *vighāta-pariḷhā* may, in some cases at least, imply "trouble" and "distress" as well as "desire".¹²⁶

In his Pillar Edicts, Aśoka uses the term *āsinava*,¹²⁷ probably an Eastern counterpart, at any rate a semantical equivalent, of *ās(r)ava*. The first occurrence is to be found at PE II C, in Aśoka's definition of *dhamma*.¹²⁸ Right conduct (*dhamma*) comprises "[having] little (or no)¹²⁹ *āsinava* and much

¹²⁰ Similarly, when at *AN* II 196 the Jinist interlocutor speaks of *dukkhavedaniyā āsavā* which may intrude upon a person in his next life, one wonders if these *āsavas* are to be taken as misfortune entailing suffering, or as characterized by (i.e., consisting in) suffering, or both. *Mp* III 175 says *dukkhavedanāya paccayabhūtā kileśā*. But such an explanation, implying as it does that in spite of complete *saṃvara* new *kileśas* may still "flow in", appears to be incompatible with the actual view of the Jainas. Moreover, *Mp*'s interpretation would require taking *abhisamparāyaṃ* not with *assaveyyuṃ* but with *dukkhavedaniya*, which in view of its position would seem to be quite improbable.

¹²¹ Not, however, exclusively: cp. n. 94 and n. 117.

¹²² See above (p. 123) + n. 94.

¹²³ See above (p. 125) + ns. 105 and 106.

¹²⁴ E.g., *MN* I 180: *yatvādhikaraṇam enaṃ . . . abhijjhādomanassā pāpakā akusalā dhammā anvāssaveyyuṃ*. For further references see *PTC* s.v. *abhijjhā*.

¹²⁵ Enomoto (1983, 20) takes *abhijjhā* as *rāga* but *domanassa* as a kind of unpleasant feeling (*vedanā*), not as a *kileśa*. But cp. Frauwallner, *AbhidSt* IV (1972), 114.

¹²⁶ Cp. *BHSD* s.v. *paridāgha* (2), *paridāha* (2), and *vighāta* (*vighāto me cīvareṇa* = "I need a robe").

¹²⁷ < **āsnava*, from **ā-snu*, *√snu* being semantically very close if not equivalent to *√sru*. In the Jaina sources, too, there is, besides *āsava* < *āsrava*, a form corresponding to **āsnava*, viz. *aṇhaya* (Schubring 1935, 113), although the only (possibly) early occurrence is, according to Enomoto (1979, 38 n. 2), *Uttarajjh* 29.26. In the Buddhist texts, no morphological equivalent of **āsnava* is found. Lüders' (*Beobachtungen* § 179) suggestion that the original text of *Sn* 535 and 370 may, for metrical reasons, have contained *āsinava* instead of *āsava* is called into question by Enomoto (loc. cit.), but it would seem that Aśoka's use of the term is most probably based on Buddhist, not Jaina, usage (see below, p. 128).

¹²⁸ PE II B–C: *kiyaṃ cu dhamme ti. apāsinave bahukayāne dayā dāne sace socaye* (v.l. *soceye ti*).

¹²⁹ Bloch 1950, 162 n. 2: "... *appa*, skr. *alpa*, est comme en pali l'équivalent de la négation".

kayāna". At PE II F, *kayāna* (Skt. *kalyāṇa*, "virtuous, beneficial") refers to good or wholesome actions.¹³⁰ Hence *āsinava*, as the antonym of *kayāna*, would seem to mean "bad action(s)". This is confirmed by PE III B-C,¹³¹ according to which *pāpa* in the sense of "bad actions" (cp. *pāpe kaṭe*) is not only the opposite of *kayāna*¹³² but also appears to be equated with *āsinava*. Besides, evil mental states like fury, cruelty, wrath, arrogance and jealousy are stated to lead to *āsinava*.¹³³ There is no difficulty in taking, here too, *āsinava* to mean "bad action(s)".

It does seem, to be sure, that Aśoka, when using the phrase "this is what is called *āsinava* (*āsinave nāma*)", is somehow aware of the fact that *āsinava* is a kind of technical term; but I do not perceive any clue suggesting that he uses it, with full consciousness, in the specific technical meaning it has acquired in Jainism, viz. "influx of (subtle) karmic stuff".¹³⁴ Anyway, it is not very probable that Aśoka, who had been, by that time, a Buddhist lay follower for almost 20 years,¹³⁵ should have taken his definition of a central religious concept like *āsinava/ās(r)ava* from Jainism. It is more likely that he started from the Buddhist use of the term, but, just as in the case of *palisava*, did so selectively, adjusting the concept to the requirements of his own *dhamma* close to lay Buddhist morality and at the same time acceptable to followers of other religious – especially Jainas – as well. For this reason he selected, from among the various aspects of the concept of *ās(r)ava* found in the Buddhist tradition, that of karma, in the sense of bad action(s).

It is hardly a mere coincidence that Aśoka's definition of *āsinava* is essentially identical with his definition of *palisava*. I consider it possible if not probable that in PE II and III Aśoka deliberately used *āsinava* instead of *palisava* because in the meantime (i. e. about 13 years later than RE X)¹³⁶ he had deepened his knowledge of the Buddhist doctrine and had realised that the usual term was *āsinava/ās(r)ava*, and not *palisava* which he had used in RE X, perhaps because he had, at that time, been particularly familiar with, or impressed by, texts like the *Sāriputtasutta*. Such an increased familiarity with Buddhist doctrine would seem to be perceptible also in Aśoka's state-

But in view of the opposition *apāsinave/bahukayāne* this may not apply here; perhaps rather: "[as] little *āsinava* [as possible], [as] much *kayāna* [as possible]".

¹³⁰ *aṃṇāni pi ca me bahūni kayāṇāni kaṭāni*. Cp. also RE V B-D; and, in Buddhist canonical texts, e. g. *MN* I 8 (*kalyāṇa-pāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ*); II 80; III 165 (*akataṃ . . . kalyāṇaṃ, . . . kataṃ pāpaṃ*); 171; 179; 181 f.; *Vj* III 78 (*kalyāṇakammasa saggakathaṃ*).

¹³¹ *kayānaṃmeva dekhanti* (v. l. °*khati*): *iyam me kayāne kaṭe ti, no mina pāpaṃ dekhanti* (v. l. °*khati*): *iyam me pāpe kaṭe ti, iyam vā* (v. l. *va*) *āsinave nāmā ti*.

¹³² Cp. also *MN* I 8, etc. (see n. 130).

¹³³ PE III F: *imāni āsinavagāṃīni nāmā ti, atha caṃḍiye niḥhūliye kodhe māne isyā . . .*

¹³⁴ Thus, e. g., Janert 1972, 42.

¹³⁵ According to MRE I (see n. 154: B-D), Aśoka became an *upāsaka* 2½ years (and a zealous one more than one year) before MRE I was dictated, which, according to Fussman 1982, 638, was in the 10th year after his consecration, whereas the PEs were dictated in the 26th (cp. PE V B) and 27th year (Fussman 1982, 639).

¹³⁶ According to Fussman (1982, 638), the REs stem from the 12th and 13th year after Aśoka's consecration (cp. RE III B, IV K, V I).

ment that what leads to *āsinava* (= bad action) is evil mental attitudes or states (fury, etc.).

As in the case of *palisava*, the chronological significance of Aśoka's use of *āsinava* is difficult to assess.

One could argue for a very short chronology if the transition from *palisava* in RE X to *āsinava* in PE II and III could be taken as a contemporary reflection of a change in Buddhist terminology, and if the verse suttas in which *parissaya* appears to be a "living" term could be regarded as forming an archaic textual layer preceding those layers which use only *āsava*. Such an assumption is, however, not sufficiently warranted since the term *parissaya* may just as well have been peculiar to a certain group (see § 2.2.1) and Aśoka's use of it the result of limited familiarity with the Buddhist lore, or of predilection.

Another possibility to argue for a short chronology would be to maintain that Aśoka's concept of *āsinava/ās(r)ava* as "bad action(s)" is archaic. But this cannot be taken for granted either. For what appears to be the most archaic meaning of *ās(r)ava* is that of (primarily external) dangers or disturbances, like (being threatened or pestered by) dangerous or troublesome animals, and perhaps the distress or pain this entails. It is true that Aśoka's use of the term presupposes not the "classical" but the earlier, broader concept of *ās(r)ava* that is not yet confined to unwholesome mental states but may include dangers or disturbances and distress or pain as well as bad actions or demerit. But it is difficult to estimate how long it took until this broader, less definite use came to be supplanted by a consistent reduction of the *ās(r)avas* to unwholesome mental states. Besides, such a development may already have started at Aśoka's time but not yet have prevailed, and may hence have been overlooked by him, or even deliberately ignored because it was less suitable for his purpose.

What may, however, be concluded from Aśoka's repeated use of the term *āsinava* in PE II and III – provided that in his later years he was indeed sufficiently familiar with the Buddhist lore – is that in his time this term was still a central concept of Buddhism, and had not yet been largely replaced by the more "modern" terms *anuśaya*¹³⁷ and *kleśa*¹³⁸ prevailing in the Abhidharma period. But this fact is of little help in deciding the question of the short or long chronology since it would doubtless fit in with both.

2.3.1

Another point to be considered is Aśoka's reference to the yonder world and to the gods. Aśoka often juxtaposes or contrasts this world with the yonder world (*pala-loka*, *palata*, etc.) or with heaven (*svaga*), but he does

¹³⁷ Used only once by Aśoka (RE XIII D) but, in spite of Bloch (1950, 126 + n.6) and Schneider (1978, 140 f.), hardly in the technical sense of "evil disposition" but rather to mean "regret" (cp. Edgerton 1952, 116 f.).

¹³⁸ Not in Aśoka.

not mention *nirvāṇa*.¹³⁹ Sircar¹⁴⁰ suggests that this fact may point to a kind of "precanonical" Buddhism. If this were correct, it would doubtless favour a short chronology. G. Roth,¹⁴¹ however, rejects Sircar's view and, instead, thinks of an acknowledgement of common people's belief in a heaven or paradise. One may also regard Aśoka's statements as expressing the typical view of the Buddhist lay follower¹⁴² who strives after an agreeable existence within the world, preferably in heaven, but not, or at least not yet in his present life, after Nirvāṇa.¹⁴³ In this, he is hardly different from the ordinary Hindu or from the Jain layman. Some difference may lie in the means, in the *dharma* practised to attain heaven: for Hindus, the decisive means was probably still ritual¹⁴⁴ or, for a *ksatriya*, also heroic death in battle,¹⁴⁵ whereas for the Buddhists and Jainas the essential element for attaining heaven was, almsgiving and donations apart, morality, just as in the *dhamma* enjoined by Aśoka. On the other hand, we cannot perhaps be sure that to a layman the goal of Buddhist soteriology must necessarily have seemed something utterly different from heaven, especially in early times when the term *nirvāṇa* would seem to have not yet become dominant at the cost of more traditional ones like *amṛta*.¹⁴⁶

2.3.2

A position somewhat similar to that of Sircar appears to be advocated, in a recent paper, by D. Schlingloff.¹⁴⁷ Basing himself on MRE I E and RE IV B, Schlingloff maintains that Aśoka assumed and even declared that the essence, or essentially new contribution, of Buddhism was to impart to people the faculty of vision of heavenly beings and spheres, or of a visionary ascent to heaven and union with the gods.¹⁴⁸ In other words: from Schlingloff's point of view, the new contribution of original Buddhism would have been nothing but showing a new way, viz. meditative vision or visualization of gods or visionary ascent to heaven, towards the old Vedic goal, viz. the

¹³⁹ Cp. Sircar 1979, 69; Schneider 1980, 149; Basham 1982, 141.

¹⁴⁰ Cp. Sircar, loc. cit.

¹⁴¹ Roth 1982, 39 = 1986, 374.

¹⁴² My use of terms like "lay Buddhism" should not create the impression that I advocate a strict dichotomy of monastic and lay Buddhism in reality, in everyday life. In view of observations like those presented in Schopen 1984, this would surely be misleading, at least for later centuries. But I need some term to distinguish the religious ideas and practices of lay people, even if they were to a large extent shared (or even initiated) by monks and nuns, from the typically monastic aspects of Buddhism, from the whole complex of what one may perhaps call "monastic soteriology", in which lay followers did not normally engage, and which was probably, at least later on, too distant a goal even for many if not for most monks and nuns.

¹⁴³ Cp. MN I 483 (*natthi kho . . . koci gihī gihī-samyojanam appahāya kāyassa bheda dukkhass' antakaro . . . atha kho bhīyyo va ye gihī . . . saggūpagā*); cp. also DN II 272 ff.

¹⁴⁴ Cp. the prohibition of ritual slaughter at RE I B.

¹⁴⁵ For possible *ksatriya* background of Aśoka's eschatology see § 2.3.3 and n. 194.

¹⁴⁶ Cp. Vetter 1988, 5 f.; 8 f.; 15 f.

¹⁴⁷ Schlingloff 1985.

¹⁴⁸ *Ib.*, 330, 19–22; 333, 31 f.

attainment of heaven, and of a fairly popular, sensual heaven at that; and this means that the nirvāṇic soteriology ubiquitous in the canonical texts (where *svarga* is, as far as I can see, never used to designate the ultimate religious goal) would have to be regarded as a later development, to be explained somehow or other.¹⁴⁹

This view, too, implying as it does that the Aśokan inscription reflect an original form of Buddhism considerably diverging from that of the bulk of the canonical texts, would doubtless strongly support a short, if not extremely short chronology.

Yet, I for one cannot but submit serious reserves against Schlingloff's exegesis of the pertinent passages¹⁵⁰ as well as against the conclusions he draws from them.

When one tries to ascertain the precise import of the expression *misamdevā*¹⁵¹ or *misā devehi* ("mixed, i. e. associated, with the gods") at MRE I E

¹⁴⁹ Cp. also Southwold (1983), who holds that "authentic" Buddhism is, and always has been (117, 28), similar to contemporary Sinhalese village Buddhism (5), the essence of which is morality and social ethics, not ritual (163 ff.; 175 f.). As one of his proofs, Southwold adduces the testimony of the Aśokan inscriptions (117; 175 ff.). The "escapist" (124) soteriology of monastic Buddhism is regarded, by Southwold, as a transformation of Buddhism due to an "élite among the saṅgha" (175, 1), and it was this élite that composed the Buddhist scriptures (115 f.). This is not the right place for a critical discussion of Southwold's view (for some remarks cp. G. D. Bond in: *JLAS* 8.2/1985, 133–135; R. Gombrich in: *TLS*, March 29, 1985, 359 f.). For the chronological problem of this symposium, Southwold's position would seem to imply that there is little chance to estimate the distance of time between the Buddha and Aśoka on the basis of ideas and religious practices, since the "authentic" Buddhism testified to by Aśoka is taken to be a fairly stable element throughout the history of Buddhism, whereas the "escapist" innovations of the élite among the clerics – which might signalize development and hence a certain lapse of time – are not testified to in Aśoka's inscriptions, at least not expressly; and if – ignoring, to be sure, the uncertainties of identification – we take the references to dwelling and meditating in solitude in some of the scriptures especially recommended by Aśoka (e. g., Sn 213 or 221 [*"Munigāthā"*]) as indirect evidence for "escapist" soteriology, such evidence would rather cast doubts on Southwold's view than support the long chronology.

¹⁵⁰ Schlingloff rightly does not make use of PE II D (*cakkhudāne pi me bahwidhe diṃne*). At first glance, one might be tempted to understand *cakkhudāna* as "imparting vision" (cp. *cakkhumdada* at Th 3) and to refer the sentence, in Schlingloff's sense, to Aśoka's imparting – by supporting Buddhism – to his subjects the faculty of vision of heavenly beings (cp. the *dibbaṃ cakkhu* at passages like Ud 88). But would it not, in this case, be equally possible to refer *cakkhudāna* to the *dharmacakṣus* and to Aśoka's promulgation of his *dhamma* among his subjects? Apart from this, Thommen (*Die Wortstellung im nachvedischen Altindischen und im Mittelindischen*, Gütersloh 1903, p. 38, n. 1; cp. Janert 1972, 37) is probably right in pointing out that on account of the position of *me* in the following sentence one should not punctuate after *diṃne* but after *vālicalesu* and understand the sentence to mean rather that Aśoka has paid manifold attention to bipeds and quadrupeds, birds and aquatic animals.

¹⁵¹ In contrast to P. Meile (1949, 204), I regard this unusual compound (cp., perhaps, with Meile, loc. cit., *AiGr* II, 1, 67 and 310: *samambhūmi* "dem Erdboden gleich") as the original wording because all other readings can, directly or by way of a variant **misādevā* (for alternation *-am/ā* cp., e. g., RE I D, IV A, IV B, IV G, IX C; cp., perhaps, the remark in Janert 1972, 99 [last sentence]), be understood as its explications or (mis)interpretations, whereas I for one do not see how they could be derived from an original wording *misā devehi*; this latter reading is, however, easily understood as a secondary replacement of the difficult com-

from the context, it becomes clear that it does not, at least not primarily, refer to meditative vision of gods nor to their real appearance on earth¹⁵² or to processions with images of gods, etc.,¹⁵³ nor to public appearances of the king,¹⁵⁴ but rather to the attainment of heaven after death. For the argument of MRE I B–H, reduced to what matters here, runs as follows:¹⁵⁵

B: Formerly, Aśoka, though he had become a [Buddhist] lay follower, was not zealous.

C–D: Recently, through closer contact with the Order, he had become very zealous.

E–F: People in Jambudvīpa, who had not been *misamdeva*, have recently been made *misamdeva*, due to zeal.¹⁵⁶

G: This is not attainable by noble or mighty persons only, but common people also, if zealous, can attain heaven.

H: The purpose of the edict is that both noble and common people should be zealous.

G would be altogether incoherent if “this” and “attaining heaven” were different. “This”, however, unambiguously resumes *misamdeva*. Hence, *misamdeva* is equivalent to “attaining heaven”. “Attaining heaven”, however, is, in Aśoka’s inscriptions, clearly connected with the “yonder world”,¹⁵⁷ i.e., refers to man’s destiny after death. Consequently, *misamdeva* means, at least primarily, “one who will be associated with the gods [after death]”, and this is, of course, implied also in the Vedic expression *miśrā devébhiḥ*.¹⁵⁸

pound *misamdevā* by the well-known Vedic formula (cp. n. 158; Meile 1949, 203) on which this compound was doubtless based.

¹⁵² Schlingloff 1985, 330, referring to Basham and Meile.

¹⁵³ Schlingloff 1985, 328 and ns. 14–17.

¹⁵⁴ Filliozat 1949.

¹⁵⁵ As for the text, see Sircar 1979, 132 ff.; cp. also Roth 1982, 34 (ff.) = 1986, 369 (ff.). I give the Eastern version, of Ahaurā (cp. also Janert 1972, 152 f. and 267 ff. [facs.]) and Sahasrām, filling the lacunae (in round brackets) with the wording of other versions:

B–C: [sā]dh[ikā](ni adhāt)iyāni saṃvachalāni aṃ upāsake sumi, no ca (Sah.: cu) bādham palakamte /

D: savachale sādhike aṃ (mama) [Bai.] saṃghe upa-y-ite [Niṭṭ.], bādham ca palakamte /

E–F: etena (Sah. add: ca) aṃtalena Jambudīpasi amisamdevā samta(m) munisā misamdevā kaṭā / palaka[masa] iyaṃ phale /

G: no (ca) [i]yaṃ mahat[va]n(ā) (Sah.: -tatā(?)) va cakiye papotave / khudakena pi palakamamīnēnā vipule pi suage (Ah. svage) cakiye ālādhetao /

H: etāye aṃhāye iyaṃ sāvane: khudakā ca udālā ca palakamamtu . . .

¹⁵⁶ I.e., primarily, due to the king’s zeal [in promulgating Buddhist lay morality] (cp. RE VI L: see n. 160), but of course also due to the people’s own zeal in practising it (cp. n. 162). There is an obvious shift of the logical subject of “being zealous”: at B–D it is clearly the king, whereas at G–H it is (noble and) common people. As for F, the logic of the argument as a whole (B–H) would seem to require taking it as (virtually) referring to both.

¹⁵⁷ Cp., e.g., RE VI L: . . . palata ca svagam ālādhayaṃtu.

¹⁵⁸ AV IV.14.2; cp. VS 17.65; TS 4.6.5; ŚBr 9.2.3.24; Meile 1949, 203; Schlingloff 1985, 330 n. 38.

on which Aśoka’s term is based,¹⁵⁹ and it is moreover supported by a parallel statement at RE VI L.¹⁶⁰

I do not entirely exclude the possibility that the expression *misamdeva* might also allude to some – visionary or other – anticipation, in this life, of this future association with the gods, just as in Vedic religion the association with the gods after death is anticipated during the ritual; but this would be at best a possible, secondary allusion, and not the primary import of the expression. Hence, all that can be safely understood from this edict is that under the influence of the Buddhist Order Aśoka had recently become zealous and had thereby succeeded in making the attainment of heaven [after death] accessible even to common people, provided that they too were zealous. In view of parallels like RE X C–D,¹⁶¹ it is natural to understand the zeal of the king as directed not towards imparting to his subjects visions of divine beings but rather towards the promulgation of moral behaviour, in the sense of – more or less – Buddhist lay morality, for the sake of attaining heaven, and to understand the zeal of people as directed towards the practice¹⁶² (and also further promulgation)¹⁶³ of this morality.

In RE IV Aśoka states that in the past for many centuries immoral practices like slaughtering animals and improper behaviour towards relatives or ascetics and brahmins had even increased (A), whereas now, thanks to Aśoka’s *dhamma* instruction, an unprecedented increase in moral practice and proper behaviour has taken place (C). In between these two sentences, which contrast the past and the present in a way similar to MRE I B–F, Aśoka refers to the manifestation of heavenly palaces, elephants (i.e. the mounts of the gods),¹⁶⁴ masses of fire (i.e. the gods themselves),¹⁶⁵ and other divine appearances. The question is whether, with Schlingloff, these manifestations are in fact to be understood as meditative visions.

However the sentence – the wording and syntax of which unfortunately presents various difficulties – is construed:¹⁶⁶ contrary to the opinion of most

¹⁵⁹ In this connection, it should be noted that MRE I G may well allude to the contrast between, on the one hand, Aśoka’s (and the lay Buddhist) *dharma* (according to which *svarga* is accessible to everybody through moral behaviour) and, on the other, the Vedic religion where the attainment of *svarga* is dependent on costly rituals.

¹⁶⁰ aṃ ca kichi palakamāmi hakaṃ ki(m)ti . . . palata . . . svagam ālādhayaṃtu (ti) [Round brackets: variant readings].

¹⁶¹ See n. 81. Cp. also RE X A.

¹⁶² Cp. SepE I (“II”) Bloch 1950, 142, 25 ff. (Alsdorf, *KISchr*, 493, 2 ff.). Cp. also RE X E.

¹⁶³ Cp. RE IX J–K (Dh/Jg/Gi).

¹⁶⁴ Cp. Schlingloff 1985, 329 + n. 30.

¹⁶⁵ Cp. *ibid.*, 329 + n. 31.

¹⁶⁶ If the version of Dh (Jg is lacunous) is followed (Alsdorf, *KISchr*, 435; cp. also Norman’s [JOIB 18/1968–69, 230 f.] remarks on Sh) and B–C taken as one sentence (with *bhelighosaṃ* . . . *dasayitu janasa* as a parenthesis after which the main thread is resumed by means of a summary repetition of A and the beginning of B), . . . *dasayitu* . . . would point to a means or prerequisite of Aśoka’s *dhammacalana* (which probably includes *dhamma* instruction (*dhammānusathi*: C)). If the reading of Er etc., viz. *bhelighose*, etc., is adopted and punctuation inserted after *dhodhammaghose* (cp., e.g., Filliozat 1957, 6), . . . *dasayitu* . . . doubtless refers to a means or prerequisite to Aśoka’s *dhammānusathi* (C). If, on the other hand, punctuation is made after *janasa* (cp., e.g., Hultzsch 1925; Schneider 1978, 125 f.), . . .

scholars,¹⁶⁷ the divine manifestations at RE IV B can hardly correspond to people's "association with the gods" at MRE I E, which is the result of (Aśoka's) zeal (in promulgating the dharma, and of people's zeal in practising it); rather they are a means utilized by Aśoka, in the context of his *dharma* instruction, in order to motivate people to exert themselves in moral behaviour. I.e., the function of these divine manifestations was probably to incite people to *dharma* practice by presenting them a visual illustration of its marvelous result^{168, 169} viz. the heavenly world one will attain after death. Theoretically speaking, meditative vision of divine appearances would serve the purpose perfectly. But Schlingloff himself¹⁷⁰ points out that the faculty of such kind of vision is a "suprahuman" (*uttari-manussa-dhamma*) one not available even to most monks, let alone to ordinary laymen and common people whom nevertheless Aśoka wanted to win for his *dharma*. One would hence have to assume some kind of mass movement in Buddhist meditative vision or visualization. But this is, to my mind, hardly more probable than the assumption of processions with artistic representations, or the like. Actually, in the canonical texts what motivates the desire to be reborn among the gods is not usually meditative vision but hearing about the excellence of their existence.¹⁷¹

One may argue that some of the terms used by Aśoka in connection with the divine manifestations are also found in Buddhist sources with the same meaning¹⁷² and particularly in the context of meditative visions.¹⁷³ Yet, it will

dasayitu ... would, once again, point to a means or method to Aśoka's *dhammacalana*, either introduced (??) or, more probably, accompanied by *bhelighosa* and *ahodhammaghosa* (see n. 168). The subject of *dasayitu* is hardly (with Schlingloff 1985, 327f.) *bheli-* or (*aho-*) *dhammaghosa* but rather Aśoka himself or, virtually, his commissioners (cp. Schneider 1978, 107).

¹⁶⁷ E.g., Hultzsich in: *JRAS* 1913, 653; Meile 1949, 198 ff. and 216 f.; contrary view: Filliozat 1949, 245.

¹⁶⁸ Cp. the expression *ahodhammaghose* (*-ghosa(m)*), which may either, like the sound of drums, refer to the announcement of the divine appearances as the marvelous effect of practising the *dhamma*, or to the admiration expressed by the spectators (cp. the fact that in at least some of the *Mahāvastu* passages where it occurs [e.g., *Mvu* I 236, 8; 241, 12; II 406, 11] the exclamation *aho dharmah* is, just like the sound of drums in passages like *DN* II 106 or 156, the reaction to some remarkable event). – Taking *aho* as a verb (aorist/preterite of *bhū*) would seem to involve serious difficulties (cp. Filliozat 1957, 4 ff.). Formal problems apart, it appears that the aorist/preterite is used in the Aśokan inscriptions, similarly as in Pāli (cp. H. Bechert in: *MSS* 3, rev. reprint, 1958, 58), to denote either a fact of the past contrasted to the present (RE I F; VIII A, B; MRE I B–C [Br., etc.] and E [Rūpn., etc.]; PE 7 B, E) or an event in the past (RE VIII C; PE 7 D, J), whereas the sentence under discussion clearly refers to the present in contrast to the past.

¹⁶⁹ Cp. Schneider 1978, 126, referring to Hultzsich.

¹⁷⁰ Schlingloff 1985, 331 ff.

¹⁷¹ Cp., e.g., *AN* IV 239 f. (No. 8.4.5); *MN* III 99 ff. (No. 120); *SN* III 243 ff. (No. 29.7 ff.; esp. 29.11).

¹⁷² Cp. Schlingloff 1985, 329, esp. n. 31 [canonical passages describing gods as appearing like a mass of fire (*aggikkhandha*)].

¹⁷³ *DN* I 152 (*dibbāni ... rūpāni passāmi*); cp. *AN* IV 302; *MN* III 157. – In connection with the version of Dh (and that of Sh? [see n. 166]) where *bhelighosa* and *ahodhammaghosa*, too, are objects of *dasayitu* it is noteworthy that at *DN* I 152 f., too, the vision of divine

be difficult to exclude the possibility that the Buddhists took over at least some of the ideas involved from popular Vedic or post-Vedic belief, just as they did with the gods Śakra and Brahman. And even if Aśoka had been inspired by specifically Buddhist meditative vision, this would not exclude that he tried to popularize the contents of these visions by means of artistic representations, nor would it imply that he considered meditative vision of gods or visionary ascent to heaven to be the heart of Buddhism. As Schlingloff himself states,¹⁷⁴ the main aim of the king was to exhort his subjects to moral behaviour, and the divine manifestations were meant to promote such moral behaviour. Hence, it is more likely that what Aśoka considered the most important aspect of Buddhism was its stress on moral behaviour and the fact that Buddhism regarded moral behaviour, and not ritual, etc., as the means for attaining heaven. This, however, does not mean that moral behaviour in order to attain heaven was in fact the most important aspect of Buddhism as a whole in Aśoka's time. However, it may well have been, and most probably was, the central aspect of the lay Buddhism of those days. But since this may have been the case for a considerable period from earliest Buddhism onward, I for one cannot discover in this point any clue so far for drawing chronological conclusions.

As against this, meditative vision or visualization of gods would be a much more specific issue. But even if it were conceded that Aśoka regarded such visions as the most important element of Buddhism, this would not, as Schlingloff himself remarks,¹⁷⁵ mean that they were in fact the heart of earliest Buddhism, since Aśoka may have selected some later or marginal element because it served his purpose. In order to prove that meditative vision of heavenly beings was a central element of earliest Buddhism, it is, of course, not sufficient to trace it in any canonical text since the canon is suspected to contain layers of different age; what is required is its occurrence, as a crucial issue, in a text the early origin of which is beyond doubt. Schlingloff¹⁷⁶ thinks he can meet this requirement by adducing a passage from the *Prātimokṣasūtra*, viz. *Pārājika* 4, stating that a monk who falsely pretends to possess superhuman (*uttari-manussadhamma*) insight (*nāṇa-dassana*)¹⁷⁷ is to be expelled from the Order. Yet, Schlingloff's specification of superhuman *nāṇadassana* as vision and meditative experience of divine manifestations is based on other sources, which are of doubtful antiquity,¹⁷⁸ and even on later exegesis and dogmatics,¹⁷⁹ and not on the *Prātimo-*

appearances (*rūpa*) is associated with an audition of divine sounds. Cp. also *dibbaṃ sotaṃ* besides *dibbaṃ cakkuṃ* in the *abhiññā* lists.

¹⁷⁴ Schlingloff 1985, 330, 23–25.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 330, 28 ff.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 331.

¹⁷⁷ A quasi-synonym compound, cp. *Vin* I 11 = *SN* V 423 *nāṇaṃ ca pana me dassanaṃ udapādi*, and the verbal expression *evaṃ jānato evaṃ passato* (e.g., *DN* I 84). Cp. also the explanation of the *Vinayavibhaṅga* (*Vin* III 91): *yaṃ nāṇaṃ taṃ dassanaṃ, yaṃ, dassanaṃ taṃ nāṇaṃ*.

¹⁷⁸ I.e., on precisely those elements of the *Dīghanikāya* version of what I have called the

ksasūtra itself, which does not supply any clue to such an interpretation. To be sure, *nāṇadassana* does occasionally have such a meaning,¹⁸⁰ but in other passages it occurs in a soteriological context, referring, e.g., to liberating insight into the four Noble Truths¹⁸¹ or, as in the *Vinayavibhaṅga* on Pārājika 4, to the "three *vidyās*"¹⁸² which include the realization of Arhatship.¹⁸³ Hence, Pārājika 4 does not necessarily refer to visions of divine manifestations in the sense of Schlingloff's interpretation of RE IV B; and even if it did, this would not necessarily mean that such visions were the core of earliest Buddhism; for since the *Prātimokṣasūtra* is not concerned with Buddhist spirituality as such but with securing proper external behaviour of monks and nuns, especially with reference to society, the sharp condemnation of pretending to such visions would merely mean that such faculties mattered a lot to society, i. e., to lay people, and that falsely pretending to possess such visions was sharply resented by them and would have considerably detracted from the reputation of the Order.

To be sure, there is, in the canonical texts, a variety of materials referring to visions or visualizations of heavenly beings or to techniques for being reborn in heaven, and a detailed investigation of these materials would probably yield interesting results. But it would also exceed the limits of this paper.

Yet, it may be allowed to propose an – admittedly quite preliminary – hypothetical alternative to the opinion expressed by Schlingloff:

In view of the uncertainties involved in Aśoka's statements, I for one cannot see any cogent reason for questioning the impression conveyed by the canonical texts that in the beginning the Buddha and his disciples were concerned with soteriology, i. e., with striving for an imperturbable state, once for ever removed from the vicissitudes of mundane existence; a state not necessarily entirely different, in every regard, from the ultimate goal of Vedic tradition – and hence likewise called *amṛta* – but certainly lacking the sensual aspects often associated with the latter. This imperturbable state was attained or secured by the abandonment of all mundane attachment and

„Stereotyped Detailed Description” of the path to Awakening or Liberating Insight (Schmithausen 1981, 204) which are missing in the Majjhima and Aṅguttara versions.

¹⁷⁹ Schlingloff 1985, 333, 8f. and 14ff.

¹⁸⁰ Cp. esp. AN IV 302: *sace kho ahaṃ . . . rūpāni . . . passeyyaṃ, evaṃ me idaṃ nāṇadassanaṃ parisuddhataraṃ assā ti*; 304: *ādhideva-nāṇadassanaṃ*. Cp. DN II 256 (. . . *nāṇaṃ amanu-sāna dassanaṃ*).

¹⁸¹ Vin I 11 (*ariyasaccesu . . . yathābhūtaṃ nāṇadassanaṃ*); cp. also the context of the verbal equivalent (see n. 177) in passages like DN I 84.

¹⁸² The three *vidyās* include, to be sure, the Divine Eye (*dibbaṃ cakkhū*), which comprises a vision of beings attaining rebirth in heaven in accordance with their karma. But it also comprises, at least in this context, a vision of beings being reborn in the underworld/hell, and serves as a prelude to Liberating Insight. Hence, its purpose is, in this context, not to illustrate the bliss of heaven but to reveal the principle of karma and rebirth, with a view to the unsatisfactoriness of all mundane existence. Its frame of reference is the attainment not of *svarga* but of *nirvāṇa*.

¹⁸³ Cp. Vin I 11 (= SN V 423; cp. MN I 167): *nāṇaṃ ca me dassanaṃ udapādi “akuppā me vimutti . . .” ti*.

craving, this abandonment being, originally¹⁸⁴ and at least in one current of the canonical period,¹⁸⁵ entailed in or achieved through meditative absorption anticipating it, at least approximately. On the other hand, since the establishment of a kind of exchange relation with lay followers appears to have been characteristic of Buddhism more or less from the outset, it must have been inevitable to formulate, quite early, what a lay follower who was unable or unwilling to quit family life and abandon all mundane attachment had to do and what goal he could still hope to attain; and it would not be implausible that the Buddha or his disciples accepted the common, traditional goal of people, viz. heaven in its popular, more sensuous form (but unreliable as to its permanence), and specified the way for its attainment by emphasizing, besides liberality, moral behaviour instead of ritual ceremonies, etc. But there was room for elaboration, e.g., by introducing or recognizing different levels in the heavenly worlds. And especially when less serious or spiritually less successful monks, too, became more interested in these heavenly worlds it must have been natural for them to use or develop techniques of meditation and meditative absorption – which had in fact been a core element of Buddhism from the outset – also in the context of the attainment or visionary anticipation of heavenly spheres.

From such an – admittedly hypothetical – point of view, visions of heavenly abodes and beings, if they are indeed referred to at RE IV B and if they were indeed inspired by Buddhism, would rather point to a certain lapse of time in the development of Buddhism, though by no means necessarily a long one.

2.3.3

A considerably different result is, however, obtained when one compares Aśoka's view on destiny after death with the various stages of the Buddhist doctrine of karma and rebirth.

According to the perceptive investigation by T. Vetter,¹⁸⁶ the view prevailing in the earliest texts appears to have been that man is reborn either in heaven or in the underworld, in accordance with his good or bad deeds or behaviour, and that he will return to human existence after some time. This view (which may be regarded as an ethicized¹⁸⁷ recast of the old concept of rebirth Witzel¹⁸⁸ postulates for the Vedic period) differs considerably from the full-fledged theory of the five *gatis* (heavenly beings, men, *pitṛs/pretas*, animals, and inhabitants of hell) according to which any living being may

¹⁸⁴ Cp. Vetter 1988, XXVII and 4ff.

¹⁸⁵ Schmithausen 1981, 214 ff.; id., in: Bechert, *Schulz.*, vol. 2 (1987), 350 f.

¹⁸⁶ Vetter 1988, 78 and 80f.

¹⁸⁷ Cp. G. Obeyesekere in: W. D. O'Flaherty (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition*, Berkeley etc. 1980, 137 ff., esp. 147 ff.

¹⁸⁸ M. Witzel, "The Oldest Form of the Idea of Rebirth", in: T. Yamamoto (ed.) *Proceedings of the 31st International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa Tokyo-Kyoto 1983*, Tokyo 1984, 145 f.

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directly be reborn, according to its karma, in any class of beings,¹⁸⁹ and which appears to be the result of a development¹⁹⁰ requiring a certain lapse of time.

Now, in the Aśokan inscriptions, there is no mention of rebirth as an animal or *preta* nor even of a return to the world of men, nor is there any instance of rebirth or transmigration terminology (like *upa-pad, cym, praty-ā-jan*).¹⁹¹ The only thing we find is that (as already stated in § 2.3.1) Aśoka contrasts, with this world, the yonder world (*palaloka*, etc.), and that he seems to equate the yonder world more or less with heaven (*svaga, suaga*)¹⁹² which will be attained (*āladhi*) by those who zealously practise his *dhamma*, i. e. moral behaviour. There is no mention of an underworld or hell as an alternative for people not practising the *dhamma* or doing evil. Only once¹⁹³ does Aśoka say that not acting in accordance with his admonition will entail great loss or misfortune (*apāya*), but the subsequent sentence shows that this does not refer to an underworld, let alone hell, but simply means that such a person will not attain heaven (nor the favour of the king).

Provided that the information the inscriptions yield on Aśoka's view on man's destiny after death is tolerably complete, this view doubtless looks fairly archaic. In so far as it does not mention an underworld or hell as a place where evil-doers go after death, nor return from heaven to the human world, it clearly looks even more archaic than what appears to be the oldest rebirth theory in the Buddhist canon. In this regard, it rather comes close to the dominant tenor of the Vedic Saṃhitā and Brāhmaṇa texts or to the old *kṣatriya* eschatology,¹⁹⁴ which emphasize the attainment of heaven but are (though with exceptions, especially in the strata familiar with the notion of *punarmytyu*) mostly tacit about its duration, and mention the underworld only sporadically. Of course, Aśoka's view differs from Vedic belief by basing attainment of heaven not on ritual or death in battle but, like Buddhism and Jainism, on moral behaviour; but apart from this it shows nothing specifically Buddhist.

It is not easy to assess the chronological implications of this evidence. Of course, Aśoka's silence on rebirth is not sufficient to prove that in his time Buddhism had not yet developed or adopted the theory of rebirth (and hence was still in a "precanonical" state and therefore probably a comparatively young movement). On the other hand, it would require explanation

¹⁸⁹ SN V 474 ff.

¹⁹⁰ Vetter 1988, 78–84.

¹⁹¹ See also Schneider 1978, 169; 1980, 149.

¹⁹² Cp. PE IV E (Bloch 1950, 164, 5 f.) and IV N (Bloch 165, 6 f.) beside RE VI L and MRE I G; SepE I ("II") Bloch 141, 25 ff. (Alsdorf, *KISchr*, 493, 3 ff.) beside 142, 27 ff. (Alsdorf, *KISchr*, 493, 24 f.).

¹⁹³ SepE II ("I") Bloch 138, 25 ff. (Alsdorf, *KISchr*, 495, 3 ff.).

¹⁹⁴ Viz. the belief that warriors dying as heroes in battle go to Indra's heaven (cp. RV 10.154.3; in connection with Aśoka: Schneider 1978, 169; 1980, 149). This belief is, by the way, expressly rejected in SN IV 308 f. (No. 42.3).

why Aśoka should deliberately and consistently have avoided reference to rebirth and underworld/hell had these concepts already been as dominant as later on. But his silence may be understandable if these ideas were, in his time, not, or not yet, current or prominent in certain circles (e. g., Brahmanism, or among *kṣatriyas*, or common people) and hence ignored by him in favour of a kind of common denominator, or if he himself, and perhaps even (some or most?) lay Buddhists at his time, still stuck to a view closer to the Vedic or *kṣatriyic* one than to those documented by the Buddhist canon. In the latter case, it would seem rather improbable that Buddhism – for which, at least according to what is documented in the canonical texts, the doctrine of *samsāra* appears to be essential – had already been in existence for more than two centuries. At any rate, the archaic character of the view on man's destiny after death documented in the Aśokan inscriptions, though perhaps not entirely irreconcilable with the long chronology, would excellently, and more naturally, fit in with a shorter one.

2.4

One may object to the preceding considerations that the fact that Aśoka prescribes animal *ahiṃsā* shows that he believed in the possibility of being reborn as an animal. But this objection is not conclusive. As was indicated before,¹⁹⁵ in Buddhism, too, the possibility of being reborn as an animal appears to have been envisaged, at least systematically, only at a somewhat later stage of development, but not to injure animals is expressly enjoined by the *Prātimokṣasūtra*,¹⁹⁶ and there is nothing to indicate that it was not an essential element of Buddhist morality from the very outset. To the Buddhist monk and nun, even injuring plants is interdicted in the *Prātimokṣasūtra*¹⁹⁷ and in some other canonical texts,¹⁹⁸ but the idea of being reborn as a plant is, to my knowledge, not attested in any Indian Buddhist text. In Vedic texts, too, injuring animals, plants and even the earth must be avoided or undone by ritual means,¹⁹⁹ although rebirth theories expressly comprising these beings are not found in the older sources.²⁰⁰ In the so-called story of "Bhṛgu in the yonder world",²⁰¹ animals, plants and even water take, in the yonder world (or on the way to it?),²⁰² revenge upon human beings who have injured them in this world, by way of an inversion of rôles, but the

¹⁹⁵ § 2.3.3; cp. Vetter 1988, 93 f.

¹⁹⁶ Pāc. 61: *yo pana bhikkhu saṃcicca paṇaṃ jīvita voropeyya, pācittiyaṃ*.

¹⁹⁷ Pāc. 11: *bhūtagāmapātavyatāya pācittiyaṃ*. For details of interpretation, see the paper mentioned in n. 206.

¹⁹⁸ Esp. DN I 5 (*bijagāmahūtagāmasamārambhā paṭivirato . . .*) and parallel passages.

¹⁹⁹ Schmidt 1968, 646 ff.

²⁰⁰ I. e., not before *Ch-Up* 5.10 / *Bṛh-Up* 6.2.

²⁰¹ *ŚBr* 11.6.1 and *JBr* 1.42–44; cp. esp. H. Lommel in: *Paideuma* 4/1950, 93 ff. = *KISchr*, 211 ff.; Schmidt 1968, 644 f.; H. W. Bodewitz, *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa I*, 1–65 (Leiden 1973), 99 ff.

²⁰² Cp., in this connection, the interesting remark in A. Höfer et al., *Die Religionen Südostasiens* (Stuttgart 1975), 50, that – obviously on his way towards the Land of the Dead – the enemies and wild animals the deceased has killed during his life try to take revenge on him.

humans remain humans, and only animals, plants and water change their appearance and assume human form, obviously simply because otherwise they would be unable to wield the chopping instruments.²⁰³ Hence, it appears that originally there was, at least in these traditions, no connection and co-extensiveness of transmigration and *ahimsā*. The Vedic as well as the early Buddhist evidence would seem to suggest that the theory of rebirth starts from an entirely human point of view, whereas *ahimsā* is owed to all living, sentient beings, among which the Vedic Indians (like the Jains) reckoned animals as well as plants and even water and earth. Out of these, Buddhist tradition, at least in India and Tibet, has come to accept, as sentient beings, only animals. But, as was stated earlier, Buddhist monks and nuns are prohibited to injure plants, too. And, what is more, a few passages, mainly in old verse texts, even speak of moving and immobile living beings²⁰⁴ – the latter expression certainly meaning plants – or adduce animals and plants under the category of “living beings” (*pāna*).²⁰⁵ This would seem to mean that in earliest Buddhism the exclusion of plants from the class of sentient beings had, at any rate, not yet become a doctrinal tenet.²⁰⁶

Asoka, on the other hand, appears to presuppose the usual Buddhist position according to which plants are definitely not sentient beings. Among the terms for “living beings”, *jīva* is clearly used with reference to animals only, implicitly excluding plants,²⁰⁷ and *pāna* is used for animals²⁰⁸ (once again implicitly excluding plants)²⁰⁹ or/and men;²¹⁰ *bhūta* does not occur in sufficiently unambiguous contexts, but in its case too there is no indication that plants are included.²¹¹

Accordingly, Asoka’s declaration concerning abstention from killing and injuring are substantially confined to (men and?)²¹² animals. Protection or

²⁰³ I.e., we have rather to do with metamorphosis than with the rebirth proper of an animal as a human being.

²⁰⁴ E.g., Sn 704 and 967; both passages, by the way, belong to texts which are probably among those recommended by Asoka in his Bhābrā edict (viz. *Moneyasūte* and *Upatisapasine*: cp. § 2.1).

²⁰⁵ Sn 600ff.

²⁰⁶ For a more detailed treatment of the problem of plants in Earliest Buddhism, see L. Schmithausen, *The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism*, Tokyo (The International Institute for Buddhist Studies) 1991.

²⁰⁷ PE V G (Bloch 166, 12): *jīveṅg jīve no pusitaviye*, clearly meaning that animals should not be fed with (other) animals; cp. also RE I B: *hida no kichi jīve (jīvaṃ) ālabhitu pajohitaviye*, I F–H using, in the same line of argument, *pāna* (instead of *jīva*) clearly with reference to animals only, as is shown by the exception mentioned at I G (*majūlā, mige*). At RE III D (Dh: *jīvesu . . . anālabhhe*) and PE V E (Bloch 166, 10: *tuse sajīve*) and V I (Bloch 166, 17: *amnāni pi jīvanikāyāni*) the meaning “animal” is at least perfectly suitable.

²⁰⁸ RE III D; IV A and C; IX G; XI C; PE VII NN (Bloch 172, 9).

²⁰⁹ RE I F–H (see n. 207).

²¹⁰ RE XIII B; SepE II (“I”) Bloch 137, 1f. (Aldorf, *KISchr.*, 494, 9f.): *pāna* equivalent to *mumisa!*; PE IV C (Bloch 163, 12); VII N (Bloch 169, 14).

²¹¹ RE IV A and C ((*a*)*vihisā bhūtānaṃ*, probably referring, at least primarily, to animals; see next n.); PE VII NN (Bloch 172, 8f.: *avihimsāye bhūtānaṃ*); RE VI L (*bhūtānaṃ ānaniyaṃ yehaṃ, ‘bhūta’* here probably comprising animals, men and gods).

²¹² Actually, this is problematic since at least most of the pertinent passages (like RE I B,

cultivation of plants is only mentioned or prescribed for the sake of helping or protecting men and animals.²¹³ In this sense, even the burning of chaff (which is dry and thus in any case not itself a living creature) is prohibited if the chaff is inhabited by animals.²¹⁴ This attitude is surprisingly close to an explanation of Pāc. 11 – i.e. the *prātimokṣasūtra* that prohibits injuring (seeds and) plants – which is found only in the *Vinayavibhaṅga* of the Sarvāstivādins and Mūlasarvāstivādins and according to which plants should not be damaged, because or in so far as they are the dwelling place of insects and other animals.²¹⁵ As this explanation, which is missing in the *Vinayas* of the other schools, is clearly secondary since it presupposes a reinterpretation of the wording of the *prātimokṣasūtra* and does not apply to the prohibition of injuring seeds,²¹⁶ the close similarity between it and Asoka’s instructions would suggest a certain distance in time between the latter and the Buddha, though not necessarily a very long one.

To be sure, the fact that Asoka does not enjoin plant *ahimsā* in general, for the benefit of plants as such, is not of chronological significance since it can be explained as a feature of the morality of lay followers whom consistent *ahimsā* of plants, too, would practically have doomed to starvation.²¹⁷ But this does not imply that they must also have rejected it as a higher ideal and that they must have denied its theoretical presupposition, viz. that plants too are sentient beings. At least in the case of Jaina lay followers such a reflection and denial is hardly imaginable since it would have implied that the Jaina monk’s strict *ahimsā* rules had to be regarded as non-sensical.²¹⁸ Rather, in the case of lay followers there will be a tendency to incongruity between theory (or ideal) and practice, even in the case of animals, as is also shown by Asoka’s PE V which appears to take actual facts into account by not interdicting the killing and injuring of animals altogether but rather restricting it as far as practicable.²¹⁹ It is normally²²⁰ only monks and ascetics who are expected to come up to the ideal.

F–H; III D; XI C) clearly point to animals only (cp. Njammasch 1987, 332); even (*a*)*vihī(m)-sā bhūtānaṃ* (RE IV A, C; PE VII NN) and *pānānaṃ (/pānesu) sa(m)yame* (RE IX G), though not as unambiguous as *pānānaṃ anālabhhe*, etc. (RE III D, etc.), strongly suggest that primarily, if not exclusively, animals are intended.

²¹³ RE II B and D, referring to planting herbs and trees for the sake of men and (domestic) animals (*pasu*); similarly PE VII R (Bloch 169, 20ff.).

²¹⁴ PE V E; *tuse sajīve no jhāpetaviye*. Similarly, probably, PE V F (see n. 218).

²¹⁵ T 1435, 75 a 23–26; T 1442, 776b 18–20; T 1443, 974b 16–18; T 1458, 577 a 16–18.

²¹⁶ For details see § 5.2 of the paper mentioned in n. 206.

²¹⁷ Hence, even for Jaina lay followers, *ahimsā* is primarily animal *ahimsā* (Williams ²1983, 65ff.).

²¹⁸ Cp. the fact that the Jaina lay follower is “also enjoined to avoid as far as possible the killing of *ekendriyas* and the wanton destruction of *sthāvāra-jīvas*” (Williams ²1983, 66 [emphasis mine]). Cp. also Asoka, PE V F (Bloch 166, 10f.: *dāve anaṭhāye . . . no jhāpetaviye*), which however, in view of the preceding prohibition (see n. 214), is rather motivated by the fact that burning a forest involves killing or extruding animals.

²¹⁹ Cp. also Njammasch 1987, 332. Yet, I am not sure whether she is right in declaring that Asoka does not anywhere proclaim a general prohibition of killing animals. At any rate, in the REs (13–14 years earlier than PE V!) no restriction is expressed, unless one takes the pro-

What might, however, seem to have chronological significance is the fact that, as was shown above, Aśoka uses terms for "living being" in a way implicitly excluding plants. To be sure, in the case of *pāna* this fact is not conclusive since in Buddhist texts also,²²¹ including the *Prātimokṣasūtra*,²²² *p(r)āna* is sometimes used in the special meaning of "animal". But *jīva* does not, in Buddhist texts, seem to be used in this way. On the contrary, it is this term that is used, in somewhat later²²³ strata of the *Vinayapīṭaka* – viz. the *Skandhaka*²²⁴ and the *Vinayavibhaṅga*²²⁵ – in connexion with the view that also plants (and even the earth)²²⁶ are living, sentient beings. Since this view is presented as that of "people" (*manussā*),²²⁷ obviously not shared by the Buddhist monks themselves, it would seem to imply that at that stage of development the Buddhist monks themselves no longer regarded plants as living beings, and that for them the term *jīva* would have been properly applicable only in a way not including plants. Since this is precisely the way the term is used in Aśoka's inscriptions, it is tempting to draw the conclusion that Aśoka's use of the term *jīva* presupposes a somewhat later stage in the development of the Buddhist view on plants, and a penetration of this view into Buddhist lay circles at that. This would support the chronological conclusion suggested above on the basis of the agreement of Aśoka's declarations with the somewhat later interpretation of the *Prātimokṣasūtra* on plant *ahiṃsā* supplied by the *Vinayavibhaṅga* of the Sarvāstivādins and Mūlasarvāstivādins.

hibition, in RE I, of killing any animal for sacrifice to imply permission of secular slaughtering; but why then the king's kitchen as norm or model? Yet, the striking terminological difference between the REs ((*an*)*ālabhhe*, *ālabhitu*, etc.) and PE V (*avadhiye*, etc.; *no haṃtavivāṇi*) calls for deliberation.

²²⁰ Lay followers, especially Jains, may, however, try to come closer to the ideal temporarily (especially on *poṣadha* days: Williams 1983, 142 ff.) or in special situations (viz. when adopting the higher *pratimās* [ib. 176 ff.] or fasting to death [ib. 166 f.]).

²²¹ Cp. *BHSD* s.v. *prāna* (2) and *prāṇaka* (2).

²²² Pāc. 61 (see n. 196) where *pāna* does not include plants (since they are treated separately in Pāc. 11 [see n. 197]) nor even men (killing whom is not *pācittiya* but *pāvājika*). Cp. also Pāc. 20 and 62 where *pāna(ka)* probably means tiny animals only.

²²³ As for the *Skandhaka/Khandhaka*, it originated, according to Frauwallner (*Vinaya*, 42 ff., esp. 54) after the Council of Vaiśālī but before Aśoka. For the *Vinayavibhaṅga* see Schlingloff, "Zur Interpretation des Prātimokṣasūtra", in: *ZDMG* 113/1963, 536 ff. It should, however, be noted that the justification of Pāc. 11 (i.e. of the prohibition to damage plants (and seeds)) by referring to the view of people that plants are living, sentient beings is still much closer to the original motive than justifying or explaining it by means of deities (*Vin* IV 34) or animals (see n. 215) inhabiting trees or plants. For details see the paper referred to in n. 206.

²²⁴ *Vin* I 137 (*Vassūpanāyika-kkhandhaka*; for parallels in the *Varṣāvastu* of other schools see Frauwallner, *Vinaya*, 82; I 189).

²²⁵ *Vin* III 156 (ad *Sanghādiseṣa* 7); IV 34 (ad Pāc. 11) and 296.

²²⁶ *Vin* IV 32 (ad Pāc. 10).

²²⁷ The *Vinayas* of the Mahāśāsakas (T 1421, 129 a7) and Dharmaguptakas (T 1428, 830 b 22) have "householders" (𑖀𑖔𑖧); *Vinaya* of the Mahāsāṅghikas (T 1425, 450 c4): "[ordinary] people" (世人), but no explicit mention of plants or animals; *Vinaya* of the Sarvāstivādins (T 1435, 173 b5): "non-Buddhist ascetics"; *Vinaya* of the Mūlasarvāstivādins (T 1445 [*Varṣāvastu*], 1041 b3): "non-Buddhists", but mentioning only insects, not plants.

Yet, this conclusion is rather shaky, resting on unwarranted presuppositions as it does; for the "people" who are said to regard plants as living and sentient beings need not necessarily have been Buddhists.²²⁸ And even if they were Buddhist lay followers,²²⁹ they may have belonged to a rural milieu, where such a view appears to have survived until recently even in Buddhist countries.²³⁰ In urban areas, however, people – or rather some people, since at least Jaina lay followers have to be exempted – may have adopted a more "rational" view at a much earlier date, perhaps already at the time of the Buddha. As long as such a possibility has to be taken into account, Aśoka's use of the terms *jīva*, etc., and the exclusion of plants from the realm of living beings it seems to imply, cannot be taken to have chronological significance for certain.

2.5

It should, perhaps, be noted that there is, in the Aśokan inscriptions, no reference to merit transfer.²³¹ This fact is hardly decisive evidence in settling the problem of the date of the Buddha. Even if we may take Aśoka's silence, by way of an argument *ex silentio*, to indicate that the idea of merit transfer was still alien to Buddhism in his time, this would, doubtless, very well fit in with a "short chronology". But it would not be irreconcilable with a "long chronology" either; for merit transfer appears to be attested to only in later strata of the canonical texts,²³² though one would, in view of its probably popular origin,²³³ expect it to have developed somewhat earlier. – Another remarkable but likewise inconclusive feature is the absence of the *cakravartin* concept in Aśoka's inscriptions.²³⁴

2.6

To sum up: The result of the (admittedly preliminary) investigation presented in this paper is that from the point of view of doctrinal development some features observed in Aśoka's inscriptions look fairly archaic, while others seem to presuppose considerable development. If this is correct, it may not, to be sure, exclude an early date for the Buddha, but would seem to render a somewhat later date more probable.²³⁵ It would, however, hardly fit in with such a late date as proposed by P. H. L. Eggermont in his contribution to the present symposium (*Symp* IV, 1, p. 245).

²²⁸ Cp. the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda versions referred to in n. 227.

²²⁹ Cp. the other versions referred to in n. 227.

²³⁰ For Sri Lanka see M. Maithri Murthi, *Das Verhalten der ceylonesischen Buddhisten gegenüber Tieren und Pflanzen* (M.A. thesis, Hamburg 1986), 62. For Burma, a similar view ("rukka-jīva") was brought to my knowledge by a Burmese Buddhist in a discussion at the A.N.U., Canberra, in October 1989.

²³¹ For references to transfer of merit in inscriptions, see Schopen 1984, 33 ff.

²³² Cp. Schmithausen, "Critical Response", in: *Karma and Rebirth – Post Classical Developments*, ed. R. W. Neufeldt, New York 1986, 210 ff.

²³³ Cp. *ibid.*, 213 f.

²³⁴ Basham 1982, 135.

²³⁵ Otherwise Schneider 1980, 20.

3.

By way of an appendix, a short remark on the *Kathāvatthu* problem. Hirakawa²³⁶ suggests that this text was compiled at least one hundred years after Aśoka, because it presupposes an advanced stage of the splitting of the Buddhist schools, even if one does not follow Buddhaghosa's commentary in all its ascriptions of the various views to specific schools. This would imply that the stage of doctrinal development documented by the *Kathāvatthu* has little bearing on the distance in time between Aśoka and the Buddha. On the other hand, Frauwallner²³⁷ may be right in maintaining that the *Kathāvatthu* as we have it is the result of a long process of redaction and enlargement. According to Frauwallner, this process started from a nucleus which the *Kathāvatthu* has in common with the *Vijñānakāya* of the Sarvāstivādins, and this nucleus is common heritage going back to the time before Aśoka's missions. A similar situation is postulated by Frauwallner²³⁸ in the case of *Vibhaṅga*, *Dharmaskandha* and (parts of the) *Sāriputrābhidharma*, the common stock of which texts is, at any rate, specific enough to exclude accidental parallelism. If Frauwallner is right, there must have been, at the time of Aśoka, at least a few fundamental dogmatic disagreements between various groups of the Buddhist Order, and also a certain development of Abhidharmic systematization. This would seem to render a very small interval between Aśoka and the death of the Buddha rather unlikely, but it is, once again, difficult to fix a minimum distance. Besides, I for one do not see how one can exclude the possibility that even the nucleus or original version of the works concerned was produced in the mother community only after the mission and then spread abroad to the already existing filial communities, since contact with them will not have ceased immediately.

Addenda

p. 115: As for the Rumindēi inscription, cp. also G. Schopen, "Burial 'Ad Sanctos' and the Physical Presence of the Buddha in Early Indian Buddhism", *Religion* 17/1987, 194f. Schopen considers, with due caution, the possibility that Aśoka knew a version of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* similar to the extant Sanskrit version. But this is hardly more than a hypothetical assumption. What is actually supported by the evidence adduced is that both the *MPS* and Aśoka seem to presuppose the existence of an established pattern of pilgrimage to the birthplace of the Buddha.

n. 33: Cp. also Alsdorf, *KISchr.* 427.

n. 59: Cp. *Sv* 812, 17: *paggharantan ti hetṭhā parissavantam*.

n. 78: Cp. also *Vism* (W) III. 99; XXIII. 35.

²³⁶ In his contribution to the present symposium, *Symp* IV, 1, p. 284.

²³⁷ Frauwallner, *AbhidSt* IV (1972), 124.

²³⁸ Frauwallner, *AbhidSt* II, 78f.; IV (1971), 103ff.; IV (1972), 136ff.

n. 88: On the close relationship between *parissaya* and *parisaha* cp. now M. Yamazaki in *IBK* 39.2 [78], 1991, pp. 939–935. Yamazaki suggests that one form may in fact be derived from the other if the *h* in *parisaha* is regarded as being (originally) merely an euphonic glide (ib., 936 and 935 n. 10). If this is correct, the parenthesis on p. 123 of my paper (before n. 88) would have to be deleted.

n. 98: Cp. also *MN* 250, 331 and 464: *āsavā sankilesikā ponobbhaviḥā* . . .

p. 129: l. 4 from below ("... *Sāriputtasutta*."): This assumption would receive additional support if the Bhābrā edict, among the texts recommended by which the *Sāriputtasutta* is probably included (see § 2.1), is, with Hultsch referred to by Alsdorf (*KISchr.* 427), in fact the earliest (or at least one of the earliest) of all Aśokan inscriptions.

n. 168: [After "Formal problems apart" insert:] (but cp. K. R. Norman on *Th* 888).

n. 189: [Add:] *AN* I 37f.

n. 211: As for the occurrence, side by side, of *pānālambe* (etc.) and *vihisā bhūtānam* (etc.) at RE IV A and C (cp. PE VII NN), it looks like a juxtaposition of the phraseology of the Vedic ritualists on the one hand and that of the ascetic tradition on the other. At any rate, we can hardly deduce from it an opposition between *pāna* and *bhūta*, in the sense of animals against plants; for it seems that *bhūta* is used in the sense of "plants" (see n. 197) only in explicit or implicit contrast to seeds (*bīja*), not animals.

Abbreviations

<i>AKBh</i>	= Vasubandhu, <i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> , ed. P. Pradhan, 1st ed., Patna, 1967.
Alsdorf 1965	= L. Alsdorf, <i>Les études Jaina</i> , Collège de France.
Aramaki 1978	= N. Aramaki, "Pāli parissaya ni tsuite", <i>Oriente-gaku Indo-gaku Ronshū (Felicitation Volume for Dr. Atsuoji Ashikaga)</i> , pp. 381–396.
<i>Āyār</i>	= <i>Āyāraṅga</i> , ed. W. Schubring, Leipzig, 1910.
Basham 1982	= A. L. Basham, "Aśoka and Buddhism – a Reexamination", <i>JLABS</i> 5.1, pp. 131–143.
Bhattacharya 1948	= V. Bhattacharya, <i>Buddhist texts as recommended by Aśoka</i> , University of Calcutta.
Bloch 1950	= J. Bloch, <i>Les inscriptions d'Asoka</i> , Paris.
Dh	= Dhāuli.
Edgerton 1952	= F. Edgerton, review of: J. Bloch, <i>Les inscriptions d'Asoka</i> , <i>JAOS</i> 72, pp. 114–117.
Enomoto 1978	= F. Enomoto, "Āsrava ni tsuite", <i>IBK</i> 27.1 [53], pp. 158f.
Enomoto 1979	= F. Enomoto, "Āsrava (ro) no seiritsu ni tsuite (omo-ni Jaina kosō-kyōten ni okeru)", <i>Bukkyō Shigaku Kenkyū</i> 22.1, pp. 17–42.

- Enomoto 1983 = F. Enomoto, "Shoki butten ni okeru āsava (ro)", *Nanto Bukkyō* 50, pp. 17-28.
- Enomoto 1989 = F. Enomoto, "Śarīrārthagāthā, A Collection of Canonical Verses in the Yogācārabhūmi, Pt. 1: Text", *Sanskrit Texte aus dem buddhistischen Kanon: Neuentdeckungen und Neueditionen*, Göttingen (SWTF, Beiheft 2), pp. 17-35.
- Er = Erraguḍi.
- Filliozat 1949 = J. Filliozat, "Les deva d'Asoka: 'Dieux' ou 'divines majestés'?", *JA* 237.2, pp. 225-247.
- Filliozat 1957 = J. Filliozat, "Les festivités du dhamma chez Asoka", *JA* 245.1, pp. 1-9.
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- Gi = Girnār.
- Gombrich 1990 = R. Gombrich, "Recovering the Buddha's message", in: Seyfort Ruegg/Smithausen 1990, pp. 5-23.
- Hultzsich 1925 = E. Hultzsich, *Inscriptions of Asoka*, Oxford.
- Isibh* = *Isibhāsiyāim*, ed. W. Schubring, Hamburg 1969.
- Janert 1972 = K. L. Janert, *Abstände und Schlußvokalverzeichnungen in den Aśoka-Inschriften*, Wiesbaden (VOHD Suppl. 10).
- JBr* = *Jaiminiyabrāhmaṇa*.
- Jg = Jaugāḍa.
- Ka = Kālsī.
- Kashiwahara 1978 = N. Kashiwahara, "'Ro' ni tsuite", *IBK* 26.2 [52], pp. 657 f.
- Ma = Mānsehrā.
- Meile 1949 = P. Meile, "Misā devehi chez Asoka", *JA* 237.2, pp. 193-223.
- Njammasch 1987 = M. Njammasch, "Krieg und Frieden unter den Mauryas", *Altorientalische Forschungen* 14, pp. 322-333.
- Norman 1990 = K. R. Norman, "Aspects of Early Buddhism", in: Seyfort Ruegg/Smithausen 1990, pp. 24-35.
- Roth 1982 = G. Roth, "Notes on Inscriptions of Aśoka", *Prajñā Bhārati* (Patna) 2, pp. 32-55.
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- Schneider 1978 = U. Schneider, *Die Großen Felsen-Edikte Aśokas*, Wiesbaden.
- Schneider 1980 = U. Schneider, *Einführung in den Buddhismus*, Darmstadt.
- Schneider 1982 = U. Schneider, "The Calcutta-Bairāṭ Edict of Aśoka", *Indological and Buddhist Studies (Volume in Honour of Prof. J. W. de Jong)*, ed. L. A. Hercus et al., Canberra, pp. 491-498.
- Schopen 1984 = G. Schopen, "Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of Transference of Merit", *StII* 10, pp. 9-47.
- Schubring 1935 = W. Schubring, *Die Lehre der Jainas*, Berlin und Leipzig.
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- Sh = Shāhbāzgarhī.
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