Digital Forensics and Incident Response

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- All opinions in this presentation are my own and all facts are based on open sources



Outline

- Incident Response
- Digital Forensics
- Finding Evidence
- Demos what do you want to see?





Who does this?

Digital forensics is often part of an incident responder's job

- Law enforcement
- CERTs (Government/industry specific/company specific)
 - In Norway: NorCERT, KraftCert, TelenorCert, FinansCert, UIOCert++
- Company IRTs
 - In Norway: DNB IRT, Statoil CSIRT++
- SysAdmins
- Consultants
 - In Norway: Watchcom Security Group, Mnemonic IRT++
- And others...





Incident Management

- Incident Response Policy
- Incident Response Team

Incident Response Policy

Responsibility

Who makes the decisions?

Asset Priority

- Which systems can be taken offline?
- Which systems can absolutely not be taken offline?

Outside Experts and Agencies

- Who you gonna call?
- At what point is Law Enforcement involved?





Incident Response Policy

As an employee, if I discover an incident, what do I do?

The policy must include information on

- Chain of escalation
- How to prevent further damage
- How to preserve evidence until the Response Team can take over

Incident Response Team

- Many names and definitions the same principles apply to all of them (MD)
 - IRT, SIRT, CERT, CSIRT... (Response Team being the key)
- Permanent
- Virtual
- Hybrid





Red Team - Blue Team

- Derived from military wargames
- A simulated attack using security specialists
- The Incident Response Team defends the system from the attack

Incident Response Procedures

- Detect
- Respond
- Recover







Detect

Know your assets

If you don't know your assets, you cannot defend them

Triage

- Weed out false positives
- Categorize events
 - Type of incident
 - Source
 - Growth
 - Damange potential





Respond

- Collect data
- Mitigate damage
- Isolate systems





Respond (2)

- Analyze and track adversary
 - What is the root cause of the incident?
 - · Who, how, when, why
- Law enforcement
 - Is it necessary?






Recover

- Fix the problem
- Improve Incident Response Policy
- Disclosure







Digital Forensics in Court

The BTK Killer

• Metadata in Word file led to arrest after 30 years

Krenar Lusha

• Search of laptop led to discovery of bomb-making equipment

Matt Baker

• Suicide of wife ruled murder after incriminating google searches is discovered 4 years later

Sharon Lopatka

• Emails on her computer led to her killer

Corcoran Group

• Evidence that data had been deleted led to conviction



Digital Forensics

It's all the same...

• Digital forensics, computer forensics, network forensics, electronic data discovery, cyberforensics, forensic computing...

Big difference in the handing of evidence

- Law enforcement
- Corporate incidents
- ... but it shouldn't be

What is digital evidence?

"Any digital data that contains reliable information that supports or refutes a hypothesis about an incident"





Forensic Investigation Process

- Identification
- Preservation
- Collection
- Examination
- Analysis
- Presentation



At the Crime Scene

Document the crime scene

- Document who has access
- Document any contamination

Photograph everything

• Especially the screen

Locate the media

- Follow cables
- All digital devices may contain digital evidence

If the computer is running, dump the RAM



The Digital Forensics Toolkit

- Screwdrivers
- Evidence bags
- Labels
- Forensic software
- Write Blocker
- Camera
- Notebook with numbered pages
- Storage Large HDDs



Basic Scientific Principles

- 1. Best evidence
- 2. Minimal Intrusion
- 3. Minimal Force
- 4. Minimal Interruption
- 5. Transparency
- 6. Chain of Custody
- 7. Primacy of the Mission
- 8. Impartiality
- 9. Documentation



Evidence Location

- Network analysis
- Media analysis
- Software analysis
- Hardware analysis

WATCHCOM

Dealing with Evidence

R-OCITE

• **R**eturn

Or sieze...

- Original
- Clone
- Image
- Targeted copy
- Extensive copy



Admissible Evidence

- How was it gathered?
- How was it treated?
- Who handled it?
- How reliable is it?
- Is the Chain of Custody complete?

Evidence Categories

Conclusive Evidence

• This is fact

Best Evidence

• This is it

Secondary Evidence

• This how it looks

Direct Evidence

• This is what I saw





Evidence Categories

Corroborative Evidence

• That happened, because of this

Circumstantial Evidence

• That could have happened, because of this

Opinion Evidence

• I'm an expert, this is what happened

Hearsay Evidence

• I heard this about that

Digital evidence is considered hearsay unless an expert vouces for it





Finding Evidence

- Many ways to hide
- Many ways to find

Hidden Files

- Setting the "hidden" flag on the file
 - Different for Windows and *nix
- Inconspicuous folder names





Locating Hidden Files

- The "hidden" flag is ignored by default
- Forensic software can be set to show the drive as a "flat" drive
 - Ignoring folder hierarchy

Changing File Extensions

- When opening the file, the system returns an error message
- "Oh, I guess it is corrupted. Too bad."





Discovering Changed File Extensions

- Some forensic software will point out files with mismatched extensions
- File signatures tells us what kind of file it is
 - Also called "Magic Numbers"

File Signatures

A hexadecimal code in the file, also called file "headers" and "footers"

Examples:

```
25 50 44 46 = %PDF = PDF
49 44 33 = ID3 = MP3
FF D8 FF = ÿØÿà = JPEG
42 4D = BM = BMP
4D 5A = MZ = EXE, COM, DLL
```





Obscure File Names

- Hiding files by giving them inconspicuous file names
- "Blueprints_iPhone8.jpeg" becomes "Florida vacation 001.jpeg"

File Names not an Issue

- Hash functions to look for known files
 - Lists of hash sums recognize known illicit files
 - Lists of hash sums recognize known "good" files
 - We can create our own lists





Steganography

- Hiding a file inside another file
- Hiding "Nuclear Launch Codes.txt" inside "Adorable Cat.jpeg"

Steganography Example

- Command & Control traffic in images
 - Known sites imgur, Dropbox, Instagram etc.
- ZeusVM botnet malware used image files to hide configuration files







Discovering Steganography

- Hard to determine unless you are looking for it
- Steganography software on suspect's computer a strong indicator
- File type signatures to the rescue
 - Linux tools: binwalk, file

Encrypted Files

- This is where the problems start for the investigator
- Strong encryption algorithms almost impossible to break
- "Sorry, I've forgotten my 50 character long password."






A CRYPTO NERD'S IMAGINATION: WHAT WOULD ACTUALLY HAPPEN:

"Breaking" Encryption

- Recovering key from RAM
- Brute force
- Exploiting weaknesses in the software or the algorithm used (Cryptanalysis)
- Some countries have laws that compel the suspect to give up keys
- Less ethical methods
 - Rubber-hose cryptanalysis
 - Black-bag cryptanalysis







Deleting Files

- Deleting the files from the computer before law enforcement claims it
- "You can't prove anything, there is nothing there."

How does the System Delete Files?

- Deleting a file does not actually remove it
- In Windows, the file is renamed
 - CorporateSecrets.txt
 - ~orporateSecrets.txt
- This tells the system that the space is available to be overwritten in the future





Reclaiming Deleted Files

- Data carving
 - Ignore file system extract file directly from the media
- Renaming the file

Reclaiming Overwritten Files

- Pieces of data can be recovered from "slack space"
- File slack, RAM slack, drive slack
- Forensics software can often recover files or parts of files from slack space

AAAA	BBBB	CCCC	DDDD	1111	2222	3333	4444
~AAA	BBBB	CCCC	DDDD	1111	2222	3333	4444
XXXX	үүүү	7222	DDDD	1111	2222	3333	4444





Metadata

• What if we only have a file, and not the source media?







Using Metadata

- Data about the file
 - . When was the file last used?
 - When was the file created?
 - Who opened it?
 - Where was it created?
- Can prove who had access to the file




Metadata Example





Metadata Example







Metadata Example





• Red Star OS – Appends unique system identifier to all media files





It's not all theory – if you want to learn more...

CTFs

Forums (/r/forensics, /r/netsec)

Virtual machines, tools & wargames

- Sans DBIR
- Redlin
- Volatility
- Sandboxed malware (be careful...)
- Books

Courses (e.g. SANS SEC504)

- Course contents are public. Use Google to learn the goals!
- Conferences (DEFCON, Black Hat, CCC, Parannia)
 - Videos are often published online, freely available
 - Paranoia is held in Oslo Spektrum on the 10th and 11th
 of May
- Books

Questions?

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Demo time!

What do you want to see?

- Red Star OS
- Redline Live Forensics
- Steganography/data carving with *nix tools
- Gaudox Botnet
- I want to go home

