

Solution, Problem 1

2) We have $S_1^*(1, w_1) = \frac{10}{3} = 3$, $S_1^*(1, w_2) = 1$, $S_1^*(1, w_3) = 5$.

Hence $Q = (q_1, q_2, q_3)$ is a risk neutral prob. measure iff

$$\begin{aligned} q_1 + q_2 + q_3 &= 1 \\ (3-2)q_1 + (1-2)q_2 + (5-2)q_3 &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

The matrix of this system is

$$\left[\begin{array}{ccc|c} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 & 3 & 0 \end{array} \right] \begin{array}{l} - \\ \leftarrow \end{array}$$

$$\downarrow$$

$$\left[\begin{array}{ccc|c} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & -2 & 2 & -1 \end{array} \right] \cdot -\frac{1}{2}$$

$$\downarrow$$

$$\left[\begin{array}{ccc|c} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & -1 & \frac{1}{2} \end{array} \right] \begin{array}{l} \leftarrow \\ - \end{array}$$

$$\downarrow$$

$$\left[\begin{array}{ccc|c} 1 & 0 & 2 & \frac{1}{2} \\ 0 & 1 & -1 & \frac{1}{2} \end{array} \right],$$

which gives $q_1 = \frac{1}{2} - 2q_3$, $q_2 = \frac{1}{2} + q_3$; $0 < q_3 < \frac{1}{4}$

1b) Since there is at least one r.n.p. measure, there is no arbitrage. Since there are more than one r.n.p.m., the market is not complete.

Solution, Problem 1 (contd.)

e) We consider the matrix

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} B_1(w_1) & S_1(1, w_1) & S_2(1, w_1) \\ B_1(w_2) & S_1(1, w_2) & S_2(1, w_2) \\ B_1(w_3) & S_1(1, w_3) & S_2(1, w_3) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{10}{q} & \frac{10}{3} & S_2(1, w_1) \\ \frac{10}{q} & \frac{10}{q} & S_2(1, w_2) \\ \frac{10}{q} & \frac{50}{q} & S_2(1, w_3) \end{bmatrix}$$

We want the r.n.p.m. to be unique. By 1a) it has to be on the form

$$Q = \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2q_3, \frac{1}{2} + q_3, q_3 \right) \text{ for some } q_3 \in \left(0, \frac{1}{4} \right).$$

Now

$$\frac{q}{10} A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 3 & x_1 \\ 1 & 1 & x_2 \\ 1 & 5 & x_3 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{with } x_i = \frac{q}{10} S_2(1, w_i),$$

which reduces to

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 3 & x_1 \\ 0 & 1 & \frac{1}{2}(x_1 - x_2) \\ 0 & 0 & -2x_1 + 2x_2 + x_3 \end{bmatrix}$$

So we need $-2x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \neq 0$.

In addition we need Q to be a r.n.p.m. for the new market, i.e.

$$(x_1 - S_2(0)) \left(\frac{1}{2} - 2q_3 \right) + (x_2 - S_2(0)) \left(\frac{1}{2} + q_3 \right) + (x_3 - S_2(0)) q_3 = 0$$

i.e.

$$(2x_1 - x_2 - x_3 + 4S_2(0)) q_3 = -\frac{1}{2}x_1 + \frac{1}{2}x_2 - S_2(0)$$

- 51.3 -

In particular, choosing $x_1 = 5, x_2 = x_3 = 1 = S_2(0)$,
we get

$$q_3 = \frac{1}{6}$$

Hence

$$Q = \left(\frac{1}{6}, \frac{2}{3}, \frac{1}{6} \right)$$

is the unique r.n.p.m. for the extended market.

Therefore the extended market is free from
arbitrage and it is complete.

Solution, Problem 2

2a) $\mathcal{F}_1 = \{\emptyset, \Omega, \{\omega_1\}, \{\omega_2, \omega_3\}\}$

$\mathcal{F}_2 =$ the family of all subsets of Ω

2b) Since $X^{-1}(0) = \{\omega_3\} \notin \mathcal{F}_1$, we conclude that X is not measurable with respect to \mathcal{F}_1 .

2c)
$$E[X | \mathcal{F}_1] = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{F}_1}} \frac{E[X \mathbf{1}_A]}{P(A)} \mathbf{1}_A$$

Hence, if $\omega \in A_1 = \{\omega_1\}$, we get

$$E[X | \mathcal{F}_1](\omega) = \frac{3 \cdot \frac{1}{3}}{\frac{1}{3}} = 3$$

If $\omega \in A_2 = \{\omega_2, \omega_3\}$, we get

$$E[X | \mathcal{F}_1](\omega) = \frac{1 \cdot \frac{1}{3} + 0 \cdot \frac{1}{3}}{\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3}} = \frac{1}{2}$$

2d) We need to verify that

$$E_Q[\Delta S(t) | \mathcal{F}_{t-1}] = 0 \quad \text{for } t=1, 2$$

$$\begin{aligned} t=1: \quad E_Q[\Delta S(1) | \mathcal{F}_0] &= (1-3) \frac{1}{2} + (5-3) \frac{1}{3} + (5-3) \frac{1}{6} \\ &= -1 + \frac{2}{3} + \frac{2}{6} = 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$t=2, \omega \in A_1: \quad E_Q[\Delta S(2) | \mathcal{F}_1] = \frac{0 \cdot \frac{1}{2}}{\frac{1}{2}} = 0$$

$$t=2, \omega \in A_2: \quad E_Q[\Delta S(2) | \mathcal{F}_1] = \frac{(4-5) \frac{1}{3} + (7-5) \frac{1}{6}}{\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{6}} = 0 \quad \text{OK}$$

Solutions, Problem 2 (contd.)

2e) We want to find $H \in \mathcal{H}$ such that

$$V_T^{(H)} = X$$

We have

$$V_T = B_T V_T^* = B_T \{v + G_T^*\} = B_T \{v + H_{1,(1)} \Delta S_{(1)}^* + H_{1,(2)} \Delta S_{(2)}^*\}$$

$$= v + H_{1,(1)} \Delta S_{(1)} + H_{1,(2)} \Delta S_{(2)}$$

NOTE: $H_{1,(1)}$ is constant, $H_{1,(2)}$ is \mathcal{F}_1 -measurable.

For $\omega = \omega_1$, we get

$$v + H_{1,(1)}(1-3) + H_{1,(2),\omega_1} \cdot 0 = X(\omega_1) = 3$$

$$\text{i.e. } \underline{\underline{H_{1,(1)} = -\frac{3}{2}}}$$

For $\omega = \omega_2$ we get

$$v + H_{1,(1)}(5-3) + H_{1,(2),\omega_2}(4-5) = X(\omega_2) = 1$$

$$\text{i.e. } v + 2(-\frac{3}{2}) - H_{1,(2),\omega_2} = 1$$

$$\text{i.e. } H_{1,(2),\omega_2} = v - 4 = H_{1,(2),\omega_3}$$

For $\omega = \omega_3$ we get

$$v + H_{1,(1)}(5-3) + H_{1,(2),\omega_3}(7-5) = X(\omega_3) = 0$$

$$\text{i.e. } v + 2(-\frac{3}{2}) + (v-4)2 = 0$$

$$\text{i.e. } 3v = 3 + 8 = 11$$

$$\underline{\underline{v = \frac{11}{3}}}$$

This gives

$$H_0 + 3H_{1,(1)} = v = \frac{11}{3}$$

i.e.

$$H_0 = \frac{11}{3} - 3(-\frac{3}{2}) = \frac{22+27}{6} = \underline{\underline{\frac{49}{6}}}$$

$$H_{1,(2),\omega_2} = H_{1,(2),\omega_3} = v - 4 = \frac{49-24}{6} = \underline{\underline{\frac{25}{6}}}$$

($H_{1,(2),\omega_1}$ is arbitrary).

Solutions, Problem 2 (contd.)

2 f) Define

$U_t(w)$ = the maximum expected utility at time T given that the wealth at time t is w and given \mathcal{F}_t .

Dynamic programming principle

$$U_t(w) = \max_H E[U_{t+1}(B_{t+1} \{ \frac{w}{B_t} + H \cdot \Delta S^*(t+1) \}) | \mathcal{F}_t]$$

\mathcal{F}_t -meas.

We first put $t=T-1=1$. Since $U_2(w) = -\exp(-w)$ we then get

$$U_1(w) = \max_H E[-\exp(-\{w + H \cdot \Delta S(2)\}) | \mathcal{F}_1]$$

\mathcal{F}_1 -meas.

If $w = w_1$ this gives

$$U_1(w) = \max_H \frac{\frac{1}{3} (-\exp(-\{w + H \cdot 0\}))}{\frac{1}{3}} = \underline{\underline{-\exp(-w)}}$$

If $w = w_2$ or w_3 this gives

$$U_1(w) = \max_H \frac{\frac{1}{3} (-\exp(-\{w + H(4-5)\})) - \exp(-\{w + H(7-5)\})}{\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3}}$$

Differentiating w.r.t. H we get

$$-\exp(-\{w-H\}) + \exp(-\{w+2H\})(-2) = 0$$

or

$$-\exp(H) + 2 \exp(-2H) = 0$$

$$-\exp(3H) + 2 = 0$$

$$H = H_1(2, w_2) = H_1(2, w_3) = \underline{\underline{\frac{1}{3} \ln 2}}$$

Hence

$$U_1(w) = \begin{cases} -\exp(-w) & \text{if } w = w_1 \\ -\frac{1}{2} \left[\exp(-\{w - \frac{\ln 2}{3}\}) + \exp(-\{w + \frac{2 \ln 2}{3}\}) \right] & \text{if } w = w_2, w_3 \end{cases}$$

or

$$U_1(w) = -\exp(-w) \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } w = w_1 \\ \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \left[\exp\left(\frac{\ln 2}{3}\right) + \exp\left(\frac{2 \ln 2}{3}\right) \right]}_A & \text{if } w = w_2, w_3 \end{cases}$$

We now proceed to find $U_0(w)$:

$$U_0(w) = \max_h E[U_1(w + h \Delta S(1))]$$

$$= \max_h \left\{ -\exp(-\{w + (1-3)h\}) \cdot \frac{1}{3} \right.$$

$$\left. -\exp(-\{w + (5-3)h\}) \cdot A \cdot \frac{2}{3} \right\}$$

$$= \max_h -\exp(-w) \left\{ \frac{1}{3} \exp(2h) + \frac{2}{3} A \exp(-2h) \right\}$$

First order conditions

$$2 \exp(2h) = 4 A \exp(-2h) = 0$$

$$\exp(4h) = -2A$$

$$\underline{\underline{h_{\max} = \frac{1}{4} \ln(-2A) = H_1(1)}}$$

It remains to find $H_0(1)$, $H_0(2, \omega)$:

Since

$$v = V_0 = H_0(1) + H_1(1) S(0) = H_0(1) + 3H_1(1),$$

this determines $H_0(1)$.

Hence

$$(i) \quad V_1 = H_0(1) + H_1(1) S(1, \omega)$$

Since H is self-financing we also have

$$(ii) \quad V_1 = H_0(2) + H_1(2) S(1, \omega)$$

Combining (i) and (ii) we find $H_0(2)$.

□