

Scholars at Risk International Partnership Conference University of Oslo 13 November 2015

Peaceful Resistance Possibilities and Challenges



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'For me, nonviolence was not a moral principle but a strategy; there is no moral goodness in using an ineffective weapon'.

Nelson Mandela




African National Congress (ANC)


- Founded in South Africa in 1912
- Incompatibility
 - Apartheid, non-whites excluded from state access/rights
- Strategies/tactics
 - Largely non-violent until 1960
 - Defiance campaign: strikes, boycotts, non-cooperation
 - Military campaign after 1960 Sharpeville massacre (MK)
 - Guerrilla tactics largely failure, shift to terrorist tactics, bombing
 - UCDP: South Africa at "war" 1981-3, 1985-8
 - Following (secret) negotiations in 1990 shift to non-violent tactics, more efforts to control violence



Gene Sharp











How do non-violent campaigns succeed?

Gene Sharp:

- The power of any state regardless of its particular structural organization - ultimately derives from the subjects of the state.
- Power structure relies upon the subjects' obedience to the orders of the ruler(s).
- If subjects do not obey, rulers have no power





Non-violence research at PRIO

- Kristian Skrede Gleditsch
- University of Essex/PRIO
- Erica Chenoweth
- University of Denver/PRIO
- Scott Gates
- University of Oslo/PRIO
- Marianne Dahl
- PRIO











Non-violence: What is it?


Absence of violence

Motivation:

- Pacifism: Religious or Ethical
- Strategic
- Structural: Lack of weapons, soldiers & places to hide etc
- Use of methods that are non-conventional political methods:
 - Acts of omission: Strike, tax boycott, consumer boycott, election boycott
 - Acts of commission: Sit-ins, demonstrations, blockades










Why Compare Non-Violent and Violent Campaigns

- Violent and non-violent campaigns have traditionally been studied separately
- This is despite the fact that many of these have the same objectives
- Including both in the same study makes it possible to ask questions we cannot answer if studying them separately:
 - What makes a group choose a non-violent instead of a violent strategy, and vice versa?
 - What causes a shift in strategy?
 - What are the consequences of a predominantly violent vs. non-violent strategy?



Why Civil Resistance Works


- Maria Stephan & Erica Chenoweth (2008) and 2011 are the first studies to compare non-violent and violent strategies across the entire world (1900-2006)
- They only include movement with maximalist goals (making sure that campaigns are comparable and reducing media bias):
 - Secessionist movements
 - 2 Anti Occupation movements
 - 8 Regime Change Movements





Main Finding

Non-Violent movements are almost twice as likely to succeed as their violent counterparts.



How do campaigns succeed

- Inflicting costs on the government make it too costly to preserve status quo
- Withdraw the support of key actors forcing the government to make concessions
- Developing a force that is sufficiently strong to physically remove the government



Tactics & Mobilization

- Large campaigns are better at inflicting costs directly on the government or at their main pillars of support
 - Non-Violent campaigns are on average four times larger than violent campaigns
 - Out of the 25 largest campaigns 20 were non-violent
- According to Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) this is the main reason why non-violent campaigns tend to be more successful than violent campaigns





The Mobilization Advantage: Physical Costs

• Many non-violent tactics demand no skills other than sitting on the ground.





The Mobilization Advantage: Physical Costs

- Many non-violent tactics demand no skills other than sitting on the ground.
- In contrast, participants in violent campaigns, must be in good shape and know how to use weapons. This take time to learn, and for many is not possible
- As a result the pool of people from which the campaign can mobilize from is smaller than for non-violent campaigns











The Mobilization Advantage: Informational Difficulties

- Individuals are more likely to engage in protests when they expect large number of people to participate
- Information regarding group size if easier to access in non-violent than violent campaigns
- Violent campaigns particularly guerilla and terrorist groups, have to hide to survive



Figure: Naxalite guerillas trek back to their jungle redoubt, south Bastar region



The Mobilization Advantage: Moral Barriers

- Taking up weapons and killing adds a new dimension.
- While some people might *not* have any moral difficulties taking up weapons, most people have
- People joining a non-violent movement often face no moral barriers



The Mobilization Advantage: Commitment Barrier & Risk tolerance

- People with varying degrees of risk and commitment tolerance can participate in non-violent movements
- It is possible to join a non-violent movement just for a day this is rarely an option for violent campaigns (training needs, access to classified information)
- It is easier to combine non-violent activities with a job and a family: Do not have to make major life sacrifices (lower opportunity costs)



Why are large movements more likely to succeed?

- Large movements inflict higher costs on the government (This is true both for non-violent and violent campaigns)
- This makes it more costly to preserve status quo, and more attractive to grant concessions
- It also makes it more likely that some sort of loyalty shift take place within the government's most important pillars of support



Loyalty Shifts

- Every political leader depends on someone (This is true for Kim Jong–un as well as Erna Solberg)
 - The most important pillar of support is the security apparatus (military and police)
 - Without the support of the security apparatus the days of the regime will be counted
 - The economic elite as well often play an important role:





Loyalty Shifts within the Security Apparatus

- When demanded to use force to quell the protests the security force (military and police) might not always do so. Instead they might:
 - Shirk: Do nothing and let the protesters do what they want (Extremely unlikely to happen if the campaign is violent)
 - Defect: Join forces with the campaign





Loyalty Shifts within the Security Apparatus

- Repression is more likely to backfire if the campaign is non-violent
- The military might be less willing to repress large number of people
- With a large number of participants, the chances for kinship ties or other social networks linking members of the military to members of the movement increases. This is likely to make soldiers more reluctant to shoot at protesters, particularly if they non-violent
- More convincing that the military will be treated well by the new regime if the campaign is non-violent







- Non-violent campaigns are more than twice as likely to succeed
- Non-violent campaigns are better at mobilizing large number of people
- High participation rates increase costs inflicted on the government and the likelihood that the regime will loose the support from their erstwhile supporters



Scholars and Non-violence

Inclination:

Are the highly educated more likely to choose non-violence?

Strategic Ability:

Is education enabling discipline, coordination and restraint?

Knowledge:

Has Academia failed to detect the prevalence of non-violent action, and, by extension, study how and when it works?





Thank you



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