Kursbeskrivelse (norsk):
Dette kurset vil fokusere på “the hard problem of consciousness”: Hvordan oppstår bevisstheten fra det fysiske? Eller, hvorfor er noen fysiske prosesser ledsaget av subjektive, fenomenale opplevelser? Vi vil ta for oss tre hovedteorier: fysikalisme, dualisme og panpsykisme, med ekstra fokus på panpsykisme.
Noen av artiklene listet opp nedenfor vil være ekstra, frivillig lesning. Artiklene merket med * finnes i Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings (red. David J. Chalmers), som det anbefales å kjøpe. De resterende artiklene legges ut i Canvas (finnes stort sett også online via UiO-nettet).
- Thomas Nagel, What is it like to be a bat?*
- Ned Block, Concepts of consciousness*
- David Papineau, The rise of physicalism (Lesning til første gang. Ligger tilgjengelig i Canvas)
- J. J. C. Smart, Sensations and brain processes*
- Hilary Putnam, The nature of mental states*
- David Lewis, Mad pain and Martian pain
- Ned Block, Troubles with functionalism (excerpt)*
- John Searle, Is the brain a digital computer?
- Jaegwon Kim, The myth of non-reductive physicalism
- Chalmers, Facing up to the hard problem of consciousness
- Saul Kripke, Naming and necessity (excerpt)*
- Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia*
- David Chalmers, Consciousness and its place in nature*
- David Lewis, What experience teaches*
- Brian Loar, Phenomenal states (second version)*
- Katalin Balog, Conceivability, possibility and the mind–body problem
- David Papineau, Thinking about consciousness (excerpts from chapters 2,4 and 6)
- Philip Goff, A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong
- David Chalmers, Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap
- Daniel Dennett, Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness
- Keith Frankish, Illusionism as a theory of consciousness
- Daniel Dennett, Quining qualia*
- Galen Strawson: The consciousness deniers
- Mark Balauger, Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinism
- Kelvin McQueen, Does consciousness cause quantum collapse?
- Barbara Montero, What does conservation of energy have to do with physicalism?
- Alyssa Ney, Defining physicalism
- Daniel Stoljar, Two conceptions of the physical*
- Colin McGinn, Can we solve the mind-body problem?*
- Galen Strawson, Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism
- David Chalmers, Panpsychism and panprotopsychism
- Hedda Hassel Mørch, Is matter conscious?
- William James, Principles of psychology (excerpt)
- William James, A pluralistic universe (excerpt)
- Philip Goff, Why panpsychism doesn’t help us explain consciousness
- David Chalmers, The combination problem for panpsychism
- Giulio Tononi, Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto
- Hedda Hassel Mørch, Introduction to the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness
- Erik Hoel, Fiction in the age of the screens
- David Graeber, What’s the point if we can’t have fun?
Voluntary Reading:
- Scott Aaronson, Why I’m not an integrated information theorist
- Giulio Tononi, Why Scott should stare at a blank wall and reconsider (or, the conscious grid)