

## **FIL4011**

### Course description:

The course is an introduction to the epistemology of language. The main focus of the course will be on the topic of conscious states of linguistic understanding and their connection to knowledge of what is said that language users are credited with.

We will discuss the following main areas:

- [1] the basic psychology of speech comprehension
- [2] the phenomenology of speech comprehension
- [3] the connection between states of linguistic understanding and typical perceptual states
- [4] the connection between states of linguistic understanding and beliefs/ knowledge of what is said
- [5] the connection between knowledge of what is said and testimonial knowledge

### Obligatory activities:

Attendance (maximum 4 meetings can be missed)

Presentation (towards the end of the course)

### Reading list:

Appelbaum, I. (1998). Fodor, modularity, and speech perception. *Philosophical Psychology* 11 (3):317-330.

Barber, A. (2013). Understanding as knowledge of meaning. *Philosophy Compass*, 8(10), 964-977.

Buchanan, R. (2010). A puzzle about meaning and communication\*. *Noûs*, 44(2), 340-371.

Dodd, J. (2014). Realism and anti-realism about experiences of understanding. *Philosophical Studies*, 168(3), 745-767.

Dummett, M. (1993). What do I know when I know a language?. In M. Dummett, *The seas of language*. Oxford University Press.

Fodor, J. A. (1983). *The modularity of mind: An essay on faculty psychology*. MIT Press. (Part III: *Input systems as modules*).

Fowler, C. A., & Magnuson, J. S. (2012). Speech perception. *The Cambridge Handbook of Psycholinguistics*, 3-20.

Fricker, E. (2003). Understanding and knowledge of what is said. In A. Barber (ed.), *Epistemology of Language* (pp. 325-66). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Lackey, J. (2006). Learning from words. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 73 (1):77–101.
- Longworth, G. (2008). Linguistic understanding and knowledge. *Noûs*, 42(1), 50-79.
- O'Callaghan, C. (2011). Against hearing meanings. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 61(245), 783-807.
- O'Callaghan, C. (forthcoming). Speech Perception. In M. Matthen (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception*. Oxford.
- Peet, A. (forthcoming). Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation. *Philosophical Studies*:1-22.
- Pettit, D. (2002). Why knowledge is unnecessary for understanding language. *Mind*, 111(443), 519-550.
- Prinz, J. (2011). The sensory basis of cognitive phenomenology. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), *Cognitive Phenomenology* (pp. 174-196). Oxford University Press.
- Siegel, S. (2006). Which properties are represented in perception? In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience* (pp. 481-503). Oxford University Press.

**Optional reading:**

- Fricker, E. (2004). Testimony: Knowing through being told. In M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), *Handbook of Epistemology*. Kluwer 109-130.
- Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? *science*, 298(5598), 1569-1579.
- Pinker, S., & Jackendoff, R. (2005). The faculty of language: what's special about it?. *Cognition*, 95(2), 201-236.
- Remez, R. E., Rubin, P. E., Pisoni, D. B., & Carrell, T. D. (1981). Speech perception without traditional speech cues. *Science*, 212(4497), 947-949.
- Remez, R. E., & Trout, J. D. (2009). Philosophical messages in the medium of spoken language. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), *Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays*. OUP Oxford.
- Smith, B. C. (2010). Speech sounds and the direct meeting of minds. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (eds.), *Sounds and perception: New philosophical essays* (pp. 183-210). Oxford University Press.