Reading list:
(Articles available on internet)
Background
Smith, Adam (1759/1790/1984) The Theory of Moral Sentiments. (TMS) Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, III.3.2, pp 134-136 [window passage] and I.i.4.4, 19-23 [limiting the need of sympathy].
Sellars, Wilfrid (1963/1991) Science, Perception, and Reality. Atascadero/California: Reidgeview Publishing Company, #14-16, pp 142-145.
McDowell, John (1985) ‘Values and Secondary Qualities.’ In Ted Honderich (ed) Morality and Objectivity. A Tribute to J.L. Mackie. London et al.: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 110-129.
Wiggins, David (1987) ‘A sensible subjectivism.’ In: David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 185-214.
Wright, Crispin (1988) ‘Moral Values, Projection, and Secondary Qualities.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 62, 1-26.
Johnston, M. (1989) ‘Dispositional theories of value.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 63, 139-174.
Blackburn, Simon (1993) ‘Cicles, Finks, Smells and Biconditionals.’ Philosophical Perspectives 7, Language and Logic, 259-280.
Further introductory reading:
Haldane, John and Crispin Wright 1993) ‘Introduction.’ In John Haldane and Crispin Wright (eds) Reality, Representation, and Perception.’ Oxford: OUP, 3-12.
Smith, Michael (1989) ‘Dispositional theories of value.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. 63, 89-112.
Smith, Michael (1993) ‘Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience’. In John Haldane and Crispin Wright (eds) Reality, Representation, and Perception.’ Oxford:OUP, 235-256.
Recent developments of the debate
d’Arms, Justin a. Daniel Jacobson (2000a) ‘Sentiment and Value’. Ethics 110, 722-748
d’Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson (2000b) ‘The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61/1, 65-90.
Deonna. Julien A. (2006) ‘Emotion, Perception, and Perspective’. Dialectica 60/1, 29-46.
Gert, Joshua (2010) ‘Color Constancy and the Color/Value Analogy’. Ethics 121/1: 58-87.
Lebar, Mark (2005) ‘Three Dogmas of Response-Dependence.’ Philosophical Studies 123, 175-211.
Railton, Peter (1993) ‘What the non-cognitivis helps us to see the naturalist must help us to explain.’ With a response by David Wiggins and a response of Peter Railton to David Wiggins. In John Haldane and Crispin Wright (eds) Reality, Representation, and Perception. OUP, 279-328.
Railton, Peter (1998) ‘Red, Bitter, Good.’ In : Peter Railton, Facts, Valurs, and Norms. Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence. CUP, 131-147.
Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen (2004) ‘The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value’. Ethics 114: 391-423.
Zangwill, N (2003) ‘Against Moral Response-Dependence.’ Erkenntnis 59/3, 285-290.