i Instructions

This exam consists of TWO parts, Part I (60%) and Part II (40%).

A pass mark is required on both parts.

For Part I, you have a choice between A and B. For Part II you have a choice between A and B.

An excerpt from an obituary in the *The Telegraph*, July 2008, is provided for consultationfor Part I A. Another text, an excerpt from *The New Yorker*, February 2017, is provided for consultation for Part I B.

All questions must be answered in English.

Dictionaries are not allowed.

What you write will be stored automatically every 15 seconds. You may, at any time, switch back and forth between exam modules in order to check what you have done in each; however, the modules are numbered and you must do each module as a separate unit.

¹ Part I

Part I (60%) Answer EITHER A OR B:

EITHER:

A. What is meant by a catenative construction and how do catenatives relate to auxiliaries?

In your account, give examples of syntactic and morphological similarities and differences between catenatives and auxiliaries. In text A attached, you can find some examples of catenative constructions (not marked) that you may use in your account if you wish. You are also welcome to illustrate your account with examples of your own.

OR:

B. Give a short account of the typical criteria used to determine the subject of a sentence.

Discuss degrees of subject-hood and support your discussion with sentences having subjects that satisfy varying degrees of subjecthood. In text B attached, ten sentences have been underlined. You are free to use these for illustration in your account.

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Maximum marks: 0

² Part II

Part II. (40%) Answer A OR B below:

A. Give a complete syntactic analysis of the following sentence:

We agreed to try practicing playing tennis more often.

OR

B. Give a complete syntactic analysis of the sentence underlined in the following text excerpt:

On the flight to New York, Greg sat next to a foreign-looking man with a mustache. <u>Clamped to the man's ears was a headset for one of those miniature tape recorders</u>.

Note:

Whether you choose A) or B) in Part II, your analysis should include the functional as well as the formal phrase level and word level categories of the constituents. Draw your syntactic tree on one of the sheets provided and remember to fill in your candidate number.

Fill in your answer here

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Maximum marks: 0

Question 1

Attached





For Question A, Part I: An excerpt from The *Telegraph*, July 2008.

Sir Charles Wheeler

Sir Charles Wheeler, the BBC foreign correspondent who died on Friday aged 85, was the last working member of the stylish post-war school of television reporting and one of the few British television journalists to whom the term distinguished could properly be applied.

2:20PM BST 04 Jul 2008

Wheeler's craggy, birdlike features, well-brushed sweep of grey hair, glistening spectacles and laconic delivery may have seemed out of place in a medium increasingly obsessed with youth and good looks; but his dispassionate air of world-weary integrity and soundness of judgment were indispensable whenever there were serious and complicated issues to be investigated. He soldiered on at the BBC well into his seventies, and was considered by many of his colleagues to be one of the most elegant and authoritative correspondents the Corporation ever produced. Anti-establishment by instinct and modest by nature, Wheeler preferred to rely on direct experience and refused to have anything to do with the inside track of off-the-record briefings beloved of diplomats, ministers and many of his fellow journalists. As a general rule he held politicians in low esteem and avoided meeting them socially. His reports on such programmes as Panorama and Newsnight, as well as countless BBC news bulletins, seemed to suggest that all political motives are flawed and that information must be judged accordingly.

He was particularly effective as a commentator on the American political scene, as the BBC's Washington correspondent from 1965 to 1973. His reports on the assassination of Martin Luther King, the Johnson and Nixon presidencies, the anti-Vietnam war protests and the civil rights movement cut through the spin and made him a household name. Long after he had left America Wheeler found that many people retained an image of him delivering his piece against the backdrop of the White House.

Slim and somewhat Napoleonic in temperament, Wheeler set high standards for himself and for those around him. Though he was always generous to colleagues and never cut the ground from under the feet of his opponents, he was known to administer withering dressings-down to those he considered had not come up to scratch. Yet he himself was not entirely flawless: producers found it difficult to get him to take deadlines seriously when he was on to a good story, and he had an astonishing knack for getting up the noses of officialdom.

For Question B, Part I: Excerpt from *The New Yorker*, February 2017.

Why facts don't change our minds.

New discoveries about the human mind show the limitations of reason.

By Elizabeth Kolbert.

In 1975, researchers at Stanford invited a group of undergraduates to take part in a study about suicide. They were presented with pairs of suicide notes. In each pair, one note had been composed by a random individual, the other by a person who had subsequently taken his own life. The students were asked to distinguish between the genuine notes and the fake ones.

<u>Some students discovered that they had a genius for the task</u>. Out of twenty-five pairs of notes, they correctly identified the real one twenty-four times. Others discovered that they were hopeless. They managed to identify the real note in only ten instances.

However, the whole setup was a put-on. Though half the notes were indeed genuine, the scores were fictitious. The high-score students were, on average, no more discerning than those who had been told they were mostly wrong.

In the second phase of the study, the deception was revealed. The students were told that the real point of the experiment was to gauge their responses to *thinking* they were right or wrong. Finally, the students were asked to estimate how many suicide notes they had actually categorized correctly, and how many they thought an average student would get right. At this point, something curious happened. The students in the high-score group thought they had, in fact, done quite well – significantly better than the average student – even though, as they'd just been told, they had zero grounds for believing this. Conversely, those who'd been assigned to the low-score group thought they had done significantly worse than the average student – a conclusion that was equally unfounded.

"Once formed," the researchers observed dryly, "impressions are remarkably perseverant."

A few years later, a new set of Stanford students was recruited for a related study. The students were handed packets of information about a pair of firefighters, Frank K. and George H.

<u>Frank's bio noted that among other things, he had a baby daughter and he liked to scuba</u> <u>dive.</u> George had a small son and played golf. The packets also included the men's responses on what the researchers called the Risky-Conservative Choice Test. According to one version of the packet, Frank was a successful firefighter who, on the test, always went with the safest option. In the other version, Frank also chose the safest option, but he was a lousy

firefighter who'd been put "on report" by his supervisors several times. Once again, midway through the study the students were informed that they'd been misled. The information they'd received was entirely fictitious. The students were then asked to describe their own beliefs. What sort of attitude toward risk did they think a successful firefighter would have? The students who'd received the first packet thought that he would avoid it. The students in the second group thought he would embrace it.

"Even after the evidence for their beliefs has been totally refuted, people fail to make appropriate revisions in those beliefs," the researchers noted. In this case, the failure was "particularly impressive," since two data points would never have been enough information to generalize from.

The Stanford studies became famous. Coming from a group of academics in the nineteen-seventies, the contention that people can't think straight was shocking. It isn't any longer. Thousands of subsequent experiments have confirmed (and elaborated on) this finding. As everyone who'd followed the research knows, any graduate student with a clipboard can demonstrate that reasonable-seeming people are often totally irrational. Rarely has this insight seemed more relevant than it does right now. Still, an essential puzzle remains: How did we come to be this way?

(Excerpt from *The New Yorker*, February 2017)