Philosophical Theories of Human Rights

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Habermas on Human Rights

List of Habermas' writings on human rights:

- Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican Version, Ratio Juris, vol.7, March 1994
- Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years' Hindsight, in Bohman, Perpetual Peace, 1997
- Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights, The Modern Schoolman, LXXV, Jan.1998
- The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights, Metaphilosophy, 2010

Habermas' Political Conception of Human Rights

Habermas' starting definition:

The concept of human rights «does not have its origin in morality, but rather bears the imprint of the modern concept of individual liberties, hence of a specifically juridical concept»

this does not mean that they are only positive legal rights, since:

1) their «mode of validity» is as universal moral norms

2)but their mode of functioning/their structure is as a positive coercive legal order.

• Human rights are Janus faced:



they show moral universal validity and they assume the form of positive laws

Question: what is Habermas' view of the validity of law?

Habermas Justificatory Strategy:

Reconstruction of the legitimacy of modern consitutionalism

Thesis: Popular Sovereignity and Human Rights are Cooriginal Notions

Popular sovereignity: «...members of a democratic community are governed by themselves collectively»

Human rights: «...they are governed by law and not by men»

J.Habermas, Ratio Juris, 1994, p.1

What does it mean?

a) Liberals/liberal democracies: priority of human rights over popular sovereignity

a) Republicans/radical democrats: priority of popular sovereignity over human rights

a)Republican liberties are positive liberties TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION/CIVIC ORGANIZATION (Rousseau's model)

b)Liberal liberties are negative liberties NOT TO BE INTERFERED (tyranny of the majority, Kant's model)

In both cases, popular sovereignity and human rights compete with each, they don't complement!

The result is that liberals cannot provide an account of autonomy as sovereign citizenry (since human rights are prior)

and

republicans cannot account for the universality of human rights (since collective affiliation is prior)

Habermas:

«Neither of these two responses satisfies our normative intuition that human rights and popular sovereignity are not only interwoven, but of equal importance and <u>even</u> <u>of the same origin</u>» (p.2)

• ...On the way to solve the riddle:

Rousseau: the «general will» incorporates human rights as «a mode of popular sovereignity» (p.11) This allows to exclude:

-non-generalizable interests but granting legal equality of all affected participants

 «...a norm lies equally in the interest of all has the sense of rational acceptability...but this is proved only through the procedures for a discursive process of opinion-and will-formation» (p.12)

Habermas's account for the validity of law is «postmetaphysical»

Contrast a)metaphysical explanations – religious grounding of law

with

b)post-metaphysical explanations – moral autonomy plus positive law (legitimate procedure of law production)

For Habermas positive human rights are «no longer constraints, but enabling conditions for the exercise of popular sovereignity» (p.13)

«private and public autonomy are co-original and of equal weight»

Habermas' co-originality thesis Co-originality thesis

There is an internal connection - mutual presupposition - between

human rights as <u>negative liberal rights</u> (freedoms of the moderns) and human rights as <u>positive</u> <u>freedoms/popular sovereignity</u> (freedoms of the ancients).

Human rights as negative protections of private liberty <u>must be presupposed</u> to the idea of a legal institutionalization of the practice of self-determination (popular sovereignity/democracy).

This is Habermas's complete system of rights!

Yet: its ultimate justification requires a further step upward...

LOGICAL GENENSIS OF HUMAN RIGHTSDicourse principle D':

«just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses»

-post-conventional principle-requirement of impartiality

- The complete system of rights as generated by the discourse principle has the following <u>categories of rights</u> as an outcome. These categories exaust the division between positive/liberty of the ancients and negative liberties/liberty of the moderns
- 1)Equal individual liberties
- 2)rights of political membership
- 3) rights of equal protection under law
- 4)rights to equal political participation (as legal institutionalization of democratic principle)
- 5)Social and economic rights for the exercise of categories 1-4

NB:

these are categories of rights falling <u>either</u> in the already mentioned category of (negative) human rights <u>or</u> in the category of (positive) democracy/sovereignity principle.

The specific content of these rights is left to the democratic dynamics of citizens to decide!

- In "The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights" complete version in C.Corradetti (Ed.), Phil.Dimensions of Human Rights, Springer 2012
- > How does this change the justificatory framework?

Thesis:

Human Rights are older codifications than Human Dignity, but this notion was <u>implicit...</u>

In what sense?

Human rights have always concerned violations of a moral worthiness etc.

The genaology of "dignity" goes from the multiplicity of different social/corporative dignities linked to honor etc. to the recognition of a universal equal dignity as moral worthiness (particulary with Kant).

• Human Dignity

becomes "a moral 'source' from which all of the basic rights derive their meaning" (p.466)

- "The euristic function of human dignity is the key to the logical interconnections between these four categories of rights" [economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights] (p.468)
- "Human dignity grounds the indivisibility of all categories of human rights" (p.468)

The co-originality thesis needs a unifying principle.

This is my principle on «equal communicative freedoms»