

# Fairness

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
# Bail decisions




# Bail decisions




# Bail decisions




# Bail decisions




# Bail decisions



# Bail decisions



# Bail decisions



## His honour the machine

Prisoners released on bail\*

%

Chosen by judges

18.6

of which: re-offend<sup>†</sup>

Suggested by algorithm

14.9

\*From a representative sample of the US Department of Justice database 1990-2009


Source: Jens Ludwig, University of Chicago

<sup>†</sup>Failure to appear in court and re-arrest before trial

Economist.com



# Whites get lower scores than blacks<sup>1</sup>



Black



White

**Figure:** Apparent bias in risk scores towards black versus white defendants.

<sup>1</sup>Pro-publica, 2016

But scores equally accurately predict recidivism<sup>2</sup>




Figure: Recidivism rates by risk score.

## But non-offending blacks get higher scores




Figure: Score breakdown based on recidivism rates.

# Graphical models and independence

- ▶ Why is it not possible to be fair in all respects?
- ▶ Different notions of **conditional independence**.
- ▶ Can only be satisfied rarely simultaneously.

# Graphical models




Figure: Graphical model (directed acyclic graph) for three variables.

## Joint probability

Let  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ . Then  $\mathbf{x} : \Omega \rightarrow X$ ,  $X = \prod_i X_i$  and:

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{x} \in A) = P(\{\omega \in \Omega \mid \mathbf{x}(\omega) \in A\}).$$

## Factorisation

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{x}_B \mid \mathbf{x}_C) \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{x}_C), \quad B, C \subset [n]$$

# Graphical models




Figure: Graphical model (directed acyclic graph) for three variables.

## Joint probability

Let  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ . Then  $\mathbf{x} : \Omega \rightarrow X$ ,  $X = \prod_i X_i$  and:

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{x} \in A) = P(\{\omega \in \Omega \mid \mathbf{x}(\omega) \in A\}).$$

## Factorisation

So we can write any joint distribution as

$$\mathbb{P}(x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_2 \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_3 \mid x_1, x_2) \cdots \mathbb{P}(x_n \mid x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}).$$

# Directed graphical models




Figure: Graphical model for the factorisation  $\mathbb{P}(x_3 | x_2) \mathbb{P}(x_2 | x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_1)$ .


## Conditional independence

We say  $x_i$  is conditionally independent of  $\mathbf{x}_B$  given  $\mathbf{x}_D$  and write

$x_i | \mathbf{x}_D \perp\!\!\!\perp \mathbf{x}_B$  iff

$$\mathbb{P}(x_i, \mathbf{x}_B | \mathbf{x}_D) = \mathbb{P}(x_i | \mathbf{x}_D) \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{x}_B | \mathbf{x}_D).$$

## Example 1 (Smoking and lung cancer)




**Figure:** Smoking and lung cancer graphical model, where  $S$ : Smoking,  $C$ : cancer,  $A$ : asbestos exposure.

### Explaining away

Even though  $S, A$  are independent, they become dependent once you know  $C$ .



## Example 2 (Time of arrival at work)



**Figure:** Time of arrival at work graphical model where  $T$  is a traffic jam and  $x_1$  is the time John arrives at the office and  $x_2$  is the time Jane arrives at the office.

### Conditional independence

Even though  $x_1, x_2$  are correlated, they become independent once you know  $T$ .

## Example 3 (Treatment effects)




Figure: Kidney treatment model, where  $x$ : severity,  $y$ : result,  $a$ : treatment applied

	Treatment A	Treatment B
Small stones	87	270
Large stones	263	80
Severity	Treatment A	Treatment B
Small stones )	93%	87%
Large stones	73%	69%
Average	78%	83%


## Example 4 (School admission)



Figure: School admission graphical model, where  $z$ : gender,  $s$ : school applied to,  $a$ : whether you were admitted.


School	Male	Female
A	62%	82%
B	63%	68%
C	37%	34%
D	33%	35%
E	28%	24%
F	6%	7%
<i>Average</i>	<i>45%</i>	<i>38%</i>

## Exercise 1



Factorise the following graphical model.


## Exercise 1



Factorise the following graphical model.


$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbb{P}(x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_2 \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_3 \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_4)$$

## Exercise 2



Factorise the following graphical model.

## Exercise 2




Factorise the following graphical model.

$$\mathcal{X}b \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbb{P}(x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_2 | x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_3 | x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_4 | x_3)$$

## Exercise 3

What dependencies does the following factorisation imply?

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbb{P}(x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_2 \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_3 \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_4 \mid x_2, x_3)$$






### Exercise 3

What dependencies does the following factorisation imply?

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbb{P}(x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_2 \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_3 \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}(x_4 \mid x_2, x_3)$$



## Deciding conditional independence

There is an algorithm for deciding conditional independence of any two variables in a graphical model.

# Measuring independence

## Theorem 5

If  $x_i \mid \mathbf{x}_D \perp\!\!\!\perp \mathbf{x}_B$  then

$$\mathbb{P}(x_i \mid \mathbf{x}_B, \mathbf{x}_D) = \mathbb{P}(x_i \mid \mathbf{x}_D)$$

## Example 6

$$\|\mathbb{P}(a \mid y, z) - \mathbb{P}(a \mid y)\|_1$$

which for discrete  $a, y, z$  is:

$$\max_{i,j} \|\mathbb{P}(a \mid y = i, z = j) - \mathbb{P}(a \mid y = i)\|_1 = \max_{i,j} \left\| \sum_k \mathbb{P}(a = k \mid y = i, z = j) - \mathbb{P}(a = k \mid y = i) \right\|_1$$

## Measuring independence

### Theorem 5

If  $x_i \mid \mathbf{x}_D \perp\!\!\!\perp \mathbf{x}_B$  then

$$\mathbb{P}(x_i \mid \mathbf{x}_B, \mathbf{x}_D) = \mathbb{P}(x_i \mid \mathbf{x}_D)$$

This implies

$$\mathbb{P}(x_i \mid \mathbf{x}_B = b, \mathbf{x}_D) = \mathbb{P}(x_i \mid \mathbf{x}_B = b', \mathbf{x}_D)$$

so we can measure independence by seeing how the distribution of  $x_i$  changes when we vary  $\mathbf{x}_B$ , keeping  $\mathbf{x}_D$  fixed.

### Example 6

$$\|\mathbb{P}(a \mid y, z) - \mathbb{P}(a \mid y)\|_1$$

which for discrete  $a, y, z$  is:

$$\max_{i,j} \|\mathbb{P}(a \mid y = i, z = j) - \mathbb{P}(a \mid y = i)\|_1 = \max_{i,j} \left\| \sum_k \mathbb{P}(a = k \mid y = i, z = j) - \mathbb{P}(a = k \mid y = i) \right\|_1$$

# Coin tossing, revisited

## Example 7

The Beta-Bernoulli prior



Figure: Graphical model for a Beta-Bernoulli prior

$$\theta \sim \mathcal{Beta}(\xi_1, \xi_2), \quad \text{i.e. } \xi \text{ are Beta distribution parameters} \quad (2.1)$$

$$x \mid \theta \sim \mathcal{Bernoulli}(\theta), \quad \text{i.e. } P_\theta(x) \text{ is a Bernoulli} \quad (2.2)$$

## Example 8

An alternative model for coin-tossing This is an elaboration of Example ?? for hypothesis testing.




Figure: Graphical model for a hierarchical prior


- ▶  $\mu_1$ : A Beta-Bernoulli model with  $\text{Beta}(\xi_1, \xi_2)$
- ▶  $\mu_0$ : The coin is fair.

$$\theta \mid \mu = \mu_0 \sim \mathcal{D}(0.5), \quad \text{i.e. } \theta \text{ is always } 0.5 \quad (2.3)$$


$$\theta \mid \mu = \mu_1 \sim \text{Beta}(\xi_1, \xi_2), \quad \text{i.e. } \theta \text{ has a Beta distribution} \quad (2.4)$$

$$x \mid \theta \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\theta), \quad \text{i.e. } P_\theta(x) \text{ is Bernoulli} \quad (2.5)$$

# Bayesian testing of independence



(a)  $\Theta_0$  assumes independence



(b)  $\Theta_1$  does **not** assume independence


## Example 9

Assume data  $D = \{x_1^t, x_2^t, x_3^t \mid t = 1, \dots, T\}$  with  $x_i^t \in \{0, 1\}$ .


$$P_\theta(D) = \prod_t P_\theta(x_3^t \mid x_2^t) P_\theta(x_2^t \mid x_1^t) P_\theta(x_1^t), \quad \theta \in \Theta_0 \quad (2.6)$$

$$P_\theta(D) = \prod_t P_\theta(x_3^t \mid x_2^t, x_1^t) P_\theta(x_2^t \mid x_1^t) P_\theta(x_1^t), \quad \theta \in \Theta_1 \quad (2.7)$$

# Bayesian testing of independence



(a)  $\theta_0$  assumes independence



(b)  $\theta_1$  does **not** assume independence

## Example 9

$$\theta_1 \triangleq P_{\theta}(x_1^t = 1) \quad (\mu_0, \mu_1)$$

$$\theta_{2|1}^i \triangleq P_{\theta}(x_2^t = 1 \mid x_1^t = i) \quad (\mu_0, \mu_1)$$

$$\theta_{3|2}^j \triangleq P_{\theta}(x_3^t = 1 \mid x_2^t = j) \quad (\mu_0)$$

$$\theta_{3|2,1}^{i,j} \triangleq P_{\theta}(x_3^t = 1 \mid x_2^t = j, x_1^t = i) \quad (\mu_1)$$





Figure: Hierarchical model.

$$\mu_i \sim \phi \quad (2.6)$$

$$\theta \mid \mu = \mu_i \sim \xi_i \quad (2.7)$$

## Marginal likelihood

$$\mathbb{P}_\phi(D) = \phi(\mu_0) \mathbb{P}_{\mu_0}(D) + \phi(\mu_1) \mathbb{P}_{\mu_1}(D) \quad (2.8)$$

$$\mathbb{P}_{\mu_i}(D) = \int_{\Theta_i} P_\theta(D) d\xi_i(\theta). \quad (2.9)$$



Figure: Hierarchical model.

## Marginal likelihood

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$$\mathbb{P}_{\mu_i}(D) = \int_{\Theta_i} P_\theta(D) d\xi_i(\theta). \quad (2.7)$$

## Model posterior

$$\phi(\mu | D) = \frac{\mathbb{P}_\mu(D)\phi(\mu)}{\sum_i \mathbb{P}_{\mu_i}(D)\phi(\mu_i)} \quad (2.8)$$

# Calculating the marginal likelihood

## Monte-Carlo approximation

$$\int_{\Theta} P_{\theta}(D) d\xi(\theta) \approx \sum_{n=1}^N P_{\theta_n}(D) + O(1/\sqrt{N}), \quad \theta_n \sim \xi \quad (2.9)$$

## Importance sampling

$$\int_{\Theta} P_{\theta}(D) d\xi(\theta) \quad (2.10)$$

# Calculating the marginal likelihood

## Monte-Carlo approximation

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## Importance sampling

$$\int_{\Theta} P_{\theta}(D) d\xi(\theta) = \int_{\Theta} P_{\theta}(D) \frac{d\psi(\theta)}{d\xi(\theta)} d\xi(\theta) \quad (2.10)$$

# Calculating the marginal likelihood

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# Calculating the marginal likelihood

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$$\int_{\Theta} P_{\theta}(D) d\xi(\theta) \approx \sum_{n=1}^N P_{\theta_n}(D) + O(1/\sqrt{N}), \quad \theta_n \sim \xi \quad (2.9)$$

## Importance sampling

$$\int_{\Theta} P_{\theta}(D) d\xi(\theta) \approx \sum_{n=1}^N P_{\theta}(D) \frac{d\xi(\theta_n)}{d\psi(\theta_n)}, \quad \theta_n \sim \psi \quad (2.10)$$

## Sequential updating of the marginal likelihood

$$\mathbb{P}_\xi(D)$$

(2.14)

### Example 10 (Beta-Bernoulli)

$$\mathbb{P}_\xi(x_t = 1 \mid x_1, \dots, x_{t-1}) = \frac{\alpha_t}{\alpha_t + \beta_t},$$

with  $\alpha_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} x_n$ ,  $\beta_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} (1 - x_n)$

## Sequential updating of the marginal likelihood

$$\mathbb{P}_\xi(D) = \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_1, \dots, x_T)$$

(2.14)

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## Sequential updating of the marginal likelihood

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{P}_\xi(D) &= \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_1, \dots, x_T) \\ &= \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_2, \dots, x_T \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_1)\end{aligned}\tag{2.11}$$

(2.14)

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## Sequential updating of the marginal likelihood

$$\mathbb{P}_\xi(D) = \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_1, \dots, x_T) \quad (2.11)$$

$$= \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_2, \dots, x_T \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_1) \quad (2.12)$$

$$= \prod_{t=1}^T \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_t \mid x_1, \dots, x_{t-1})$$

(2.14)

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$$\mathbb{P}_\xi(x_t = 1 \mid x_1, \dots, x_{t-1}) = \frac{\alpha_t}{\alpha_t + \beta_t},$$

with  $\alpha_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} x_n$ ,  $\beta_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} (1 - x_n)$

## Sequential updating of the marginal likelihood

$$\mathbb{P}_\xi(D) = \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_1, \dots, x_T) \quad (2.11)$$


$$= \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_2, \dots, x_T \mid x_1) \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_1) \quad (2.12)$$

$$= \prod_{t=1}^T \mathbb{P}_\xi(x_t \mid x_1, \dots, x_{t-1}) \quad (2.13)$$

$$= \prod_{t=1}^T \int_{\Theta} P_{\theta_n}(x_t) \underbrace{d\xi(\theta \mid x_1, \dots, x_{t-1})}_{\text{posterior at time } t} \quad (2.14)$$

### Example 10 (Beta-Bernoulli)

$$\mathbb{P}_\xi(x_t = 1 \mid x_1, \dots, x_{t-1}) = \frac{\alpha_t}{\alpha_t + \beta_t},$$

with  $\alpha_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} x_n$ ,  $\beta_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{t-1} (1 - x_n)$  

## Further reading

### Python sources

- ▶ A simple python measure of conditional independence  
`src/fairness/ci_test.py`
- ▶ A simple test for discrete Bayesian network  
`src/fairness/DirichletTest.py`
- ▶ Using the PyMC package  
[https://docs.pymc.io/notebooks/Bayes\\_factor.html](https://docs.pymc.io/notebooks/Bayes_factor.html)

# Bail decisions, revisited

 $x$  $\downarrow \pi$ 

## Bail decisions, revisited

 $x$ 
 $\downarrow \pi$ 
 $a_1$  $\pi(a | x)$ 

(policy)

## Bail decisions, revisited

 $x$ 
 $\downarrow \pi$ 

 $\pi(a | x)$ 

(policy)

 $a_1$  $a_2$ 

## Bail decisions, revisited

 $x$  $\pi$  $\pi(a | x)$ 

(policy)

 $\mathbb{P}(y | a, x)$ 

(outcome)

 $a_1$  $a_2$  $y_1$ 



## Bail decisions, revisited

 $x$  $\pi$  $\pi(a | x)$ 

(policy)

 $\mathbb{P}(y | a, x)$ 

(outcome)

 $a_1$  $a_2$  $y_1$ 

## Bail decisions, revisited

 $x$  $\pi$  $\pi(a | x)$ 

(policy)

 $\mathbb{P}(y | a, x)$ 


(outcome)

 $a_1$  $a_2$  $y_1$  $y_2$ 

## Bail decisions, revisited

 $x$  $\pi$  $\pi(a | x)$  (policy) $\mathbb{P}(y | a, x)$  (outcome) $a_1$  $a_2$  $U(a, y)$  (utility) $y_1$  $y_2$ 

## Recidivism rates by risk score




$y$  Result.

$a$  Assigned score.

$z$  Race.

$$\mathbb{P}^\pi(y | a, z) = \mathbb{P}^\pi(y | a) \quad (\text{calibration})$$

$$\mathbb{P}^\pi(a | y, z) = \mathbb{P}^\pi(a | y) \quad (\text{balance})$$



$y$  Result.

$a$  Assigned score.

$z$  Race.


$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi}(y | a, z) = \mathbb{P}^{\pi}(y | a) \quad (\text{calibration})$$

$$\mathbb{P}^{\pi}(a | y, z) = \mathbb{P}^{\pi}(a | y) \quad (\text{balance})$$

## Meritocratic decision

$$a_t(\theta, x_t) \in \arg \max_a \mathbb{E}_\theta(U \mid a, x_t) = \int_{\mathcal{Y}} U(a_t, y) \mathbb{E}_\theta(U \mid a_t, x_t) \quad (3.1)$$

$$D[\pi(a | x), \pi(a | x')] \leq \rho(x, x'). \quad (3.2)$$



# The Bayesian approach to fairness

## The value of a policy

Let  $\lambda$  represent the trade-off between utility and fairness.

$$V(\lambda, \theta, \pi) = \lambda \overbrace{U(\theta, \pi)}^{\text{utility}} - \underbrace{(1 - \lambda)F(\theta, \pi)}_{\text{fairness violation}} \quad (3.3)$$

$$V(\lambda, \xi, \pi) = \int_{\Theta} V(\lambda, \theta, \pi) d\xi(\theta). \quad (3.4)$$



## Online resources

- ▶ COMPAS analysis by propublica  
<https://github.com/propublica/compas-analysis>
- ▶ Open policing database <https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/>