

# IN2120 Information Security

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## Lecture 4: Communications Security

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# Outline

- Network security concepts
  - Communication security
  - Perimeter security
- Protocol architecture and security services
- Example security protocols
  - Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  - IP Layer Security (IPSec)
- VPN – Virtual Private Network

# Network Security Concepts


Assumes that each organisation owns a network

- Wants to protect own local network
- Wants to protect communication with other networks


Network Security: two main areas

- **Communication Security:** Protection of data transmitted across networks between organisations and end users
  - Topic for this lecture
- **Perimeter Security:** Protection of an organization's network from unauthorized access
  - Topic for next lecture

# OSI model vs. TCP/IP model (The Internet)



# Communication Security Analogy



# Security Protocols

- Many different security protocols have been specified and implemented for different purposes
  - Authentication, integrity, confidentiality
  - Key establishment/exchange
  - E-Voting
  - Secret sharing
  - etc.
- Protocols are surprisingly difficult to get right!
  - Many vulnerabilities are discovered years later (e.g. for TLS: DROWN, POODLE, ROBOT, Logjam, FREAK, BEAST, ...)
  - ... some are never discovered (or maybe only by the attackers)

# Security Protocols Overview

- This lecture discusses the operation of two network-related protocols that are in common use.
  - **Transport Layer Security (TLS):**  
Used extensively on the web and is often referred to in privacy policies as a means of providing confidential web connections.
  - **IP Security (IPSec):**  
Provides security services at the IP level and is used to provide Virtual Private Network (VPN) services.

# Transport Layer Security

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
**TLS/SSL**



# SSL/TLS: History

- 1994: Netscape Communications developed the network authentication protocol Secure Sockets Layer, SSLv2.
  - Badly broken, officially deprecated 2011
- 1995: Netscape release their own improvements SSLv3.
  - Broken, officially deprecated 2015
- In January 1999, [RFC 2246](#) was issued by the IETF, Transport Layer Security Protocol: TLS 1.0
  - Similar to, but incompatible with SSLv3
  - Followed by TLS 1.1 (2006) and TLS 1.2 (2008)
  - Current version: TLS 1.3 (2018), removes all old/insecure features/algorithms

# SSL/TLS Protocol versions




# TLS: Overview


- TLS is a cryptographic services protocol based on the Browser PKI, and is commonly used on the Internet.
  - Each server has a server certificate and private key installed
  - Allows browsers to establish secure sessions with web servers.
- Port 443 is reserved for HTTP over TLS/SSL and the protocol https is used with this port.
  - `http://www.xxx.com` implies using standard HTTP using port 80.
  - `https://www.xxx.com` implies HTTP over TLS/SSL with port 443.
- Other applications:
  - IMAP over TLS: port 993
  - POP3 over TLS: port 995

# TLS: Layer 4 Security

TLS operates  
at Layer 4



# TLS: Protocol Stack



# TLS: Architecture Overview

- Designed to provide secure reliable end-to-end services over TCP.
  - Confidentiality
  - Integrity
  - Authenticity
- Consists of 3 higher level protocols:
  - TLS Handshake Protocol
  - TLS Alert Protocol
  - TLS Change Cipher Spec Protocol
- The TLS Record Protocol provides the practical encryption and integrity services to various application protocols.

# TLS: Handshake Protocol

- The handshake protocol
  - Negotiates the encryption to be used
  - Establishes a shared session key
  - Authenticates the server
  - Authenticates the client (optional)
- After the handshake, application data is transmitted securely (encrypted + integrity protected)
- Several variations of the handshake exist
  - RSA variants
  - Diffie-Hellman variants

# TLS: Simplified RSA-based Handshake

Client



Server



Supported crypto algorithms and protocol versions

Client Hello

Secret material encrypted with server pub. key

Server Hello

Client Key Exchange

Common protocol, Common algorithm, Server certificate

Client and Server generate session key from secret material

Go to crypto with common algorithm and session key

Change Cipher Suite

Change Cipher Suite

Go to crypto with common algorithm and session key


Continues with TLS Record protocol encrypted with session key



# TLS: Handshake

## Four phases

- Phase 1: Initiates the logical connection and establishes its security capabilities
- Phases 2 and 3: Performs key exchange. The messages and message content used in this phase depends on the handshake variant negotiated in phase 1.
- Phase 4: Completes the setting up of a secure connection.



# TLS: Elements of Handshake

- Client hello

- Advertises available algorithms (e.g. RSA, AES, SHA256)
- Different types of algorithms bundled into “Cipher Suites”
- Format:  
*TLS\_key-exchange-algorithm\_WITH\_data-protection-algorithm*
- Example (TLS 1.2): `TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256`
  - RSA for key exchange
  - AES (128 bit key) with CBC mode for encryption
  - SHA256 as hash function for authentication and integrity protection
- Example (TLS 1.3): `TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384`
  - DH for key exchange (implicit)
  - AES with GCM for encryption + integrity protection
  - SHA384 as hash function for authentication

# TLS: Elements of Handshake

- **Server hello**
  - Returns the selected cipher suite
  - Server adapts to client capabilities
- **Server Certificate**
  - X.509 digital certificate sent to client
  - Client verifies the certificate including that the certificate signer is in its acceptable Certificate Authority (CA) list. Now the client has the server's certified public key.
- **Client Certificate**
  - Optionally, the client can send its X.509 certificate to server, in order to provide mutual authentication
- **Server/Client Key Exchange**
  - The client and server can establish a session key using asymmetric encryption or DH key exchange (details below)

# TLS: Record Protocol Overview

- Provides two services for TLS connections.
  - Message Confidentiality:
    - Ensure that the message contents cannot be read in transit.
    - The Handshake Protocol establishes a symmetric key used to encrypt TLS payloads using symmetric encryption.
  - Message Integrity:
    - Ensure that the receiver can detect if a message is modified in transmission.
    - The Handshake Protocol establishes a shared secret key used to construct a MAC.


# TLS: Record Protocol Operation

- Fragmentation:
  - Each application layer message is fragmented into blocks of 214 bytes or less.
- ~~Compression:~~
  - Optionally applied.
  - ~~SSL v3 & TLS – default compression algorithm is null~~
- Add MAC:
  - Calculates a MAC over the compressed data using a MAC secret from the connection state.
- Encrypt:
  - Compressed data plus MAC are encrypted with symmetric cipher.
  - Permitted ciphers include AES, ~~IDEA, DES, 3DES, RC4~~
  - For block ciphers, padding is applied after the MAC to make a multiple of the cipher's block size.


# TLS: Key Exchange

- Two possibilities for exchange of secret key material (premaster secret, PS):
  - RSA encryption
  - DH exchange
- **RSA encryption:**
  - Client generates PS + encrypts PS with server public key (RSA)
  - Server decrypts PS with server private key (RSA)

# Weakness of DH Key Exchange



# Countermeasure





# TLS: Key Exchange

- Two possibilities for exchange of secret key material (premaster secret, PS):
  - RSA encryption
  - DH exchange
- ~~RSA encryption:~~
  - Client generates PS + ~~encrypts PS with server public key (RSA)~~
  - ~~Server decrypts PS with server private key (RSA)~~
- DH exchange:
  - Client and server perform Diffie-Hellman-Exchange (DH)
  - Server signs his DH value with server private key (RSA)
  - Client validates signature with server public key (RSA)

# TLS Key Exchange

- Problem with RSA key exchange?
- Lets assume adversary records complete TLS session
- If later private key of server is known
  - Premaster secret can be decrypted
  - Session key can be calculated
  - Complete payload can be decrypted
- With DH exchange:
  - later knowledge of private key is useless
  - Payload remains protected
  - “perfect forward secrecy”


# TLS Challenges

- Many vulnerabilities exist for TLS
  - keep client and server software up-to-date
- Also vulnerabilities in cryptographic algorithms
  - configure server to exclude weak algorithms
- TLS provides security just for a single TCP connection
  - Browser can establish HTTP and HTTPS connections; even to the same server
  - User can be tricked to use HTTP instead of HTTPS (→ next slide)
- Relies on browser PKI which has many security issues
  - Fake server certificates difficult to detect (→ lecture “PKI”)
  - Fake root server certificate can compromise all certificates, e.g. Lenovo Komodia advance scam (→ lecture “Network Security”)


# Demo

# HTTPS redirect

- Typical for normal browsing behaviour



# TLS Stripping Attack




- Variations include
  - MitM server can connect to client over https in msg (6) with server certificate that has similar domain name as real server.
  - Attacker can leave the connection after stealing credentials, then the client connects directly to real server with https
  - Attacker just downgrades the https connection to a vulnerable SSL/TLS version or a broken cipher suite

# HSTS – HTTP Strict Transport Security

## Preventing TLS Stripping

- A secure server can instruct browsers to only use https
- When requesting website that uses HSTS, the browser automatically forces connect with https.
- Users are not able to override policy
- Two ways of specifying HSTS websites
  - List of HSTS websites can be preloaded into browsers
  - HSTS policy initially specified over a https connection
    - HSTS policy can be changed over a https connection
- Disadvantages
  - HSTS websites can not use both http and https
  - Difficult for a website to stop using https
  - Can cause denial of service, e.g. no fallback to http in case of expired server certificate

# Preventing TLS Stripping with HSTS




- Limitation of HSTS:
  - Requires first visit to secure website to set HSTS policy in browser
- Can be solved by browser having preloaded list of HSTS websites
- Browsers would be vulnerable if attacker could delete HSTS cache



# Demo

# Phishing and failed authentication



# IP Layer Security

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
IPSec & Virtual Private Networks

# IPSec: Introduction

- Internet Protocol security (IPSec) is standard for secure communications over Internet Protocol (IP) networks, through the use of cryptographic security services.
- Uses encryption, authentication and key management algorithms
- Based on an end-to-end security model at the IP level
- Provides a security architecture for both IPv4 and IPv6
  - Mandatory for IPv6
  - Optional for IPv4
- Requires operating system support, not application support.

# Layer 3 Security

IP Sec Operation →



# IPSec: Security Services

- **Message Confidentiality.**
  - Protects against unauthorized data disclosure.
  - Accomplished by the use of encryption mechanisms.
- **Message Integrity.**
  - IPsec can determine if data has been changed (intentionally or unintentionally) during transit.
  - Integrity of data can be assured by using a MAC.
- **Traffic Analysis Protection.**
  - A person monitoring network traffic cannot know which parties are communicating, how often, or how much data is being sent.
  - Provided by concealing IP datagram details such as source and destination address.

# IPSec: Security Services


- **Message Replay Protection.**
  - The same data is not delivered multiple times, and data is not delivered grossly out of order.
  - However, IPsec does not ensure that data is delivered in the exact order in which it is sent.
- **Peer Authentication.**
  - Each IPsec endpoint confirms the identity of the other IPsec endpoint with which it wishes to communicate.
  - Ensures that network traffic is being sent from the expected host.
- **Network Access Control.**
  - Filtering can ensure users only have access to certain network resources and can only use certain types of network traffic.

# IPSec: Common Architectures

- Gateway-to-Gateway Architecture
- Host-to-Gateway Architecture
- Host-to-Host Architecture




# IPSec: Gateway-to-Gateway Architecture




Source: NIST Special Publication 800-77

# IPSec: Host-to-Gateway Architecture



Source: NIST Special Publication 800-77

# IPSec: Host-to-Host Architecture



Source: NIST Special Publication 800-77

# IPSec:

## Protocols Types



- Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
  - Confidentiality, authentication, integrity and replay protection
- Authentication Header (AH)
  - Authentication, integrity and replay protection. However there is no confidentiality
- Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
  - negotiate, create, and manage security associations
- A connection consists of two SA (Security Associations)
  - SA includes cryptographic keys and algorithms, key lifetimes, security parameter index (SPI), and security protocol identifier (ESP or AH).

# IPSec:

## Modes of operation


- Each protocol (ESP or AH) can operate in transport or tunnel mode.
- **Transport mode:**
  - Operates primarily on the payload (data) of the original packet.
  - Generally only used in host-to-host architectures.
- **Tunnel mode:**
  - Original packet encapsulated into a new one, payload is original packet.
  - Typical use is gateway-to-gateway and host-to-gateway architectures.

# Transport Mode ESP




Original IP Packet protected by Transport-ESP

# Tunnel Mode ESP




# Internet Key Exchange

- Alice and Bob have common (long term) secret  $s$
- DH exchange is **authenticated** (MITM not possible)
- After each session, session key is destroyed
- → **Perfect forward secrecy**






# Typical usage of IPSec: VPN



# Risk of using VPN




Secure pipe can be attack channel to home network !

# Risks of using IPSec for VPN

- IPSec typically used for VPN (Virtual Private Networks)
- A VPN client at external location may be connected to the Internet (e.g. from hotel room or café) while at the same time being connected to home network via VPN.
  - VPN gives direct access to resources in home network.
- Internet access from external location may give high exposure to cyber threats
  - No network firewall, no network IDS
- Attacks against the VPN client at external location can directly access the home network through VPN tunnel

# Cloud VPN Hosted VPN VPNaaS




# Cloud VPN



- A cloud-based infrastructure for VPN.
- A.k.a.:
  - Hosted VPN
  - VPNaaS (Virtual Private Network as a Service)
- Cloud VPNs provide security and globally accessible VPN service access without the need for any VPN infrastructure on the user's end.
- The user connects to the cloud VPN through the provider's website or a desktop/mobile app.
- The pricing of cloud VPN is based on pay-per-usage or a flat-fee subscription.
- Disadvantages /risks
  - Cleartext-gap at the VPN provider
  - VPN provider knows Internet usage profile
  - Malicious VPN service?

Internet services

# VPN Browsing – via VPN Proxy



# Tor – The Onion Router




Image courtesy indymedia.de

- An anonymizing routing protocol
- Originally sponsored by the US Naval Research Laboratory
- From 2004 to 2006 was supported by EFF
- Since 2006 independent nonprofit organisation
  
- Creates a multi-hop proxy circuit through the Internet from client to destination.
- Each hop “wraps” another encryption layer thereby hiding the next destination.
- No cleartext-gap, except at the exit-node.
- No node knows end-to-end client-server association

# How Tor Works: 1




Image courtesy <https://www.torproject.org>



# How Tor Works: 2





Image courtesy <https://www.torproject.org>

# How Tor Works: 3



Alice



**Step 3:** If at a later time, the user visits another site, Alice's tor client selects a second random path. Again, **green links** are encrypted, **red links** are in the clear.



Dave





Jane



Bob

Image courtesy <https://www.torproject.org>

# „Onion“ Message






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End of lecture