#### **INF2120 Information Security**

#### Lecture 05:

- Information Security Management
- Human Factors for Information Security



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#### Information Security Governance Styring/strategist ledelse av informasjonssikkerhet

IS governance provides strategic direction, ensures objectives are achieved, manages risk appropriately, uses organizational resources responsibly, and monitors the success or failure of the enterprise security programme.

- IT Governance Institute

#### Merk:

Begrepet: *"information security management"* oversettes offisielt til *"ledelse av informasjonssikkerhet"*. Vær oppmerksom på at frem til 2014 ble *"information security management"* oversatt til *"styring av informasjonssikkerhet*", og at mange organisasjoner (f.eks. NSM) fortsetter med det.

Det særnorske begrepet *"internkontroll"* er omtrent ekvivalent med *"ledelse av informasjonsikkerhet".* 

Security Governance

## Benefits of IT Security Governance

#### **Protecting assets** = creating value

- Trust from customers, partners, investors, own staff
- Reputation, brand, image
- Competitive advantage
- Prevention and reduction of losses
- Business continuity & resilience
  - In case of disasters and major incidents
- Increase shareholder value





# Goals of information security governance as defined by COBIT and ISACA

- 1. Strategic alignment of the security program
- 2. Risk management
- 3. Value delivery
- 4. Resource management
- 5. Performance measurement

www.isaca.org/knowledge-center/research/documents/information-securitygovenance-for-board-of-directors-and-executivemanagement\_res\_eng\_0510.pdf



### ISACA - Mål for styring av IT-sikkerhet

- 1. Strategisk tilpasning av sikkerhetsprogrammet
  - IS-aktiviteter skal støtte organisasjonens helhetlige strategi.
- 2. Risikohåndtering
  - Avdekke trusler, sårbarheter og risiko. Deretter bruke adekvate virkemidler for å redusere risiko til et akseptabelt nivå.
- 3. Verdiskapning
  - Søk optimal balanse mellom reduksjon av risiko og tap, og kostnader forbundet med sikkerhetsvirkemidler.
- 4. Ressursbruk
  - Arbeidet med informasjonssikkerhet skal gjøres effektivt
- 5. Målbarhet
  - Effekten av sikkerhetsarbeidet skal måles



#### Characteristics of good IS Governance

#### Managed as a business-wide issue

Alignment of frameworks, policies and activities

Viewed as business requirement

Seen as essential for sustainable business operations
Leaders are informed

Leaders understand security risks and get regular reviews
Leaders take responsibility

Visible leaders who set clear goals and priorities

#### **Risk-based priorities**

Tolerances to risk understood and established

#### Roles & responsibilities defined

Clear segregation of duties

#### Information security management Ledelse av informasjonssikkerhet (Internkontroll)

Includes:

- Development and maintenance of security policies
  - Documented goals, rules and practice for IS
- Planning and organisation of the security activities
   Information Security Management System (ISMS)
- Inventory and classification of resources and Information
- Threat and risk assessment
- Reporting and coordination with top level management
- Deployment and maintenance of security controls
- Security education and training
- Incident response and business continuity planning

Security Management

### **IS Management Standards**

- ISO/IEC 27K security standards:
  - ISO: International Standards Organization
  - ISO 27001: Information Security Management System (ISMS)
  - ISO 27002: Code of practice for information security controls
  - + many more
  - ISO/IEC standards cost money
- USA
  - NIST (National Institute for Standards and Technology) Special Publications 800 ,
  - Cover similar topics as ISO27K
  - NIST standards are free
- Norge NSM
  - Veileder i sikkerhetsstyring
  - Risikovurdering for sikring



NSM





#### ISO/IEC 27000 family of standards and related standards



### Evolution of ISO 27001 & 27002 Standards



• 1995

BS 7799: Code of Practice for Information Security Management

• 1999

BS 7799-2: Information Security Management System (ISMS)



2001
 BS 7799 → ISO/IEC 17799
 BS 7799-2 → ISO/IEC 17799-2





#### • 2013

ISO Management Standards Alignment

- ISO/IEC 27001: ISMS
- ISO/IEC 27002: Code of Practice for Information Security Controls
- 2018

Major changes to ISO/IEC 27001: ISMS planned

### ISO/IEC 27001:2013- What is it?



- ISO 27001 specifies requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining and continually improving an information security management system (ISMS) within the context of the organization.
- ISMS is a holistic approach to IS management
   ... not an IT system
- While the ISO 27002 (code of practice) defines a set of security goals and controls, ISO 27001 (ISMS) defines how to manage the implementation of security controls.
- Organizations can be certified against ISO 27001

   ... but not against ISO 27002
- ISO 27001 is to be used in conjunction with ISO 27002

#### IS Management System Cycle



### CISSP 7<sup>th</sup> Ed. IS Program Phases

CISSP 7 <sup>th</sup> Ed. (p.41) IS program phases	Description
1. Plan and organise	<ul> <li>Establish mgmt commitment and high level IS policy</li> <li>Define roles and committees,</li> <li>Assess threats, vulnerabilities and risk</li> <li>Identify and plan security solutions and controls</li> </ul>
2. Implement	<ul> <li>Assign roles and responsibilities</li> <li>Develop specific IS policies and procedures</li> <li>Implement security solutions and controls</li> </ul>
3. Operate and maintain	<ul> <li>Execute security operations tasks</li> <li>Carry out internal and external audit</li> <li>Develop monitoring and metrics for security controls</li> </ul>
4. Monitor and evaluate	<ul> <li>Review audits, monitoring and metrics</li> <li>Assess goal accomplishment</li> <li>Identify areas for improvement, and integrate in phase 1.</li> </ul>

#### ISO/IEC 27002— What is it? Code of practice for information security controls



- ISO 27002 provides a checklist of general security controls to be considered implemented/used in organizations
  - Contains 14 categories (control objectives) of security controls
  - Each category contains a set of security controls
  - In total, the standard describes 113 generic security controls
- Not all controls are relevant to every organisation
- Objective of ISO 27002:
- "... gives guidelines for [...] information security management practices including the selection, implementation and management of controls taking into consideration the organization's information security risk environment(s)."

#### The 14 Control Objectives of ISO/IEC 27002:2013



### 20 CSC: Critical Security Controls

- Alternative to ISO/IEC 27002
- https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
- Description of each control:
  - Why control is critical
  - How to implement controls
    - Specific tasks
  - Procedures and tools
    - Advice on implementation
  - Effectiveness metrics
  - Automation metrics
    - How to automate effectiveness metrics
  - Effectiveness tests
  - System entity relationship diagram
    - Relevant architecture integration





#### Grunnprinsipper for IKT-sikkerhet Oversettelse og sammendrag av ISO/IEC 27002

NSM

https://www.nsm.stat.no/publikasjoner/rad-og-anbefalinger/grunnprinsipper-for-ikt-sikkerhet/



#### Evaluation of the ISMS through Security Measurements

- What is the effectiveness of a security control ?
  - You have to measure it to know it.
- Security measurements provide
  - info about how well security controls work
  - basis for comparing effect of controls on risks
  - benchmark for assessing security investments



#### Why do we care: Example

- **The CEO asks**, *"Is our network perimeter secure?"*
- Without metrics:

"Well, we installed a firewall, so it must be."

#### • With metrics:

"Yes, our evidence tells us that we are. Look at our intrusion statistics before and after we completed that firewall project. It's down 80%. We are definitely more secure today than we were before."

### IS Measurement Model (ISO 27004)



#### Measurement – ISMS integration



#### CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integration for Information Security Management

Considerable time and effort needed to reach each next level in the maturity model for IS management.



#### CMM levels 1 - 3

- 1. Initial / Ad Hoc
  - + Processes are ad-hoc and disorganised.
  - + Risks are considered on an ad hoc basis, but no formal processes exist.
- 2. Repeatable but intuitive
  - + Processes follow a regular pattern.
  - + Emerging understanding of risk and the need for security
- 3. Defined process
  - + Processes are documented and communicated.
  - + Company-wide risk management.'
  - + Awareness of security and security policy

#### CMM levels 4 - 5

- 4. Managed and measurable
  - + Processes are monitored and measured.
  - + Risks assessment standard procedures
  - + Roles and responsibilities are assigned
  - + Policies and standards are in place
- 5. Optimized
  - + Security culture permeates organisation
  - + Organisation-wide security processes are implemented, monitored and followed

## The human factor in information security

#### Personnel integrity

Making sure personnel do not become insider attackers

#### Personnel as defence

Making sure personnel do not fall victim to social engineering attacks

#### Security usability

Making sure users operate security correctly



### Personnel Integrity

Preventing employees from becoming attackers

- Consider:
  - Employees
  - Executives
  - Customers
  - Visitors
  - Contractors & Consultants
- All these groups obtain some form of access privileges
- How to make sure privileges are not abused?

#### Personnel crime statistics

- Organisations report that a large proportion of computer crimes originate from inside
- US Statistics (PWC) 2014, 2015, 2016
  - http://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness/publications/assets/2014-us-state-of-cybercrime.pdf
  - https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/insider-threat/2017/01/2016-us-state-of-cybercrime-highlights.html
  - 28% had insider attacks, 32% very concerned about insider threats
- Australian Statistics (CERT Australia) 2015
  - http://apo.org.au/research/cyber-crime-and-security-survey-report-2013
  - 14% had insider attacks, 60% very concerned about insider threats
- Kriminalitets- og sikkerhetsundersøkelsen i Norge (KRISINO 2015)
  - https://www.nsr-org.no/krisino/
  - 28% of enterprises had experienced insider attacks.

### Strengthening employee integrity

- Difficult to determine long term integrity of staff at hiring

   Integrity can change, influenced by events
- All personnel should follow security awareness training
- Reminders about security policy and warnings about consequences of intentional breach of policy
  - Will strengthen power of judgment
- Personnel in highly trusted positions must be supported, trained and monitored
- Support and monitor employees in difficult situations:
  - conflict, loss of job, personal problems
- Always try to stay on good terms with staff.

#### **Personnel Departure**

- Different reasons for departure
  - Voluntary
  - Redundancy
  - Termination
- Different types of actions
  - Former employee may keep some privileges
  - Revoke all privileges
  - Escort to the exit.
- Staff who lose their job due to redundancy are at greater risk to become insider attackers. To mitigate this risk:
  - The redundancy process must be seen as fair
  - Try to keep a good dialogue
  - ... even with staff who feel being treated badly
- During exit interview, review the original employment agreement (i.e. non-compete, wrongful disclosure, etc.

# Social engineering attacks

#### Where people are the defence

## **Social Engineering Attacks**



- According to Kevin Mitnick:
  - "The biggest threat to the security of a company is not a computer virus, an unpatched hole in a program, or a badly installed firewall. In fact the biggest threat could be you."
  - "What I found personally to be true was that it's easier to manipulate people rather than technology. Most of the time, organisations overlook that human element".

From "How to hack people", BBC NewsOnline, 14 Oct 2002

## **Types of Social Engineering Attacks**

- Technical Social-Engineering Attacks
  - Electronic contact with victims
  - Email, telephone, messaging, social networks, websites
  - Multi-channel attacks
- In-Person Social-Engineering Attacks
  - Manipulate people face-to-face in person
  - Convince victims to perform actions which compromise security
  - Open doors, give physical access, provide IT resources





## Phishing Attacks



- A kind of social-engineering attack in which criminals use spoofed emails to trick people into sharing sensitive information or installing malware on their computer
- Phases
  - 1. Sending phishing email, getting through spam-filters, and landing in victim's inbox
    - Increasingly difficult to get through email filtering (SPF, DKIM, DMARC)
    - Content must be sufficiently credible to trick the user
  - 2. The victim taking the suggested action in the message
    - Got to a fake website
    - Replying with sensitive information
    - Installing malware
  - 3. The criminals exploiting and monetizing the stolen information

## **Types of Phishing**

- Mass Phishing Mass, large-volume attack intended to reach as many people as possible
- Spear Phishing Targeted attack directed at specific individuals or companies using gathered information to personalize the message and make the scam more difficult to detect
- Whaling Type of spear phishing attack that targets "big fish," including high-profile individuals or those with a great deal of authority or access
- Clone Phishing Spoofed copy of a legitimate and previously delivered email, with original attachments or hyperlinks replaced with malicious versions, which is sent from a forged email address so it appears to come from the original sender or another legitimate source

#### **Detect a Phishing Scam**

- Spelling errors (e.g., "passward"), lack of punctuation or poor grammar
- Hyperlinked URL differs from the one displayed, or it is hidden
- Threatening language that calls for immediate action
- Requests for personal information
- Announcement indicating you won a prize or lottery
- Requests for donations
- Be skeptical, use common sense

#### Protect Yourself → Refuse the Bait

- STOP. THINK. CONNECT.
  - Before you click, look for common baiting tactics, ask colleagues
- Be extremely careful about clicking on links in an email
  - User your computer mouse to hover over each link to verify its actual destination, even if the message appears to be from a trusted source
  - Pay attention to the URL and look for a variation in spelling or different domain (e.g., ndsu.edu vs. ndsu.com)
  - Consider navigating to familiar sites on your own instead of using links within messages
- Examine websites closely
  - Malicious websites may look identical to legitimate sites
  - Look for "https://" or a lock icon in the address bar before entering any sensitive information on a website

# In case you took the bait: Protect Yourself $\rightarrow$ Take Action Now

If you suspect that	You should
You interacted with, or replied to a phishing scam	$\rightarrow$ Immediately contact your help desk, or other relevant entity.
You might have revealed or shared personal or financial information	<ul> <li>→ Immediately change the password(s) for your account(s). If you use the same password for multiple accounts and sites, change it for each account. Do not reuse that password in the future.</li> <li>→ Watch for signs of identity theft by reviewing your bank and credit card statements for unauthorized charges and activity. If you notice anything unusual, immediately contact your credit card or bank.</li> </ul>
	$\rightarrow$ Consider reporting the attack to the police.

#### IN-PERSON SOCIAL ENGINEERING TACTICS

- Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP)
- Develop Trust
- Induce strong affect
- Information overload
- Reciprocation
- Diffusion of responsibility and moral duty
- Authority
- Commitment creep



#### SE Tactics: Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP)

- Mirror their target's body language
  - Match the voice, tone and body language of their victim.
  - Match the breathing rate, voice and vocabulary
  - Use common industry or company jargon
- Produces an affective connection with the target on a subconscious level
- Frequently used by salespeople to get clients to like them

#### SE Tactics: Develop Trust

- People are naturally helpful and trusting
- Ask during seemingly innocent conversations
- Slowly ask for increasingly important information
- Learn company lingo, names of key personnel, names of servers and applications
- Cause a problem and subsequently offer your help to fix it (aka. reverse social engineering)
- Talk negatively about common enemy
- Talk positively about common hero

### SE Tactics: Induce strong affect

- Heightened emotional state makes victim
  - Less alert
  - Less likely to analyse deceptive arguments
- Triggered by attacker by creating
  - Excitement ("you have won a price")
  - Fear ("you will loose your job")
  - Confusion (contradictory statements)

### SE Tactics: Information overload

- Reduced the target's ability to scrutinize arguments proposed by the attacker
- Triggered by
  - Providing large amounts of information to produce sensory overload
  - Providing arguments from an unexpected angle, which forces the victim to analyse the situation from new perspective, which requires additional mental processing

### **SE Tactics: Reciprocation**

- Exploits our tendency to return a favour
  - Even if the first favour was not requested
  - Even if the return favour is more valuable
- Double disagreement
  - If the attacker creates a double disagreement, and gives in on one, the victim will have a tendency to give in on the other
- Expectation
  - If the victim is requested to give the first favour, he will believe that the attacker becomes a future ally

#### SE Tactics: Diffusion of responsibility and moral duty

- Make the target feel the he or she will not be held responsible for actions
- Make the target feel that satisfying attacker's request is a moral duty

### **SE Tactics: Authority**

- People are conditioned to obey authority
  - Milgram and other experiments
  - Considered rude to even challenge the veracity of authority claim
- Triggered by
  - Faking credentials
  - Faking to be a director or superior
  - Skilful acting (con artist)

#### SE Tactics: Commitment creep

- People have a tendency to follow commitments, even when recognising that it might be unwise.
- It's often a matter of showing personal consistency and integrity
- Triggered e.g. by creating a situation where one commitment naturally or logically follows another.
  - First request is harmless
  - Second request causes the damage

#### Multi-Level Defence against Social Engineering Attacks

6: Offensive Level	Incident Response
5: Gotcha Level	Social Engineering Detectors
4: Persistence Level	Ongoing Reminders
3: Fortress Level	Resistance Training for Key Personnel
2: Awareness Level	Security Awareness Training for all Staff
1: Foundation Level	Security Policy to Address SE Attacks

Source: David Gragg: http://www.sans.org/rr/whitepapers/engineering/

#### SE Defence: Foundation

- The security policy must address SE attacks
  - Policy is always the foundation of information security
    - Address e.g.: Shredding, Escorting, Authority obedience
- Ban practice that is similar to social attack patterns
  - Asking for passwords over phone is a typical SE attack method
     → Therefore never provide passwords over the phone
  - Calling a user and pretending to represent IT department is a typical SE attack

 $\rightarrow$  Therefore never call user, or make it possible/mandatory for user to authenticate the IT Department

Calling IT dep. and pretending to be user is a typical SE attack
 → Therefore make it possible/mandatory for IT department to authenticate the user

#### SE Defence: Awareness

- Security awareness training for all staff
  - Understanding SE tactics
  - Learn to recognise SE attacks
  - Know when to say "no"
  - Know what is sensitive
  - Understand their responsibility
  - Understand the danger of casual conversation
  - Friends are not always friends
  - Passwords are personal
  - Uniforms are cheap
- Awareness of policy shall make personnel feel that the only choice is to resist SE attempts

#### SE Defence: Fortress

- Resistance training for key personnel
  - Consider: Reception, Help desk, Sys.Admin., Customer service,
- Fortress training techniques
  - Inoculation
    - Expose to SE arguments, and learn counterarguments
  - Forewarming
    - of content and intent
  - Reality check:
    - Realising own vulnerability,

#### SE Defence: Persistence

- Ongoing reminders
  - SE resistance will quickly diminish after a training session
  - Repeated training
  - Reminding staff of SE dangers
    - Posters
    - Messages
    - Tests

### SE Defence: Gotcha

- Social Engineering Detectors

   Filters and traps designed to expose SE attackers
- Consider:
  - The justified Know-it-all
    - Person who knows everybody
  - Centralised log of suspicious events
    - Can help discover SE patterns
  - Call backs mandatory by policy
  - Key questions, e.g. personal details
  - "Please hold" mandatory by policy
    - Time to think and log event
  - Deception
    - Bogus question
    - Login + password of "alarm account" on yellow sticker

#### SE Defence: Offensive

- Incident response
  - Well defined process for reporting and reacting to
    - Possible SE attack events,
    - Cases of successful SE attacks
- Reaction should be vigilant and aggressive
  - Go after SE attacker
  - Proactively warn other potential victims

### Security Usability

## Security Learning

- Good and intuitive security metaphors facilitate learning
   E.g.: "digital signature", "Trojan horse malware"
- Bad metaphors can be misleading
   E.g.: "firewall"?, it would be better to say: "checkpoint"
- Security usability is different from traditional usability
  - You can't use a system if you don't know how to operate it.
  - You can still use a system even if you don't know how to securely operate it.
- Security can not be made totally transparent to the user
  - The user must understand certain security concepts and be able to make informed security decisions.
- Security learning can be difficult
  - It takes time to thoroughly understand security

#### Stages of security learning (Security is often more complex than you think)



- *"This is far more complex than I first thought. I realise that it can never be made totally secure."*
- " "I understand it now, it's simple, and I know how to make it totally secure"
- "I don't understand it, and I don't want to know about it. Why can't security simply be transparent?"

#### **End of Lecture**