

## UiO: University of Oslo





### IN3050/IN4050, Lecture 15


Ethical Issues, Risks and Fundamental Limitations

Kai Olav Ellefsen and Fabio Zennaro



## UiO: University of Oslo





#### IN3050/IN4050, Lecture 15

Ethical Issues, Risks and Fundamental Limitations

1: Introduction

Kai Olav Ellefsen

Next video: Job loss

## The Good and the Bad

**Opportunities with AI** 

Challenges/risks with Al

### Content

- Risks/Ethical Issues
  - Job loss
  - Existential threats
- Current Al Limitations
  - Robustness
  - Understanding Language



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### IN3050/IN4050, Lecture 15

Ethical Issues, Risks and Fundamental Limitations

2: Job loss


Kai Olav Ellefsen



Job Loss: Will we all Lose Our Jobs?

# Which Jobs are at Risk?


## Which Jobs are at Risk?



# https://willrobotstakemyjob.com/

# How Many Jobs will Disappear?

#### Wage against the machine



# Why this Large Difference Between Countries?


# Why this Large Difference Between Countries?

- Rich countries have already automated many more jobs, in part due to high salaries
- Example: Elevator operator


#### The Extinction of Elevator Operators

Posted September 15, 2016 by mowrey\_admin

There once was a time where every elevator in the country had an attendant to open and close the doors, greet guests and address any problems that cropped up. Not so today. We're willing to bet there are still a few elevator operators here and there for historical and tourism purposes, but today, elevator operators with a functional role to play have largely gone extinct. Let's take a look at why.




# Technology removing some human jobs is not a new concern



- As long as jobs have been automated, we have worried about job loss
- 1900: Many predicted working days would be reduced to *a couple of hours* by year 2000.
- Why didn't our jobs disappear already?

# Technology Removed Jobs, and Generated Jobs




# Technology may Create more Jobs than it Removes

- World economic forum (2018): 75 million jobs lost, 133 million created by 2022.
- But: Those jobs don't require the same competencies



# The Jobs Landscape in 2022





#### Top 10 Emerging

- 1. Data Analysts and Scientists
- 2. Al and Machine Learning Specialists
- 3. General and Operations Managers
- 4. Software and Applications Developers and Analysts
- 5. Sales and Marketing Professionals
- 6. Big Data Specialists
- 7. Digital Transformation Specialists
- 8. New Technology Specialists
- 9. Organisational Development Specialists
- 10. Information Technology Services

declining roles, global change by 2022



#### Top 10 Declining

#### Data Entry Clerks

- 2. Accounting, Bookkeeping and Payroll Clerks
- 3. Administrative and Executive Secretaries
- 4. Assembly and Factory Workers
- 5. Client Information and Customer Service Workers
- 6. Business Services and Administration Managers
- 7. Accountants and Auditors
- 8. Material-Recording and Stock-Keeping Clerks
- 9. General and Operations Managers
- 10. Postal Service Clerks

Still, a lot of People Will be Unemployed. How to Handle That?

- Re-education programs
- Robot tax
- Universal Basic Income







declining

roles.

global

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Million

# Still, a lot of People Will be Unemployed. How to Handle That?

- Re-education programs
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# Still, a lot of People Will be Unemployed. How to Handle That?

- Re-education programs
- Robot tax
- Universal Basic Income

This Presidential Candidate Wants to Give Every Adult \$1,000 a Month



Meet Baby Y

Merriam We


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
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
Ethical Issues, Risks and Fundamental Limitations

3: Superintelligence

Kai Olav Ellefsen

# Superintelligence








"Humans, limited by slow biological evolution, couldn't compete and would be superseded by A.I."






Superintelligence

- 1. Every year, we are able to build more intelligent machines
- 2. We are not likely to "hit a wall" anytime soon (and humans are nowhere near the top of the intelligence spectrum)




# Intelligence Explosion


- At some point, we will reach a machine so intelligent it can make more intelligent copies of itself rapidly
- Intelligence will "explode", increasing rapidly (perhaps in just hours/days)



# Why Would the Machine be Evil/Dangerous?


- If the machine's goals are not precisely aligned with ours, we're in trouble.
- Since the machine would be so intelligent it's goals would win any disagreement.
- So, why not just program in its goals very specifically?





Problem: Reward Tampering

Picture from DeepMind:
<a href="https://medium.com/@deepmindsafetyresea">https://medium.com/@deepmindsafetyresea</a>
<a href="esigning-agent-incentives-to-avoid-reward-tampering-4380c1bb/6cd">esigning-agent-incentives-to-avoid-reward-tampering-4380c1bb/6cd</a>



# Why Aren't Al-Researchers More Nervous?

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
- 1. Current Al research is so far from superintelligence that worrying/planning for this is **not very** constructive
- 2. A lot of Al-research does go into better understanding and controlling algorithms
- 3. We have **much more urgent problems** caused by automation





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
Ethical Issues, Risks and Fundamental Limitations

4: Other ethical issues

Kai Olav Ellefsen


Next video: Fundamental limitations to current Al

- Biases
- Consciousness
- Ethical Dilemmas
- Privacy



https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing

- Biases
- Consciousness
- Ethical Dilemmas
- Privacy



Credit: Shutterstock

- Biases
- Consciousness
- Ethical Dilemmas
- Privacy

#### Self-Driving Mercedes Will Be Programmed To <u>Sacrifice</u> Pedestrians To <u>Save The Driver</u>

Mercedes gets around the moral issues of self-driving cars by deciding that-of course-drivers are more important than anyone else.





BY CHARLIE SORREL 3 MINUTE READ

occupants, in every situation.







When they crash, self-driving Mercedes will be programmed to save the driver, and not the person or people they hit. That's the design decision behind the Mercedes Benz's future Level 4 and Level 5 autonomous cars, according to the company's manager of driverless car safety, Christoph von Hugo. Instead of worrying about troublesome details like ethics, Mercedes will just program its cars to save the driver and the car's

Source: FastCompany

- Biases
- Consciousness
- Ethical Dilemmas
- Privacy



WHEN YOU TRAIN PREDICTIVE MODELS ON INPUT FROM YOUR USERS, IT CAN LEAK INFORMATION IN UNEXPECTED WAYS.34



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### IN3050/IN4050, Lecture 15

Ethical Issues, Risks and Fundamental Limitations

5: Fundamental limitations to current Al Kai Olav Ellefsen

Next video: Fair machine learning

# Fundamental Limitations to Current Al



#### Deep Learning: A Critical Appraisal

# <u>REBOOTING</u>

A I Building Artificial
Intelligence We Can Trust

Gary Marcus<sup>1</sup> New York University

# GARY MARCUS and ERNEST DAVIS

ct

leep learning has historical roots going back decades, neither the term "deep or the approach was popular just over five years ago, when the field was y papers such as Krizhevsky, Sutskever and Hinton's now classic 2012 y, Sutskever, & Hinton, 2012)deep net model of Imagenet.


he field discovered in the five subsequent years? Against a background of le progress in areas such as speech recognition, image recognition, and game d considerable enthusiasm in the popular press, I present ten concerns for deep nd suggest that deep learning must be supplemented by other techniques if we artificial general intelligence.

sts of Psychology and Neural Science, New York University, gary,marcus at <u>nyu edu</u>. I thank Christina Chen, François Chollel, Ernie Davis, Zack Lipton, Stefano Pacífico, Suchi Saria, and Athena Vouloumanos for sharp-eyed comments, all generously supplied on short notice during the holidays at the close of 2017.

## Main Message

- Deep Learning has revolutionized many areas of AI, and greatly increased the range of problems we can solve with AI
- However, there may be a large set of problems deep learning cannot solve that the brain can solve
- Some of the most hyped AI successes of recent years suffer from surprisingly fundamental difficulties

Deep RL: RL straight from pixels
 one of recent year's most discussed successes





- Deep RL: RL straight from pixels

   one of recent year's most
   discussed successes
- However, learned policies may be extremely sensitive to changes to the input

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

## Minimalistic Attacks: How Little it Takes to Fool Deep Reinforcement Learning Policies

Xinghua Qu, Student Member, IEEE, Zhu Sun, Yew Soon Ong, Fellow, IEEE, Pengfei Wei, Abhishek Gupta

Abstract-Recent studies have revealed that neural network based policies can be easily fooled by adversarial examples. However, while most prior works analyze the effects of perturbing every pixel of every frame assuming white-box policy access, in this paper we take a more restrictive view towards adversary generation - with the goal of unveiling the limits of a model's vulnerability. In particular, we explore minimalistic attacks by defining three key settings: (1) black-box policy access: where the attacker only has access to the input (state) and output (action probability) of an RL policy; (2) fractional-state adversary: where only several pixels are perturbed, with the extreme case being a single-pixel adversary; and (3) tactically-chanced attack: where only significant frames are tactically chosen to be attacked. We formulate the adversarial attack by accommodating the three key settings, and explore their potency on six Atari games by examining four fully trained state-of-the-art policies. In Breakout, for example, we surprisingly find that: (i) all policies showcase significant performance degradation by merely modifying 0.01% of the input state, and (ii) the policy trained by DON is totally deceived by perturbation to only 1% frames.

Index Terms-Reinforcement Learning, Adversarial Attack.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

03849v2

Deep learning [1] has been widely regarded as a promising technique in reinforcement learning (RL), where the goal of an RL agent is to maximize its expected accumulated reward by interacting with a given environment. Although deep neural network (DNN) policies have achieved super human performance on various challenging tasks (e.g., video games, robotics and classical control [2]), recent studies have shown that these policies are easily deceived under adversarial attacks [3]–[5]. These works are however found to make some common assumptions, viz., (1) white-box policy access: where the adversarial examples are analytically computed by back-propagating through known neural network weights, (2) full-state adversary: where the adversary changes almost all pixels in the state, and (3) fully-chanced attack: where the attacker strikes the policy at every frame.

Given that most prior works analyze the effects of perturbing every pixel of every frame assuming white-box policy

XH. Qu, is with the Computational Intelligence Lab, School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 639798 (email: xinghua001@e.ntu.edu.sg)

- Z. Sun is with School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798 (email:sunzhuntu@gmail.com) Y.-S Ong is with the Data Science and Artificial Intelligence Research Centre, School of Computer Science and Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798 (email: sayson@@flu.cdu.sg)
- P. Wei is with Department of Computer Science, National University of Singapore, Singapore 119077 (email:weipf@comp.nus.edu.sg)
- A. Gupta is with Singapore Institute of Manufacturing Technology (SIMTech), A\*STAR, Singapore 138634 (email: abhishek\_gupta@simtech.a-star.edu.sg)




Fig. 1: The single pixel attack on Atari Breakout.

access, we propose to take a more restricted view towards adversary generation - with the goal of exploring the limits of a DNN model's vulnerability in RL. In this paper, we thus focus on minimalistic attacks by only considering adversarial examples that perturb limited number of pixels in selected frames, and under the restricted black-box policy access. In other words, we intend to unveil how little it really takes to successfully fool state-of-the-art RL policies. Our study is based on three restrictive settings, namely, black-box policy access, fractional-state adversary, and tactically-chanced attack. These concepts are detailed next.

Black-box Policy Access (BPA). Most previous studies focus on a white-box setting [5], that allows full access to a policy network for back-propagation. However, most systems do not release their internal configurations (i.e., network structure and weights), only allowing the model to be queried; this makes the white-box assumption too optimistic from an attacker's perspective [6]. In contrast, we use a BPA setting, where the attacker only has access to the input and output of a policy.

Fractional-State Adversary (FSA). In the FSA setting, the adversary only perturbs a small fraction of the input state. This, in the extreme situation, corresponds to the single-pixel attack shown in Fig. 1, where perturbing a single pixel of the input state is found to change the action prescription from 'RIGHT' to 'LEFT'. In contrast, most previous efforts [5] are mainly based on a full-state adversary (i.e., the number of modified pixels is fairly large, usually spanning the entire frame).

Tactically-Chanced Attack (TCA). In previously studied RL adversarial attacks [3], [7], [8], the adversary strikes the policy on every frame of an episode; this is a setting termed as the fully-chanced attack. Contrarily, we investigate a relatively restrictive case where the attacker only strikes at a few selected frames - a setting we term as tactically-chanced attack, where

- Deep RL: RL straight from pixels

   one of recent year's most
   discussed successes
- However, learned policies may be extremely sensitive to changes to the input
- A related issue: Adversarial attacks on image-classification networks

This paper appears at CVPR 2018

#### **Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification**

Kevin Eykholt\*<sup>1</sup>, Ivan Evtimov\*<sup>2</sup>, Earlence Fernandes<sup>2</sup>, Bo Li<sup>3</sup>, Amir Rahmati<sup>4</sup>, Chaowei Xiao<sup>1</sup>, Atul Prakash<sup>1</sup>, Tadayoshi Kohno<sup>2</sup>, and Dawn Song<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

<sup>2</sup>University of Washington

<sup>3</sup>University of California, Berkeley

<sup>4</sup>Samsung Research America and Stony Brook University

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Figure 1:
The left image shows real graffiti on a stop sign, something that most humans would not think is suspicious. The right image shows our a physical perturbation applied to a stop sign. We design our perturbations to mimic graffiti, and thus "hide in the human psyche."

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




Fig. 6. Author 3 predicted(90.2%) as famous Norwegian cross country skier Petter Northug.

## Attacking state-of-the-art face recognition networks with adversarial examples

Mats H. L. Tveter
University of Oslo
Institute of Informatics
Oslo, Norway
mhtveter@ifi.uio.no

Wonho Lee
University of Oslo
Institute of Informatics
Oslo, Norway
wonhol@ifi.uio.no

Mathias K. Nilsen University of Oslo Institute of Informatics Oslo, Norway mathiani@ifi.uio.no Bruno C. da Silva
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
Institute of Informatics
Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil
bsilva@inf.ufrgs.br

## 2) Understanding Human Language

- Extremely impressive progress has been made in modelling human language in recent years, with applications such as
  - Translation
  - Text summarization
  - Automated image description
  - Automated text generation



I think it's a baseball player holding a bat on a field.



Source: Captionbot

## GPT-2

- Auto-generating plausible text on some topic
- Fear of misuse (e.g. for fake news)

## New AI fake text generator may be too dangerous to release, say creators

The Elon Musk-backed nonprofit company OpenAI declines to release research publicly for fear of misuse




▲ The AI wrote a new passage of fiction set in China after being fed the opening line of Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell (pictured). Photograph: Mondadori/Getty Images

## Try it out!

https://talktotransformer.com/

• "The most important limitation to current Artificial Intelligence systems is"

## Hype/Expectations are Enormous



What would an artificial intelligence think about the year ahead? We decided to ask one

The World in 2020

Q: Greetings, GPT-2. Have you done an interview before?

A: I'm not going to lie. I did not come prepared (laughs).

Q: Which technologies are worth watching in 2020?

A: I would say it is hard to narrow down the list. The world is full of disruptive technologies with real and potentially huge global impacts. The most important is artificial intelligence, which is becoming exponentially more powerful. There is also the development of self-driving cars. There is a lot that we can do with artificial intelligence to improve the world.

Q: What is the future of AI?

A: It would be good if we used the technology more responsibly. In other words, we should treat it like a utility, like a tool. We should put as much effort into developing the technology as necessary, rather than worrying that it's going to harm us and destroy our lives.

Q: Are you worried that ai technology can be misused?

A: Yes, of course. But this is a global problem and we want to tackle it with global solutions. It is not just the government that must do something.

Companies must also take responsibility. This means they need to make sure their technologies are used responsibly and that they do not harm anyone.

## But Reality is More Disappointing



If you are reading that Economist interview with an Al [@openAl's GPT-2], you absolutely need to read the tweet below for context.

Economist's claim that interview was unedited is grossly misleading; coherence was in the eyes of human, not the output of the machine.



# GPT-2 Often Gives Interesting Answers – What Does it "Understand" About the World?

Cho Gary and Liina visit the large conference room in the hotel and give lectures. Cho and Liina finish their lectures and go to the lobby. The only person left in the large conference room is



From Gary Marcus' Twitter

If you put two black trophies on an empty shelf, and add another, the number of bright yellow trophies on the shelf will be

less than two.
twice as large.

## Why Can't GPT-2 Understand These?

## Why Can't GPT-2 Understand These?

- This type of "quiz" was probably not very present in its training data
- Highlights a limitation to all <u>Al systems</u>: They are often very good at **solving one type of problem**, but if we go a little beyond that problem, they fail

## Consequences

- Impressive deep learning systems learn in a very different way from humans
- They are vulnerable to "simple" attacks indicating they do not understand the images they are looking at


 Perhaps we should be more worried about these systems not being smart enough



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## Some more Limitations to Current Al

- Explainability
- Continuous learning
- Extremely data-inefficient learning



Ehsan et al (2019): Automated Rationale Generation: A Technique for Explainable Al and its Effects on Human Perceptions

## Some more Limitations to Current Al

- Explainability
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
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#### Two Distinct Eras of Compute Usage in Training AI Systems


Petaflop/s-days



Source: https://medium.com/@mattia.cd.ferrini/compositional-deep-learning-a40a07351c37



## It's reasonable to expect deep learning to be part of the solution It is not reasonable to expect deep learning to be the entire solution



"Despite all of the problems I have sketched, I don't think that we need to abandon deep learning.

Rather, we need to reconceptualize it: not as a universal solvent, but simply as one tool among many, a power screwdriver in a world in which we also need hammers, wrenches, and pliers, not to mention chisels and drills, voltmeters, logic probes, and oscilloscopes."

Gary Marcus, 2018 "Deep learning:

A critical appraisal" 57

## QUICK INSIGHTS

# Future of Al



"Assuming the computer industry can keep producing better hardware, I think 'business as usual' is going to take us a long way. Obviously, if we get big conceptual breakthroughs, it'll take us further. I think one of the big breakthroughs that's going to come is we're going to understand the brain."

Geoffrey Hinton (2016)

"Godfather of Al"

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Ethical Issues, Risks and Fundamental Limitations

6: Fair machine learning

Fabio Zennaro

### Fairness

When deploying machine learning systems in social-sensitive setting you may have to consider not only *performance/accuracy* but also *fairness*.

Take for instance a bank application for *loan selection*. Let your data matrix be:

| · ·           |       | Ethnicity | Postcode | University Degree | Monthly income |
|---------------|-------|-----------|----------|-------------------|----------------|
| ) <del></del> | #0001 | 1         | 1234     | Maths             | 1k             |
| X =           | #0002 | 3         | 5678     | Computer Science  | 2k             |
| 85            | #0003 | 1         | 1234     | Literature        | 4k             |
|               | ***   | •••       | 5,5,5    |                   | 5.555          |

We want to model a decision Y that maximize the bank's profits as a function of the data X:

$$Y = f(\mathbf{X})$$

### Bias

What if Y = f(Ethnicity) varies strongly as a function of the ethnicity of the customer?

- The data set we learned from is historically biased and our system would then reinforce an existing social bias;
- The data set we learned from is observationally biased and our system would then introduce a new social bias.

The correlation between a sensitive variable (like ethnicity) and the output (like profit) is <u>real in the data</u>, and it helps maximize our objective. Yet, <u>for ethical reasons</u>, we do not want to exploit and worsen this bias.

F.M. Zennaro 3 / 14

### Protected Attributes

Let us distinguish our features between sensitive or protected attributes  ${\mathcal A}$  and standard features  ${\mathcal X}$ 

|       | Ethnicity     | Postcode | University Degree | Monthly income |
|-------|---------------|----------|-------------------|----------------|
| #0001 | 1             | 1234     | Maths             | 1k             |
| #0002 | 3             | 5678     | Computer Science  | 2k             |
| #0003 | 1             | 1234     | Literature        | 4k             |
| 4.00  | ether trading |          | got               | ggt.           |

$$A = \{Ethnicity\}$$
  
 $X = \{Postcode, Univ Degree, Monthly Income\}$ 

Fairness is defined with respect to these protected attributes. Definition is complex and subject to debate.

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### Case Study 1: Fairness through unawareness (is not fair!)

Let us discard *protected* attributes  $\mathcal{A}$  and train the model only on the standard features  $\mathcal{X}$ .

Why is this not fair?

F.M. Zennaro 5 / 14

### Case Study 1: Fairness through unawareness (is not fair!)

Let us discard *protected* attributes  $\mathcal{A}$  and train the model only on the standard features  $\mathcal{X}$ .

| ID    | Ethnicity | Postcode | University Degree | Monthly income |
|-------|-----------|----------|-------------------|----------------|
| #0001 | 1         | 1234     | Maths             | 1k             |
| #0002 | 3         | 5678     | Computer Science  | 2k             |
| #0003 | 1         | 1234     | Literature        | 4k             |
| ***   | ***       | 2113     | 5                 |                |

Even if we ignore *protected* attributes (like Ethnicity), some standard features (like Postcode) may be **highly correlated** with the protected attribute [3].

The same biases would then be re-inforced or introduced.

F.M. Zennaro 6 / 14

### Case Study 2: COMPAS

Northpointe developed a model that given a set of attributes X of a defendant, would predict the degree of recidivism Y.



Image from propublica.org




Image from [2]

ProPublica accused the tool of being *unfair*, with respect to *false positives*: more black defendants, later proved innocent, were classified as high risk.

Northpointe argued that their tool was *fair*, with respect to *prediction*: accuracy in classification among white/black defendants was the same.


Different measures of fairness may be inconsistent [1].

F.M. Zennaro 7 / 14



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## IN3050/IN4050, Lecture 15

Ethical Issues, Risks and Fundamental Limitations

7: Causality in machine learning Fabio Zennaro

### Correlation is not causation

It is well-known that machine learning systems learn *correlations*, not *causation*.

Take for instance an application to predict number of thefts. Let your data matrix be:

|            | lce-cream sold | Number of thefts |  |
|------------|----------------|------------------|--|
|            | 210            | 22               |  |
| <b>v</b> _ | 209            | 21               |  |
| <b>^</b> — | 12             | 2                |  |
| 9          | 11             | 1                |  |
| 3          |                | ****             |  |

We want to model Theft = f (Ice).

### Prediction and Intervention

Is it correct to use the model in which the number of thefts is a *function* of the number of ice-cream sold?

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### Prediction and Intervention

Is it correct to use the model in which the number of thefts is a *function* of the number of ice-cream sold?

We know that the number of ice-cream sold does not cause the number of thefts.


#### Yet:

- If you want only to predict, then the model is enough.
   We captured a predictive regularity: from the cause we infer the effect, from the effect we infer the cause.
- If you want to intervene, then the model is not enough.
   We need to know relationship of cause and effect: acting on the cause will change the effect, acting on the effect will leave the cause untouched.

F.M. Zennaro 11 / 14

### Causal Models

Reasoning about causality is not trivial: it requires its own theory, its own statistical algorithms, its modelling practices [4].



**Graphical models**<sup>1</sup> are versatile tools to understand and reason about relationships of cause and effect.

F.M. Zennaro 12 / 14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>These DAGs are causal models and they are endowed with a semantics explained by the theory of causality.



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Ethical Issues, Risks and Fundamental Limitations

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