IN3070/4070 – Logic – Autumn 2020 Lecture 11: Modal Logics

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29th October 2020





UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Today's Plan

- Motivation
- Modal Logic
- Satisfiability & Validity
- Different Modal Logics
- ► A Modal Sequent Calculus

Outline

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 - Reasoning about concepts and relationships

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- Turns out: many of the reasoning patterns from the previous slide can be turned into decidable logics.

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- ▷ □ is not a formula.

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
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- ▶ For epistemic logic, we want:

$$\{p \to \Box p, \diamond \neg p\} \models \neg p$$

THREE LOGICIANS WALK INTO A BAR ...



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Kripke Semantics

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
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- one propositional interpretation $\mathcal{I}(w)$ for each $w \in W$

Kripke Frame – Example

Example:
$$F = (W, R)$$
 with $W = \{w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4, w_5\}$ and
 $R = \{(w_1, w_1), (w_3, w_3), (w_5, w_5), (w_1, w_2), (w_2, w_3), (w_1, w_4), (w_4, w_5), (w_2, w_5)\}$



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
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- Temporal logic:
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 - \blacktriangleright $w_1 R w_2$: w_1 is earlier than w_2 .

Kripke Model – Example

Example: F = (W, R) as before



Definition 2.5 (Modal Truth Value).

Let $\mathcal{I}_M = ((W, R), \{\mathcal{I}(w)\}_{w \in W})$ be a Kripke model. The modal truth value $v_{\mathcal{I}_M}(w, A)$ of a formula A in the world w in the model \mathcal{I}_M is T (true) if "w forces A under \mathcal{I}_M ", denoted $w \Vdash A$, and F (false), otherwise.

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
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
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▶ $w \Vdash QA \text{ iff } v \Vdash A \text{ for some } v \in W \text{ with } (w, v) \in R$
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Modal truth value – Examples



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$$\begin{split} F_1 &\equiv p \lor \Box \neg p \\ w_0 \Vdash \Box \neg p \quad \text{iff} \\ v \Vdash \neg p \quad \text{for all } v \in W \text{ with } (w_0, v) \in R \end{split}$$

Modal truth value – Examples


w₀ p true W_1 p false

$$F_1 \equiv p \lor \Box \neg p$$


$$w_0 \Vdash \Box \neg p \text{ iff}$$

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
but $(w_0, w_1) \in R$ and $w_1 \Vdash p$ holds



► $F_1 \equiv p \lor \Box \neg p$ $w_0 \Vdash \Box \neg p$ iff $v \Vdash \neg p$ for all $v \in W$ with $(w_0, v) \in R$ but $(w_0, w_1) \in R$ and $w_1 \Vdash p$ holds hence, neither $w_0 \Vdash p$ nor $w_0 \Vdash \Box \neg p$




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
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Knowledge Logic:

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
Temporal Logic:

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- A holds at all future points in time
- ▶ $w \Vdash \Diamond A$: A holds at some future point in time


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If we look out of the window, we know whether it rains:

$$\mathcal{I}\models q
ightarrow ig((
ho
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Outline

- Motivation
- Modal Logic
- Satisfiability & Validity
- Different Modal Logics
- ► A Modal Sequent Calculus

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Logical Consequence: Local and Global

There are two ways of defining logical consequence in modal logic.

Definition 3.2 (Global Logical Consequence).

Let U be a set of formulae and A be a formula. A is a global consequence of U, denote $U \models^{G} A$, iff for every modal interpretation \mathcal{I}_{M} the following holds: if $w \Vdash F$ for all $F \in U$ and all worlds $w \in W$ then $w \Vdash A$ for all worlds $w \in W$.

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- ▶ the deduction theorem does not hold for the global consequence
- ▶ if $U \models^{L} A$ then $U \models^{G} A$; the opposite direction does not hold

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
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
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
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▶ it turns out:

A frame
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Reminder: (W, R) is reflexive if wRw for all $w \in W$.

 \implies Let (W, R) be reflexive, $\mathcal{I}_M = ((W, R), \{\mathcal{I}(w)\}_{w \in W})$, and $w \in W$.

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More Modal Logics

modal logic	condition on R	axioms
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K4	transitive	$\Box A ightarrow \Box \Box A$
D	serial	$\Box A \rightarrow \Diamond A$
D4	serial, transitive	$\Box A ightarrow \Diamond A$, $\Box A ightarrow \Box \Box A$
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(A relation $R \subseteq W \times W$ is *serial* iff for all $w_1 \in W$ there is some $w_2 \in W$ with $(w_1, w_2) \in R$; a relation $R \subseteq W \times W$ is *euclidean* iff for all $w_1, w_2, w_3 \in W$ the following holds: if $(w_1, w_2) \in R$ and $(w_1, w_3) \in R$ then $(w_2, w_3) \in R$.)

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
Lemma: if a relation is reflexive and euclidean, it is also symmetric and transitive, i.e. an equivalence relation.

Validity Relation for Different Modal Logics

The validity relationship between different modal logics and domain conditions is depicted in the following figure:


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E.g. a formula that is valid in D is also valid in T, S4, etc.

Outline

- Motivation
- Modal Logic
- Satisfiability & Validity
- Different Modal Logics
- ► A Modal Sequent Calculus

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$$\begin{array}{c|c} \hline \Gamma \Rightarrow u: A, \Delta & \Gamma \Rightarrow u: B, \Delta \\ \hline \Gamma \Rightarrow u: A \land B, \Delta \\ \hline \end{array} \land \text{-right} \\ \hline \end{array} The \diamondsuit \text{-left rule creates a new label:} \\ \hline \frac{\Gamma, uRv, v: A \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma, u: \diamondsuit A \Rightarrow \Delta} \diamondsuit \text{-left} & \text{for a fresh label } v \\ \hline \end{array} The \Box \text{-left rule transfers info to other labels:} \\ \hline \frac{\Gamma, uRv, v: A, u: \Box A \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma, uRv, u: \Box A \Rightarrow \Delta} \Box \text{-left} \\ \hline \end{array} Axioms require same labels: $u: A, \Gamma \Rightarrow u: A, \Gamma \end{array}$$$

Rules for the Succedent

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 - More about that next week!