



# Mobile paymentPayment appMobile phoneMobile service providerRegional network providerRegional network providerBank serverRegional network providerNation wide network providerBank serverRegional network providerRegional network providerBank serverBank serverBank serverBank serverBank serverBank server

#### Mobile payment


Payment app Mobile phone Mobile service provider Regional network provider Nation wide network provider **Bank server – value chain for authentication** Regional network provider Nation wide network provider Regional network provider **Bank server – value chain for authentication** 

#### Mobile payment

Payment app

Mobile phone

Mobile service provider – operation outsourced Regional network provider – operation outsourced Nation wide network provider – operation outsourced **Bank server – value chain for authentication** Regional network provider – operation outsourced Nation wide network provider – operation outsourced Regional network provider – operation outsourced **Bank server – value chain for authentication** 



# Properties of digital value chains

Faults propagate instantly, and sometimes in unpredictable ways.

- The services that constitute a value chain span multiple sectors, and are subject do different regulative regimes.
- For those developing a service on top of such value chains, it is very challenging to get an overview of the inherited vulnerabilities throughout the value


Some services are at the bottom of a very large number of value chains.

## Almost all sectors facing the same challenges

They are in the midst of a profound technologically driven transformation Enthusiasm of technology mixed with alienation to risk Workforce with yesterday's competence Management lacks background to comprehend the hazards, understand the remedies and evaluate residual risk Regulations adapted to former times

*The criticality of Telenors core network needs to be reduced* 





#### Critical infrastructure

Norwegian Security Act (Sikkerhetsloven): «anlegg og systemer som er nødvendige for å opprettholde samfunnets grunnleggende behov og funksjoner».

**Civil Protection Act (Sivilbeskyttelsesloven):** «anlegg, systemer eller deler av disse som er nødvendige for å opprettholde sentrale samfunnsfunksjoner, menneskers helse, sikkerhet, trygghet og økonomiske eller sosiale velferd og hvor driftsforstyrrelse eller ødeleggelse av disse vil kunne få betydelige konsekvenser».

Can we still assume that all installations satisfying these definitions are located in Norway, overseen by Norwegian authorities, and governed by Norwegian Law?



Professor Olav Lysne

#### Digital Border Control/Lawful Interception

An installation that gives the Norwegian foreign intelligence service access to data from the Internet-cables crossing the Norwegian border.

Similar installations already exist in countries we like to compare ourselves to

- Sweden, Germany, France, Great Britain, USA and Canada
- Switzerland has approved legislation, and had a referendum with positive result
- · Under consideration in the Netherlands and in Finland
- The Norwegian Foreign Intelligence service have argued that they need it

The Lysne I commission argued that a new commission should write a report, followed by a public debate.

#### Etterretningstjenesten's mission Foreign intelligence – civil and military

Obtain information of activities foreign states, organizations and individuals that are of relevance to Norwegian interests.

This information is intended for support of decisions taken by Norwegian authorities and Norwegian defence

The information is not intended for fighting crime Etterretningstjenesten are not allowed to collect information on Norwegians residing in Norway.


## Lawful interception - why now?

Changes in the threat landscape

- International cyber-attacks are escalating in complexity and in absolute numbers
- International terror is being coordinated over the Internet

Technological changes

- Earlier communication channels are being replaced by Internet-based services
- · Older capacities for intelligence need be replaced



## Privacy


What will be possible in 20 years?What will be compromising in 20 years?Is it possible to allow collection of big datasets, and later disallow?Should we worry about a national coup?The chilling effect-how strong is it?

### Why is this difficult?

- A large and increasing portion of the digital activity of Norwegians in Norway crosses our borders in the cables that will be intercepted.
- A diminishing part of our lives are fully analogue. Most of our daily activities generate digital traces that cross the border
- Access to the cables crossing the border gives access to information of the daily lives of Norwegians on an unprecedented scale.
- This makes the question sensitive with respect to privacy, human rights, legality, and it challenges the relation of trust between the population and Etterretningstjenesten.

## Lawful interception is only recommendable if it can be made

technologically feasible, legally acceptable, does not harm the relation of trust between the population and the authorities, and gives valuable intelligence.




Valuable intelligence – meta-data and content- data

Foreign terrorist cell is discovered, and they are suspected to plan an

• Have any of them been communicating with someone in Norway lately?


We observe that they are moving


• Are they communicating with Norway, and if so, what are they saying/writing?




























Few countries can control their own digital vulnerability - most inherit vulnerabilities from other countries.

## Digital vulnerability and national autonomy


- Small countries are completely dependent on international providers of digital equipment.
- We are to some extent governed not only influenced by decisions taken outside of our borders.
- Popular trends and products can undermine national autonomy.





## Trust, but verify!

# How do you verify electronic equipment?



#### Structure of the problem


#### **Scenarioes**


- 1. Vendor is malicious already at the time of delivery.
- 2. Vendor becomes malicious at a later stage.


#### Consequences


- 1. Espionage and surveillance
- 2. Render the equipment useless (or threaten to)

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















#### The questions

- Is the problem decidable in the Church/Turing sense?
- Can software quality management help us (models management, metrics, standards)?
- Can existing malware detection techniques help us?
- Can decompilation and reverse engineering help?
- How does the war between code obfuscation and deobfuscation look?
- Can Formal Methods help?
- Dynamic methods/sandboxing?
- · Can we contain untrusted modules architecturally?

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