

# INF3510 Information Security

## University of Oslo

### Spring 2011

## Lecture 5

# Cryptography



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# Cryptography

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- **Cryptography is the science and study of secret writing.**
- Cryptanalysis is the science and study of methods of breaking ciphers.
- Cryptology: cryptography and cryptanalysis.
- Today: **Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information security, such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication, and data origin authentication. [Handbook of Applied Cryptography]**

# When is cryptography used?

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- If you require
  - **Confidentiality:**
    - so that your data is not made available to anyone who shouldn't have access.
    - That is, protection against snoops or eavesdroppers
  - **Integrity:**
    - So you know that the message content is correct, and has not been altered, either deliberately or accidentally
  - **Authentication:**
    - So you can be sure that the message is from the place or sender it claims to be from
- Cryptography can provide these security services.

# When is cryptography used?


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- Some example situations:
  - **Historically**, the military and spy agencies were the main users of cryptology
    - Situation: transmitting messages over insecure channels
  - **Now**, it is used in many other areas, especially in electronic information processing and communications technologies:
    - **Banking**: your financial transactions, such as EFTPOS
    - **Communications**: your mobile phone conversations
    - **Info stored in databases**: hospitals, universities, etc.
- Cryptography can be used to protect information in storage or during transmission

# Traditional paradigm

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
- *A* and *B* communicate over an insecure channel.
- *A* and *B* trust each other.
- Intruder can read, delete, and insert messages.
- With cryptography, *A* and *B* construct a secure logical channel over an insecure network.



# Trust paradigm

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
- **Electronic commerce:** *A* and *B* have a business relationship, but do not fully “trust” each other.
- We want protection against fraud and deception as much as possible.
- **Trusted Third Parties** help settle disputes.



# Law enforcement paradigm

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- In many countries laws regulate how a **law enforcement agency (LEA)** can intercept traffic.
- **Key recovery** makes cryptographic keys available to their owner.
- **Key escrow** makes keys available to a LEA.



# Alternatives to cryptography

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
- **Steganography:** – used to hide the existence of a message
  - Hide the information within a document or image, so that the presence of the message is not detected
- **Steganographic techniques include**
  - Using invisible ink (try writing in lemon juice)
  - Microdots
  - Character arrangement and selection
  - Hiding information, e.g. in graphics and sound files
- **Steganographic techniques do **not** use a secret key**




# Encryption

# Taxonomy of modern ciphers


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# Block Cipher vs. Stream Cipher



Block cipher




Stream cipher

# Terminology

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- **Encryption**: plaintext (clear text)  $M$  is converted into a ciphertext  $C$  under the control of a key  $k$ .
  - We write  $C = E(M, k)$ .
- **Decryption** with key  $k$  recovers the plaintext  $M$  from the ciphertext  $C$ .
  - We write  $M = D(C, k)$ .
- **Symmetric ciphers**: the secret key is used for both encryption and decryption.
- **Asymmetric ciphers**: Pair of private and public keys where it is computationally infeasible to derive the **private decryption key** from the corresponding **public encryption key**.

# Symmetric Key Encryption




# Classical Ciphers

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
- Caesar cipher
  - Shift alphabet a fixed number of places
- Vigenère cipher
  - Multiple Caesar ciphers
- Mono/poly-alphabetic ciphers
  - Substitute alphabet(s)
- Transposition ciphers
  - Reorder characters within a block
- Product ciphers
  - Serial combination of substitution and transposition
- Vernam cipher / one-time pad
  - Modular character addition (key size = message size)

Should remove statistical regularities as much as possible

# Letter Frequencies → statistical attacks



# Ideal 4-bit Block Cipher



- Diagram shows a single substitution function from the message space to the ciphertext space
- $16!$  different substitution functions possible with 4-bit blocks

Modern ciphers have a 128-bit block, but only have e.g. 128 or 256 bit keys ( $2^{128}$  or  $2^{256}$  substitutions), not  $(2^{128})!$  substitutions




# Claude Shannon (1916 – 2001)

The Father of Information Theory – MIT / Bell Labs


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- Information Theory
  - Defined the „binary digit“ (bit) as information unit
  - Definition of „entropy“ as a measure of information
- Cryptography
  - Model of a secrecy system
  - Definition of perfect secrecy
  - Defined cryptographic „confusion“ and „diffusion“
  - Designed S-P networks (Substitution & Permutation)



# Shannon's S-P Network

- “S-P Networks” (1949)
  - Sequence of many substitutions & permutations
  - small, carefully designed substitution boxes (“confusion”)
  - their output mixed by a permutation box (“diffusion”)
  - iterated a certain number of times
  - Functions **must be invertible**




# Horst Feistel's (1915 – 1990) and his revolutionary cipher design

- The **feistel cipher** is a general and elegant architecture for designing product ciphers
- Split input block in two halves
  - Perform S-P transformation on one half
  - XOR output with other half
  - Swop Halves
  - Repeat for multiple rounds
- The S-P transformation does **not** have to be invertible



# 2-round Feistel Network



# Data Encryption Standard - History

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
- In May 1973, and again in Aug 1974 the NBS (now NIST) called for possible encryption algorithms for use in unclassified government applications.
- Response was mostly disappointing
- IBM submitted their Feistel-network based Lucifer cipher as a candidate for DES. After some redesign (a reduction to a 56-bit key and 64-bit block, it became the Data Encryption Standard in 1977.

# Data Encryption Standard

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- Published in 1977 by the US National Bureau of Standards for use in unclassified government applications with a 15 year life time.
- 16 round Feistel cipher with 64-bit data blocks, 56-bit keys.
- 56-bit keys were controversial in 1977; today, exhaustive search on 56-bit keys is very feasible.
- Controversial because of classified design criteria, however no loop hole has yet emerged.
- DES designed to resist **differential cryptanalysis**.

# One Round of DES



# Advanced Encryption Standard

- Public competition to replace DES: because 56-bit keys and 64-bit data blocks no longer adequate.
- Rijndael nominated as the new Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2001 [FIPS-197].
- Rijndael (pronounce as “Rhine-doll”) designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen.
- Versions for 128-bit, 196-bit, and 256-bit data and key blocks (all combinations of block length and key length are possible).
- Rijndael is not a Feistel cipher.



# Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Contest (1997-2001)

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**January 1997**

**Call for cipher proposals**

**Key sizes:** 128, 192 or 256 bit, **block size:** 128 bits

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**June 1998**

**15 Candidates**

from USA, Canada, Belgium,  
France, Germany, Norway, UK, Israel,  
Korea, Japan, Australia, Costa Rica

**Round 1**

**Security,  
Software efficiency,  
Flexibility**

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**August 1999**

**5 final candidates**

Mars, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent, Twofish

**Round 2**

**Security,  
Hardware efficiency**

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**October 2000**

**1 winner: Rijndael Belgium**

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**November 2001**

**AES FIPS PUB 197 standard**

# Rijndael, the selected AES cipher


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Designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen from Belgium




# Comparison DES – AES Round

DES Round



AES Round



# Using encryption for real

- With a block cipher, encrypting a  $n$ -bit block  $M$  with a key  $k$  gives a ciphertext block  $C = E(M, k)$ .
- Given a well designed block cipher, observing  $C$  would tell an adversary nothing about  $M$  or  $k$ .
- What happens if the adversary observes traffic over a longer period of time?
  - The adversary can detect if the same message had been sent before; if there are only two likely messages “buy” and “sell” it may be possible to guess the plaintext without breaking the cipher.


# Block Ciphers: Modes of Operation

- Block ciphers can be used in different modes in order to provide different security services.
- Common modes include:
  - **E**lectronic **C**ode **B**ook (ECB)
  - **C**ipher **B**lock **C**haining (CBC)
  - **O**utput **F**eedback (OFB)
  - **C**ipher **F**eedback (CFB)
  - **C**ounter Mode (CTR)

# Electronic Code Book

- **ECB Mode encryption**

- Simplest mode of operation
- Plaintext data is divided into blocks  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n$
- Each block is then processed separately
  - Plaintext block and key used as inputs to the encryption algorithm




# ECB Mode

- **ECB Mode Issues**

- Problem: For a given key, the same plaintext block always encrypts to the same ciphertext block.
  - This may allow an attacker to construct a code book of known plaintext/ciphertext blocks.
  - The attacker could use this codebook to insert, delete, reorder or replay data blocks within the data stream without detection
- Other modes of operation can prevent this, by not encrypting blocks independently
  - For example, using the output of one block encryption as input to the next (chaining)

# Cipher Block Chaining Mode





# CBC Mode

- **CBC Mode Issues**
  - Chaining guards against the construction of a code book
    - The same plaintext block encrypts to different ciphertext blocks each time.
  - May assist in detecting integrity breaches
    - Such as the insertion, deletion or reordering of data blocks into the ciphertext.
- **What happens when there is an error?**
  - If there is a bitflip error (0 to 1 or vice versa) that block and the following block will be decrypted incorrectly
  - If a ciphertext bit, or even a character is inserted or deleted this will be detected because of the incorrect ciphertext length
    - Not multiples of block size
  - Inserting or deleting a block will cause incorrect decryption

# OFB Output Feedback Mode

A bit error in the ciphertext affects exactly the same bit in the plaintext.







Figure 6.6 Output Feedback (OFB) Mode

# Output Feedback Mode (OFB)

- Repeated plaintext blocks do not show up as repeated blocks in the ciphertext.
- Different encryptions of the same plaintext with the same key and IV give the same ciphertext.
- Encryption of different plaintexts with the same key and IV reveals information about the plaintexts.


# CFB Cipher Feedback Mode




# Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)

- Repeated plaintext blocks do not show up as repeated blocks in the ciphertext.
- Different encryptions of the same plaintext with the same key and IV give the same ciphertext.
- Encryption of different plaintexts with the same key and IV is not a security problem.
- A single bit error in a ciphertext block affects decryption until this block is shifted out of the register of the key generator.

# CTR Counter Mode



(a) Encryption



(b) Decryption

# Counter (CTR)

- a “new” mode, though proposed early on
- similar to OFB but encrypts counter value rather than any feedback value
- must have a different key & counter value for every plaintext block (never reused)

$$O_i = E_K(i)$$

$$C_i = P_i \text{ XOR } O_i$$

- uses: high-speed network encryptions

# Advantages and Limitations of CTR

- Efficiency
  - can do parallel encryptions in h/w or s/w
  - can preprocess in advance of need
  - good for bursty high speed links
- Random access to encrypted data blocks
- Provable security (good as other modes)
- But must ensure never reuse key/counter values, otherwise could break (cf OFB)



# Block cipher: Applications


- Block ciphers are often used for providing **confidentiality services**
- They are used for applications involving processing large volumes of data, where time delays are not critical.
  - Examples:
    - Computer files
    - Databases
    - Email messages
- Block ciphers can also be used to provide **integrity services**, i.e. for message authentication

# Stream Ciphers


- Consist of a key stream generator and a function for combining key stream and data.
- The combining function tends to be simple, exclusive-or is a typical example.
- The key stream generator takes as its input a key  $k$  seed  $S_0$  and updates its state with a state transition function  $f_k$ ,  $S_{i+1} = f_k(S_i)$ .
- The output at step  $i$  is the bitstream key  $K_i$  derived from  $S_i$

# Stream Ciphers

## Encryption



## Decryption



Encryption and decryption are usually identical operations.

# Stream Ciphers

- In such a cipher, a bit error in ciphertext bit  $i$  causes a single bit error in plaintext bit  $i$ .
- Wireless networks use stream ciphers to protect **data confidentiality**.
- An adversary can make precise relative changes to the plaintext by modifying the corresponding ciphertext bits.
- Stream ciphers therefore cannot be used for **integrity** protection.

# Is there a 'perfect' cipher?

- Yes - if you require **confidentiality**, the **One Time Pad** is provably secure.
- BUT we don't use it much.
- To understand
  - why the OTP is not widely used, and
  - how to provide other security services like integrity or authenticationyou need to know a bit more about ciphers.
- Basically, there are two types: **symmetric** and **asymmetric**.

# The perfect cipher: One-Time-Pad

- Famous example: *Vernam one-time pad*
  - One-time pad is **the only provably secure cipher**
  - Vernam OTP:
    - Plaintext is a stream of bits
    - Key is a truly random binary sequence same length as message
    - The cipher is a binary additive stream cipher, so
      - Ciphertext is obtained by binary addition (XOR) of plaintext and key
      - Plaintext is recovered by binary addition (XOR) of ciphertext and key
  - NOTE: Key can be used **once only** (hence the name), so each message requires a new, truly random key

# Integrity Check Functions

# Integrity protection

- Protection against modification of data can be done with integrity check values
  - CRC (cyclic redundancy code), message digest, hash functions etc.
- Unintentional modification (accidental errors) poses no threat to the integrity check values.
- **Protecting integrity check values against intentional modifications relies on security**
  - By access control, can be used for stored data
  - By cryptography, used in data communications



# Cryptographic data integrity

- Data origin authentication includes data integrity: a message that has been modified in transit no longer comes from the original source.
- Data integrity includes data origin authentication: when the sender's address is part of the message, you have to verify the source of a message when verifying its integrity.
- Under the assumptions made, data integrity and data origin authentication are equivalent.
- In other applications a separate notion of data integrity makes sense, e.g. for file protection by anti-virus software.

# Hash functions (message digest functions)

Requirements on a one-way hash function  $h$ :

- **Ease of computation:** given  $x$ , it is easy to compute  $h(x)$ .
- **Compression:**  $h$  maps inputs  $x$  of arbitrary bitlength to outputs  $h(x)$  of a fixed bitlength  $n$ .
- **Pre-image resistance (one-way):** given a value  $y$ , it is computationally infeasible to find an input  $x$  so that  $h(x)=y$ .


# Hash collisions

- The application just described needs more than the one-way property of  $h$ .
- We are not concerned about an attacker reconstructing the message from the hash.
- We are concerned about attackers who change message  $x$  to  $x'$  so that  $h(x') = h(x)$ .
- Then, our integrity protection mechanism would fail to detect the change.
- We say there is a **collision** when two inputs  $x$  and  $x'$  map to the same hash.

# Collision Resistance

- Integrity protection requires collision-resistant hash functions; we distinguish between:
- **2nd pre-image resistance (weak collision resistance)**: given an input  $x$  and  $h(x)$ , it is computationally infeasible to find another input  $x'$ ,  $x \neq x'$ , with  $h(x)=h(x')$ .
- **Collision resistance (strong collision resistance)**: it is computationally infeasible to find any two inputs  $x$  and  $x'$ ,  $x \neq x'$ , with  $h(x)=h(x')$ .


# Properties of hash functions



# Hash function construction

- Pattern for the design of fast hash functions:
- The core of the hash function is a **compression function**  $f$  that works on fixed size input blocks.
- An input  $x$  of arbitrary length is broken up into blocks  $x_1, \dots, x_m$  of the given block size; the last block has to be padded.
- Compute the hash of  $x$  by repeatedly applying the compression function: with a (fixed) initial value  $h_0$ , compute  $h_i = f(x_i, h_{i-1})$  for  $i=1, \dots, m$  and take  $h_m$  as the hash value of  $x$ .

# Hash function principle



# Frequently used hash functions

- MD5: 128 bit digest. Broken. Often used in Internet protocols but no longer recommended.
- SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm): 160 bit digest. Potential attacks exist. Designed to operate with the US Digital Signature Standard (DSA);
- SHA-256, 384, 512 bit digest. Still secure. Replacement for SHA-1
- RIPEMD-160: 160 bit digest. Still secure. Hash function frequently used by European cryptographic service providers.
- NIST competition for new secure hash algorithm, announcement in 2011.



# Message Authentication Codes

- A message  $M$  with a simple message hash  $h(M)$  can be changed by attacker.
- In communications, we need to verify the origin of data, i.e. we need message authentication.
- MAC (message authentication code) computed as  $h(M, k)$  from message  $M$  and a secret key  $k$ .
- To validate and authenticate a message, the receiver has to share the same secret key used to compute the MAC with the sender.
- A third party who does not know the key cannot validate the MAC.

# MAC and MAC algorithms

- MAC means two things:
  1. The computed message authentication code  $h(M, k)$
  2. General name for algorithms used to compute a MAC
- In practice, the MAC algorithm is e.g.
  - HMAC (Hash-based MAC algorithm)
  - CBC-MAC (CBC based MAC algorithm)
  - CMAC (Cipher-based MAC algorithm)
- MAC algorithms, a.k.a. **keyed hash functions**, support data origin authentication services.

# HMAC


- A MAC algorithm can be derived from a hash algorithm  $h$  using the HMAC construction:
- For a given key  $k$  and message  $M$ , compute

$$HMAC(x) = h(k||p_1||h(k||p_2||M))$$

where  $p_1$  and  $p_2$  are bit strings (padding) that extend  $k$  to a full block length of the compression function used in  $h$ .

- HMAC is specified in Internet RFC 2104.

# CBC-MAC principle



# CBC-MAC and CMAC

- A block cipher used in CBC mode can be used as a MAC algorithm
  - For a given message or data file,
    - The file is encrypted using the block cipher in CBC mode
    - The last ciphertext block is used as a Message Authentication Code (MAC) value
    - Both the message and the MAC are sent to the receiver
  - Described in ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999
  - Security depends on block-size of cipher. The typical block size of 128 bit is too short.
- CMAC uses a block cipher in a way to output hash blocks that are larger than the cipher block.

# Security of hash functions


- Large block size necessary to resist birthday attacks.
- Birthday paradox:
  - A group of 253 persons is needed to have  $p = 0.5$  that any person has birthday on a specific date. Seems reasonable.
  - A group of only 23 persons is needed to have  $p = 0.5$  that any two persons have birthday on the same date. Seems strange.
- Finding any two hashes that are equal (collision) in a large table of hash values is therefore relatively easy.
- A block size of  $n$  bits is considered to provide only  $n/2$  bit complexity.
- To provide strong collision resistance, large blocks are needed. 160 bit hash block is currently a minimum.

# Hash functions and Message Authentication

- Shared secret key is used for HMAC, CBC-MAC and CMAC
- When used during message transmission, this provides an additional security service of **Message Authentication**:
  - A correct MAC value confirms the sender of the message is in possession of the shared secret key
  - Hence, much like a password, it confirms the authenticity of the message sender to the receiver.
- Indeed, message integrity is meaningless without knowing who sent the message.

# Symmetric key distribution

- Shared key between each pair
- Each participant needs  $n-1$  keys.
- Total number of exchanged keys:  
 $= (n-1) + (n-2) + \dots + 2 + 1$   
 $= n(n-1)/2$
- Grows exponentially, which is problematic.
- Is there a better way?



Community of 5 nodes



# Public-Key Cryptography

# James H. Ellis (1924 – 1997)

- British engineer and mathematician
- Worked at GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters)
- Idea of non-secret encryption to solve key distribution problem
- Encrypt with non-secret information in a way which makes it impossible to decrypt without related secret information
- Never found a practical method



# Clifford Cocks

## (1950 – )

- British mathematician and cryptographer
- Silver medal at the International Mathematical Olympiad, 1968
- Works at GCHQ
- Heard from James Ellis the idea of non-secret encryption in 1973
- Spent 30 minutes in 1973 to invent a practical method
- Equivalent to the RSA algorithm
- Was classified TOP SECRET
- Revealed in 1998



# Malcolm J. Williamson

- British mathematician and cryptographer
- Gold medal at the International Mathematical Olympiad, 1968
- Worked at GCHQ until 1982
- Heard from James Ellis the idea of non-secret encryption, and from Clifford Cocks the practical method.
- Intrigued, spent 1 day in 1974 to invent a method for secret key exchange without secret channel
- Equivalent to the Diffie-Hellmann key exchange algorithm



# Public Key Encryption

- Proposed in the open literature by Diffie & Hellman in 1976.
- Each party has a **public encryption key** and a **private decryption key**.
- Reduces total number of exchanged keys to  $n$
- Computing the private key from the public key should be computationally infeasible.
- The public key need not be kept secret but it is not necessarily known to everyone.
- There can be applications where even access to public keys is restricted.

# Ralph Merkle, Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie

- Merkle invented (1974) and published (1978) Merkle's puzzle, a key exchange protocol which was unpractical
- Diffie & Hellman invented (influenced by Merkle) a practical key exchange algorithm using discrete logarithm.
- D&H defined public-key encryption (equiv. to non-secret encryption)
- Defined digital signature
- Published 1976 in "*New directions in cryptography*"



# Diffie-Hellman key agreement

Alice picks random integer  $a$



Alice computes the shared secret

$$(g^b)^a = g^{ab} \bmod p$$

Bob picks random integer  $b$



Bob computes the same secret

$$(g^a)^b = g^{ab} \bmod p.$$


$$g^a \bmod p$$



$$g^b \bmod p$$



# Man-in-the-middle attack in Diffie-Hellman



Carol now shares keys with both Alice and Bob. Alice sends confidential messages believing that she is communicating with Bob. Carol can decrypt these messages, read them and re-encrypt the message for Bob and send it on. Likewise, Bob sends messages to Alice unaware of Carol.



# Diffie-Hellman Applications

- **IPSec (IP Security)**
  - IKE (Internet Key Exchange) is part of the IPSec protocol suite
  - IKE is based on Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
- **SSL/TLS**
  - Several variations of SSL/TLS protocol including
    - Fixed Diffie-Hellman
    - Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
    - Anonymous Diffie-Hellman

# Public key encryption algorithms

- Each party  $B$  has a **public encryption key** and a **private decryption key**.
- A method is required for each communicating party  $A$  to get an authentic copy of  $B$ 's public key (**hopefully easier than getting a shared secret key**).
- For  $n$  parties, only  $n$  key pairs are needed
  - as opposed to  $n(n-1)/2$  symmetric keys.

# Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman



- Read about public-key cryptography in 1976 article by Diffie & Hellman: *“New directions in cryptography”*
- Intrigued, they worked on finding a practical algorithm
- Spent several months in 1976 to re-invent the method for non-secret/public-key encryption discovered by Clifford Cocks 3 years earlier
- Named RSA algorithm


# RSA Algorithm

- $n = pq$  which is made public (but not  $p$  and  $q$  )
- Calculate secret:  $z = (p-1)(q-1)$
- Choose a public key  $e$
- Compute private key  $d$  such that  $ed = 1 \pmod{z}$
- Encryption of message  $m$  where  $(1 < m < n)$ .
  - Compute:  $c = m^e \pmod{n}$
- Decryption of ciphertext  $c$ 
  - Compute:  $m = c^d \pmod{n}$
- Security depends on the difficulty of factorizing  $n$ 
  - so the prime factors  $p$  and  $q$  must be LARGE

# Asymmetric Ciphers: Examples of Cryptosystems

- RSA: best known asymmetric algorithm.
  - RSA = Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (published 1977)
  - Historical Note: U.K. cryptographer Clifford Cocks invented the same algorithm in 1973, but didn't publish.
- ElGamal Cryptosystem
  - Based on the difficulty of solving the discrete log problem.
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography
  - Based on the difficulty of solving the EC discrete log problem.
  - Provides same level of security with smaller key sizes.

# Asymmetric Encryption: Basic encryption operation




- In practical application, large messages are not encrypted directly with asymmetric algorithms. Hybrid systems are used.

# Hybrid Cryptosystems

- Symmetric ciphers are faster than asymmetric ciphers (because they are less computationally expensive ), but ...
- Asymmetric ciphers simplify key distribution, therefore ...
- a combination of both symmetric and asymmetric ciphers can be used – a hybrid system:
  - The asymmetric cipher is used to distribute a randomly chosen symmetric key.
  - The symmetric cipher is used for encrypting bulk data.

# Confidentiality Services: Hybrid Cryptosystems






# Digital Signatures

# Digital Signature Mechanisms


- A MAC cannot be used as evidence that should be verified by a third party.
- Digital signatures used for non-repudiation, data origin authentication and data integrity services, and in some authentication exchange mechanisms.
- Digital signature mechanisms have three components:
  - key generation
  - signing procedure (private)
  - verification procedure (public)

# Digital signature: Basic operation



- In practical applications, message  $M$  is not signed directly, only a hash value  $h(M)$  is signed.

# Digital signature based on hash value



# Digital Signatures

- *A* has a **public verification key** and a **private signature key** ( $\rightarrow$  public key cryptography).
- *A* uses her private key to compute her signature on document *m*.
- *B* uses a public verification key to check the signature on a document *m* he receives.
- At this technical level, digital signatures are a cryptographic mechanism for associating documents with verification keys.

# Digital Signatures

- To get an authentication service that links a document to  $A$ 's name (identity) and not just a verification key, we require a procedure for  $B$  to get an authentic copy of  $A$ 's public key.
- Only then do we have a service that proves the authenticity of documents 'signed by  $A$ '.
- This can be provided by a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
- Yet even such a service does not provide **non-repudiation** at the level of persons.

# Difference between MACs & Dig. Sig.

- MACs and digital signatures are both authentication mechanisms.
- MAC: the verifier needs the secret that was used to compute the MAC; thus a MAC is unsuitable as evidence with a third party.
  - The third party does not have the secret.
  - The third party cannot distinguish between the parties knowing the secret.
- Digital signatures can be validated by third parties, and can in theory thereby support both non-repudiation and authentication.



# Key length comparison:

Symmetric and Asymmetric ciphers offering comparable security

<b>AES Key Size</b>	<b>RSA Key Size</b>	<b>Elliptic curve Key Size</b>
-	1024	163
128	3072	256
192	7680	384
256	15360	512



# Ciphers and security

- A cipher must
  - be hard to cryptanalyse
  - use a sufficiently large key
- Algorithm secrecy makes cryptanalysis harder, but
  - can give false assurance, i.e. “security by obscurity”
  - challenging to keep cipher design confidential
  - safest to assume that attacker knows cipher
- Auguste Kerckhoffs proposed in 1883 that communication secrecy should only be based on the secrecy of the key
- Still, many organisations use secret algorithms.



# Hopefully, you now know:

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- What cryptography is
- When cryptography is used
- That there is a 'perfect' cipher, but that it has serious limitations
- That there are practical ciphers and how to use them
  - Symmetric ciphers (stream and block)
  - Asymmetric ciphers
- Hash and MAC functions and how to use them
- Hybrid cryptosystems and digital signatures