	Lecture Overview				
INF3510 Information Security Spring 2015	 Fundamental computer security concepts CPU and OS kernel security mechanisms Virtualization Memory Protection 				
<u>Lecture 4</u> Computer Security	Trusted computing and TPM				
University of Oslo Audun Jøsang	L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 2				
Vulnerabilities of the PC Today Sample of Common Vulnerabilities	Meaningless transport defences when endpoints are insecure				

User Output Memory · Access to graphics frame buffer · Ring 0 access to memory CPU · Result: Software can see or change · Result: Software can snoop thru the what the user sees memory to find, capture, and alter settings, data, passwords, keys, etc. to SW to SV User Input Chipset · Access to keyboard & mouse data · Result: Software can see or change DMA Master to SW what the user is typing attacl Simple Hardware · DMA controller access to memory Result: Software can access protected memory directly with DMA controller. USB Intel evelopei Into Forum-12

endpoints are insecure



"Using encryption on the Internet is the equivalent of arranging an armored car to deliver credit card information from someone living in a cardboard box to someone living on a park bench."

(Gene Spafford)

Approaches to strengthening platform security

- · Harden the operating system
 - SE (Security Enhanced) Linux, Trusted Solaris, Windows Vista/7/8
- Add security features to the CPU
 - Protection Layers, NoExecute, ASLR
- · Virtualisation technology
 - Separates processes by separating virtual systems
- Trusted Computing
 - Add secure hardware to the commodity platform
 - E.g. TPM (Trusted Platform Module)
- Rely on secure hardware external to commodity platform

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- Smart cards
- Hardware tokens

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TCB – Trusted Computing Base

- The trusted computing base (TCB) of a computer system is the set of all hardware, firmware, and/or software components that are critical to its security, in the sense that bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside the TCB might jeopardize the security properties of the entire system.
- By contrast, parts of a computer system outside the TCB must not be able to breach the security policy and may not get any more privileges than are granted to them in accordance to the security policy

(TCSEC – Trusted Computer Evaluation Criteria, 1985).

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
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Reference Monitor

- Reference monitor is the security model for enforcing an access control policy over subjects' (e.g., processes and users) ability to perform operations (e.g., read and write) on objects (e.g., files and sockets) on a system.
 - The reference monitor must always be invoked (complete mediation).
 - The reference monitor must be tamperproof (tamperproof).
 - The reference monitor must be small enough to be subject to analysis and tests, the completeness of which can be assured (verifiable).
- The security kernel of an OS is a low-level (close to the hardware) implementation of a reference monitor.

OS security kernel as reference monitor

- Hierarchic security levels were introduced in X86 CPU architecture in 1985 (Intel 80386)
- 4 ordered privilege levels
 - Ring 0: highest
 - Ring 3: lowest
 - Intended usage \rightarrow see diagram:



Protection Rings


CPU Protection Ring structure from 2006 What happened to rings 1 & 2 ? New Ring -1 introduced for virtualization. Necessary for protecting hypervisor from ... it eventually became clear that the hierarchical VMs (Virtual Machines) running in Ring 0. protection that rings provided did not closely match Hypervisor controls VMs in Ring 0 the requirements of the system programmer and Ring 0 is aka .: Supervisor Mode gave little or no improvement on the simple system of having two modes only. Rings of protection lent themselves to efficient implementation in hardware, Ring -1: Hypervisor Mode but there was little else to be said for them. [...]. This again proved a blind alley... Ring 0: Kernel Mode (Unix root, Win. Adm.) Maurice Wilkes (1994) Ring 1: Not used Ring 2: Not used Ring 3: User Mode L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 10 L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 9

Privileged Instructions

- Some of the system instructions (called "privileged instructions") are protected from use by application programs.
- The privileged instructions control system functions (such as the loading of system registers). They can be executed only when the Privilege Level is 0 or -1 (most privileged).
- If one of these instructions is attempted when the Privilege Level is not 0 or -1, then a general-protection exception (#GP) is generated, and the program crashes.

Principle of protection ring model

- A process can access and modify any data and software at the same or less privileged level as itself.
- A process that runs in kernel mode (Ring 0) can access data and SW in Rings 0, 1, 2 and 3
 - but not in Ring -1
- The goal of attackers is to get access to kernel or hypervisor mode.
 - through exploits
 - by tricking users to install software




User processes access to system resources

- User processes need to access system resources (memory and drivers)
- User application processes should not access system memory directly, because they could corrupt memory.
- The CPU must restrict direct access to memory segments and other resources depending on the privilege level.
- Question 1: How can a user process execute instructions that require kernel mode, e.g. for writing to memory ?
 - Answer: The CPU must switch between privilege levels
- Question 2: How should privilege levels be switched?
 - Answer: Through Controlled invocation of code segments

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Controlled Invocation of code segments




Controlled Invocation

- The user process executes code in specific code segments.
- Each code segment has an associated mode which dictates the privilege level the code executes under.
- Simply setting the mode of user process code to Kernel would give kernel-privilege to user process without any control of what the process actually does. Bad idea!
- Instead, the CPU allows the user process to call kernel code segments that only execute a predefined set of instructions in kernel mode, and then returns control back to the user-process code segment in user mode.
- We refer to this mechanism as controlled invocation.

Platform Virtualization

Virtual machines (VM) Platform Virtualization A software implementation of a machine (OS) that Hypervisor (aka. VMM - Virtual Machine Monitor) is executes programs like a real machine (traditional OS) needed to manage multiple guest OSs (virtual machines) in the same hardware platform. Example: • Many types of hypervisors available Java Virtual Machine (JVM) - VMWare is most known Commercial product - JVM accepts a form of computer intermediate language commonly referred to as Jave bytecode. Free version comes with a limitations "compile once, run anywhere" - VirtualBox is a hypervisor for x86 virtualization - The JVM translates the bytecode to executable code on the fly It is freely availably under GPL Platform Virtualization • Runs on Windows, Linux, OS X and Solaris hosts - Simultaneous execution of multiple OSs on a single computer Hyper-V is Microsoft's hypervisor technology hardware, so each OS becomes a virtual computing platform Requires Windows Server L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 17 L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 18 Type 1 VM Architecture (advanced virtualization) Type 2 VM Architecture (simple virtualization) App. App. App. App. App. App. App. App App **Guest OS VM** Guest OS VM Guest OS VM Virtual **Guest OS VM Guest OS VM** Virtual e.g. Windows e.g. Linux e.g. Mac OS Machines Machines e.g. Linux e.g. Mac OS Hypervisor Hypervisor App. App. Hardware (X86 CPU from Intel or AMD) Host OS (e.g. Windows, Linux or Mac OS) Hardware (X86 CPU from Intel or AMD) No host OS Hypervisor runs directly on hardware Hypervisor runs on top of host OS High performance Performance penalty, because hardware access goes through 2 OSs Traditionally good GUI Traditionally limited GUI, but is improved in modern versions Traditionally good HW support, because host OS drivers available HW support can be an issue L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 20 19



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		Buffer overflow	

Memory Protection • Example:

- A program tries to store more data in a buffer than it was intended to hold.
 - Assume a 5 bytes buffer to store a variable in memory:
 - Write10 bytes to buffer, then 5 extra bytes get overwritten

	а	b	с	d	е	f	g	h	i	j
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- If the overwritten part contained a return pointer or software, it is possible for the attacker to execute his own instructions.
- Many attacks are based on buffer overflow techniques



Buffer Overflow


- Buffer overflow is when written data size > buffer size - Results in neighbouring buffers being overwritten
- Unintentional buffer overflow crashes software, and results in unreliability software.
- Intentional buffer overflow is when an attacker modifies specific data in memory to execute malware
- Attackers target return addresses (specify the next piece of code to be executed) and security settings.
- In languages like C or C++ the programmer allocates and de-allocates memory.

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 Type-safe languages like Java guarantee that memory management is 'error-free'.

Memory corruption and buffer overflow

- The stack contains memory buffers that ٠ hold return address. local variables and function arguments. It is possible to decide in advance where a particular buffer will be placed on the stack.
- Heap: dynamically allocated memory; more difficult but not impossible to decide in advance where a particular buffer will be placed on the heap.
- BSS: Block Segment of Static Variables




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Stack Frame – Layout High address previous frame Inputs to function stack growth argument n_ Current stack frame Saved RIP (Instruction Pointer) (return address) (EIP in 32 CPU) argument 1 saved RIP Saved RBP (Base Pointer) saved RBP⁻ (reference point for relative addressing, a.k.a. frame pointer) local (EBP in 32 bit CPU) variables free memory Local variables stored in memory buffers (ranges) of specific sizes. Low address 31 L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015

Stack-based Overflows

- Find a buffer on the runtime stack that can overflow.
- Overwrite the return address with the start address of the code you want to execute.
- The code can also be injected by overflowing buffers.
- You can now execute your own code.



Defences against memory corruption

- Hardware mechanisms
 - NX (No eXecute) bit/flag in stack memory
 - Injected attacker code will not execute on stack
- OS / compiler mechanisms
 - Stack cookies: detects corruption at runtime
 - ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization)
 - · Makes it difficult to locate functions in memory

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- Programming language
 - Type safe languages like Java and C#
- Programming rules
 - Avoid vulnerable functions like
 - strcpy (use strncpy instead)
 - gets (use fgets instead)

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Trusted Computing Motivation

- Software alone can not be trusted.
- Malware infection in OS kernel remains undetected by anti-malware tools.
- Physical access to computers opens up for attacks that can circumvent traditional TCBs (Trusted Computing Base), e.g. secure operating systems.
- Remote parties do not know the status of systems they are communicating with.
- Remote parties do not know the physical identity of hosts they are communicating with.

Basic idea of Trusted Computing

- Use specialised **security hardware** as part of TCB in a computer system
 - Can not be compromised by malware
 - Can verify the integrity of OS kernel

Trusted Computing

- Can make physical tampering difficult
- Can report status of system to remote parties
- Can report identity of system to remote parties
- Gives increased level of trust that the system will perform as expected/specified



Need for trusted hardware

- Computing platforms are typically deployed in hostile environments, in contrast to 1960's and 1970's protected computing centres
 - Users are considered to be hostile
- Trusted Computing is not a new idea!
- Tygar and Yee: A System for Using Physically Secure Coprocessors 1991
 - Cryptography assumes the secrecy of keys
 - Secrecy requires physical security

(J. D. Tygar and B. Yee. A System for Using Physically Secure Coprocessors, *Technical Report CMU-CS-91-140R*, Carnegie Mellon University, May 1991)

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What is "trust" in the sense of TC?

- To have confidence in assumptions about security
- Trust is to believe that security assertions will hold

"A trusted component, operation, or process is one whose behaviour is assumed to be correct under any operating condition, and which is assumed to resist subversion by malicious software, viruses, and manipulations"

- A trusted component enforces the security policy as long as these assumptions hold
- · A trusted component violates the security policy if it breaks
- Q1: How do you know that a component is 'trustworthy', i.e. that it will not break ?
- Q2: Trusted by whom to do what ?
 - Trusted by user, by vendor, or by 3rd party (NSA)
 - What if they have conflicting interests?
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
Characteristics of Trusted Hardware

- Physically secure hardware component
 - Assumed not to break because it's hardware
- Environmental monitoring (temperature, power supply, structural integrity)
- Tamper responsive
- Implementations
 - CPU
 - ROM for OS and application code
 - Specialized hardware for cryptography and for storing secrets


Trusted Hardware – Example

• IBM 4765 Secure Coprocessor





TCG History & Evolution Trusted Computing Group (TCG) October 1999: TCPA formed • - Trusted Computing Platform Alliance - Founders: IBM, HP, Compaq, Intel and Microsoft 2001: 1st TPM specification released TCG Promoters - Trusted Platform Module 2002: TCPA changes its name to TCG Microsoft - Trusted Computing Group nd AMD - Industry standards organization HEWLETT 2003: TCPA TPM spec. adopted by TCG as TPM 1.2 Sun Sun • 2011: Latest TPM spec. 1.2 Ver.116 SONY 2012: Draft TPM Specification 2.0 published - TPM 2.0 spec. not compatible with TPM 1.2 spec. 2015: Official TPM specification 2.0 41 L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 42 L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 **TPM Functionality TPM** usage



- TPM is both the name of a standard and a chip
- TPM chip at the heart of hardware / software approach to trusted computing
- Current TPM chips implement TPM spec. 1.2
 - Latest version of TPM spec. 1.2 is from 2011
- TPM chip mounted on motherboard,
- TPM equipped computing platforms
 - Laptops, servers, pads, mobile phones
- Used by software platforms
 - Windows Vista / 7 / 8, Linux, and MAC OS
- Supports 3 basic services:
 - Authenticated/measured boot,
 - Sealed Storage / Encryption
 - Remote attestation,



Two modes of booting

Secure boot with UEFI (not with TPM, see UEFI later)

 Encrypts data so it can be decrypted - The platform owner can define expected (trusted) measurements - by a certain machine in given configuration (hash values) of OS software modules. • Depends on - Hash values stored in memory signed by private PK (Platform Key). - Storage Root Key (SRK) unique to machine - Public PK stored in secure firmware on platform - Decryption only possible on unique machine - Measured has values can be compared with stored values. Can also extend this scheme upward - Matching measurement values guarantee the integrity of the - create application key for desired application version running on corresponding software modules. desired system version - Boot process terminates if a measurement does not match the Supports disk encryption stored value for that stage of the boot process. Authenticated/Measured boot with TPM - Only records measured values in PCRs and reports to remote party - Does not terminate boot of measured values are not as expected L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 45 L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 46 **TPM Key Hierarchy** Remote Attestation EK (Endorsement Key) Pair Endorsement Key (EK) ٠ - Created once TPM can certify configuration to others Keypub Keypriv - Stored securely in non-二 이 - with a digital signature in configuration info volatile memory - giving another user confidence in it Signing Validation Storage Root Key (SRK) - Based on Attestation Key (AK) - Stored security in non-Remote parties can validate signature based on a PKI ٠ SRK (Storage Root Key) Pair volatole memory · Provides hierarchical certification approach - Validated by EK SRKpriv SRKpub - trust TPM, then trust the OS, then trust applications Attestation Key (AK) <u>ر</u> ک Used for remote attestation Validation Signing - Validated by SRK Custom kevs AK (Attestation Key) Pair Possible to create additional $\mathsf{AK}_{\mathsf{pub}}$ AKpriv keys and validate that they are created under SRK. L04 - INF3510, UiO Spring 2015 47

Sealed Storage / Encryption

UEFI

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
Unified Extensible Firmware Interface

- What is UEFI?
 - Replaces traditional BIOS
 - Like BIOS it hands control of the pre-boot environment to an OS
- Key Security Benefits:
 - Secure Boot



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TPM Secure Boot in Windows 8



- Possible to start anti-malware early in the Windows 8 boot process
 - Early Launch Anti-Malware (ELAM) driver is signed by Microsoft
 - Malware can no longer bypass Anti-Malware inspection
 - UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) replaces BIOS

UEFI Secure Boot

- Prevents loading unsigned drivers or OS loaders
- When secure boot is enabled, it is initially placed in "setup" mode, which writes public key known as the "Platform key" (PK) to firmware.
- Once the key is written, secure boot enters "User" mode, where only drivers and loaders signed with the platform key can be loaded by the firmware.
- "Key Exchange Keys" (KEK), signed by private PK, can be added to a database stored in memory to allow other signatures by other than PK.
- Secure boot supported by Win 8, Win Server 2012, Fedora, OpenSuse, and Ubuntu
- Does not require TPM

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End of lecture