INF3510 Information Security University of Oslo Spring 2015


Lecture 9

Identity Management and Access Control



University of Oslo Spring 2015

The concept of identity



Outline

- Identity and access management concepts
- Identity management models
- Access control models (security models)

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Concepts related to identity

- Entity
 - A person, organisation, agent, system, etc.
- Identity
 - A set of names / attributes of entity in a specific domain
 - An entity may have multiple identities in one domain
- Digital identity
 - Digital representation of names / attributes in a way that is suitable for processing by computers
- Names and attributes of entity
 - Can be unique or ambiguous within a domain
 - Transient or permanent, self defined or by authority, interpretation by humans and/or computers, etc

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Identity

- Etymology (original meaning of words)
 - "identity" = "same one as previous time".
- "First-time" authentication is not meaningful
 - because there is no "previous time"
- Authentication requires a first time registration of identity in the form of a name within a domain
- Registration can be take two forms:
 - pre-authentication, from previous identity, e.g. passport
 - creation of new identity, e.g. New born baby

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
Identity Domains

- An identity domain has a name space of unique names
 - Same user has separate identities in different domains

Service A Id-1 User Silo Id Domain B Service B

- Identity domain structure options:
 - Silo domain with single authority, e.g. User Ids in company network
 - Distributed hierarchic domain: e.g. DNS (Domain Name System)
- Federation of identity domains
 - Multiple domains have single identity for same user
 - Requires alignment of identity policy between domains


Identity management processes **User Side Service Provider Side User Identity** IdMan processes for IdMan processes for Management user lds & credentials user lds & credentials Password on SP side on user side 👤 Id / Token **SP** Identity IdMan processes for IdMan processes for Management SP Ids & credentials SP Ids & credentials Id Cert. on SP side on user side • This lecture focuses on user identities, not SP identities L09 - Id Man & AC INF3510 - UiO 2015 6



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Silo identity management model



Single Id and SSO (Single Sign-On)

- Users don't want more identifiers and credentials
- Low acceptance of new services that require separate user authentication
- Silo model requires users to provide same information to many service providers
- Silo model makes it difficult to offer bundled services, i.e. from different service providers
- Service providers want to bundle and collect user information

Silo Id domains

- SP (Service Provider) = IdP (Identity Provider): SP controls name space and provides access credentials
- Unique identifier assigned to each entity
- Advantages
 - Simple to deploy, low cost for SPs
- Disadvantages
 - Identity overload for users, poor usability, lost business

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
Kerberos SSO

- Part of project Athena (MIT) in 1983.
- User must authenticate once at the beginning of a workstation session (login session).
- Server then authenticates Kerberos client on user's workstation instead of authenticating the user
 - So user does not need to enter password every time a service is requested!
- Every user shares a password with the AS (Authentication Server)
- Every SP (service provider) shares a secret key with the TGS (Ticket Granting Server)
- Tickets are sealed (encrypted) by TGS proves to SPs that the user has been authenticated

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Kerberos – simplified protocol



Identity Federation

- Identity Federation
 - A set of agreements, standards and technologies that enable a group of SPs to recognise user identities, credentials & entitlements from other IdPs and SPs
- Three main architectures:
 - **1. Centralized Federation:** Single user name & credential, with centralized IdP and authentication
 - 2. Distributed Federation: Separate credential for each domain. Distributed authentication.
 - **3. Distributed Federation with Centralised Broker:** Same as (2) but a centralised broker connects user, SP, and IdP. Two types: a) Names are unique per separate SP domain, and b) or names are unique in broker domain

Kerberos – Advantages and limitations

- First practical SSO solution
- Centralized TTP (Trusted Third Party) model
- Uses only symmetric cryptography
- Requires Kerberos clients and servers + KDC
- Only suitable for organisations under common management (single domain)
- Does not scale to very large domains
- Not suitable for open environments (Internet)


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Federation protocols

- Authentication by one IdP or SP is communicated as a security assertions (cryptographic token) to other SPs that trust and accept it
- Usually based on SAML protocol
 Security Assertions Markup Language
- Involves multiple entities
 - User, IdP, SP, and sometimes broker entity



Federated Identity Management

• Advantages


- Improved usability
- Compatible with silo user-identity domains
- Allows SPs to bundle services and collect user info
- Disadvantages
 - High technical and legal complexity
 - High trust requirements
 - E.g. SP-A is technically able to access SP-B on user's behalf
 - Privacy issues,
 - IdP collects info about user habits wrt. which SPs are used
 - Limited scalability,
 - · Can only federate SPs with similar interests
 - An Identity federation becomes a new silo


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
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
SAML protocol profile: Browser Post Security token via front-end





SAML protocol profile: Browser Artefact Security token via back-end






Service Access Without Password

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If you would like to be a reviewer sign up now!		
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OpenID self registration

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Your OpenID URL is how sites that accept OpenID know you. You can use your na	me or anything that you want to
be known by.	
Username josang	
John Doe, idoe123	
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You'll use this password to sign in to myOpenID, but you won't have to give it to a Password Password Password (confirm)	

First Time Service Access



OpenID Characteristics


- Self registration
- Anybody can be IdProvider and Server, also you
- Not all IdProviders are recognised as "authorities"
- A SP can specify which IdPs it accepts
- Not suitable for sensitive services
- Typically for services that only require low authentication assurance
- Vulnerable to multiple forms of abuse

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FIDE (Felles Elektronisk Identitet)

- FEIDE is a distributed federation with centralised broker for the Norwegian national education sector.
- Users register username and password with own home organisation
- Users authenticate to web-services via FEIDE's centralized login service
- The Service Provider receives user attributes from the user's Home Institution
- The Service Providers never sees the user's password/credential, it only receives user attributes that it need to know in order to provide the service.


Facebook Centralised Federation



EDE (continued)

- FEIDE has formal agreements with the universities and schools before they are connected
- Home Institutions (universities and schools) are responsible for keeping user data correct and up-to-date
- Service Providers decide themselves what services their own users and other users should be able to access via FEIDE's central log-in service.


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Introduction to Logical Access Control


Physical Access Control: (not the theme today)

Logical Access Control: (this lecture)





Norw, e-Gov, Distributed Fed, with Broker



Basic concepts

Access control security models:

- How to define which subjects can access which objects with which access modes?

- Three classical approaches
 - Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
 - Mandatory access control (MAC)
 - Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
- Advanced approach for distributed environments:
 - Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
 - Generalisation of DAC, MAC and RBAC

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Access modes

- Modes of access:
 - Authorizations specify the access permissions of subjects (users) when accessing objects (resources)
- If you are authorized to access a resource, what are you allowed to do to the resource?
 - Example: possible access permissions include
 - read observe
 - write observe and alter
 - execute neither observe nor alter
 - append alter

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DAC – Discretionary Access Control

- Access authorization is specified and enforced based on the identity of the user.
- DAC is typically implemented with ACL (Access Control Lists)
- DAC is discretionary in the sense that the owner of the resource can decide at his/her discretion who is authorized
- Operating systems using DAC:
 - Windows and Linux


DAC / MAC According to the Orange Book (TCSEC)

TCSEC (1985) specifies two AC security models

 Discretionary AC (DAC) - AC policy based on user identities - e.g. John has (r,w) - access to HR-files Sales HR DEPARTMENT OF John r,w TRUSTED COMPUTER Mary r,w SYSTEM EVALUATION RITERIA Mandatory AC (MAC) - AC policy based on security labels e.g. secret clearance needed for access Secret Orange Book, 1985 L09 - Id Man & AC INF3510 - UiO 2015 34

DAC principles

- AC Matrix
 - General list of authorizations
 - Impractical, too many empty cells
 - Access Control Lists (ACL)
 - Associated with an object
 - Represent columns from AC Matrix
 - Tells who can access the object



AC Matrix

					-	_		_		
		O1			O2			O3		O4
• AC lists \rightarrow	S1	r,w		S1	-		S1	х	S1	r
	S2	r		S2	-		S2	r	S2	r,w
	S3	-		S3	х		S3	-	S3	-
	S4	r,w		S4	х		S4	x	S4	х
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ACL in Unix

Each file and directory has an associated ACL

- Three access operations: Access applied to a directory:
 - -read: from a file -write: to a file
- read: list contents of dir
- -execute: a file

- write: create or rename files in dir - execute: search directory

•Permission bits are grouped in three triples that define read, write, and execute access for owner) group, and others,

•A '-' indicates that the specific access right is not granted.

•rw-r--r-- means: read and write access for the owner, read access for group, and for others (world).

•rwx----- means: read, write, and execute access for the owner, no rights for group and no rights for others

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MAC – Mandatory Access Control

- Access authorization is specified and enforced with security labels
 - Security clearance for subjects
 - Classification levels for objects
- MAC compares subject and object labels
- MAC is mandatory in the sense that users do not control access to the resources they create.
- A system-wide set of AC policy rules for subjects and objects determine modes of access
- OS with MAC:
 - SE Linux supports MAC

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Capabilities

- Focus on the subjects:
 - access rights stored with subjects
 - Represents rows of AC Matrix
- Must be impossible for users to create fake capabilities
- Subjects may grant own capabilities to other subjects. Subjects may grant the right to grant rights.
- Challenges:
 - How to check who may access a specific object?
 - How to revoke a capability?
- Similar to SAML security token


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MAC principles: Labels

- Security Labels can be assigned to subjects and objects
 - Can be strictly ordered security levels, e.g. "Confidential" or "Secret"
 - Can also be partially ordered categories, e.g. {Sales-dep, HR-dep}
- Dominance relationship between labels
 - ($L_A \ge L_B$) means that label L_A dominates label L_B
- Object labels are assigned according to sensitivity
- Subject labels are determined by security clearance
- Access control decisions are made by comparing the subject label with the object label according to specific model
- MAC is typically based on Bell-LaPadula model (see later)



	Capa		les	
	01	02	O3	04
S1	r,w	-	х	r
	01	O2	O3	O4
S2	r	-	r	r,w
	01	02	O3	04
S3	-	x	-	-
	O1	O2	O3	04
S4	r,w	х	х	х

AC

Capabilitian

Bell-LaPadula: The classical MAC model

SS-property (Simple Security): No Read Up


- A subject should not be able to read files with a higher label than its own label, because otherwise it could cause unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information.
- So you should only be able to read documents with an equal or lower label as your security clearance level.
- *-Property (Star Property): No Write Down
- Subjects working on information/tasks at a given level should not be allowed to write to a lower level, because otherwise it could create unauthorized information flow.
- So you should only be able write to files with an equal or higher label as your security clearance level.

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
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*Bell-LaPadula (MAC model) *-Property: No Write Down




Bell-LaPadula (MAC model) SS-Property: No Read Up



Labels in Bell La Padula

- Users have a clearance level LSM (Subject Max level)
- Users log on with a current clearance level L^{SC} (Subject Current level) where $L^{SC} \leq L^{SM}$
- Objects have a sensitivity level L^O (Object)
- SS-property allows read access when $L^{\text{SC}} \geq L^{\text{O}}$
- *-property allows write access when $L^{SC} \leq L^{O}$

Bell-LaPadula label relationships



RBAC: Role Based Access Control

- A user has access to an object based on the assigned role.
- Roles are defined based on job functions.
- Permissions are defined based on job authority and responsibilities within a job function.
- Operations on an object are invocated based on the permissions.
- The object is concerned with the user's role and not the user.

Combined MAC & DAC

- Combining access control approaches:
 - A combination of mandatory and discretionary access control approaches is often used
 - MAC is applied first,
 - DAC applied second after positive MAC
 - Access granted only if both MAC and DAC positive
 - Combined MAC/DAC ensures that
 - no owner can make sensitive information available to unauthorized users, and
 - 'need to know' can be applied to limit access that would otherwise be granted under mandatory rules


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RBAC Flexibility



RBAC Privilege Principles

- Roles are engineered based on the principle of least privilege .
- A role contains the minimum amount of permissions to instantiate an object.
- A user is assigned to a role that allows her to perform only what's required for that role.
- All users with the same role have the same permissions.

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- Attribute Based Access Control
- ABAC makes AC decisions based on Boolean conditions on attribute values.
- Subject, Object, Context, and Action consist of attributes
 - Subject attributes could be: Name, Sex, DOB, Role, etc.
 - Each attributes has a value, e.g.:
 - (Name (subject) = Alice), (Sex(subject) = F), (Role(subject) = HR-staff), (AccessType(action) = {read, write}),
 (Owner(abject) = HP), (Type(abject) = colory)
 - (Owner(object) = HR), (Type(object) = salary)
- The AC logic analyses all (attribute = value) tuples that are required by the relevant policy.
 - E.g. permit if:

[Role(subject) = HR-staff) and (AccessType(action) = read) and (Owner(object) = HR)] and (Time(query) = office-hours)]

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
ABAC and XACML

ABAC = Attribute Based Access Control

- ABAC specifies access authorizations and approves access through policies combined with attributes. The policy rules can apply to any type of attributes (user attributes, resource attribute, context attributed etc.).
- XACML used to express ABAC attributes and policies.

XACML = eXtensible Access Control Markup Language

- The XACML standard defines a language for expressing access control attributes and policies implemented in XML, and a processing model describing how to evaluate access requests according to the rules defined in policies.
- XACML attributes are typically structured in ontologies



Global Consistence

- ABAC systems require an XML terminology to express all possible attributes and their values,
- Must be consistent across the entire domain,
 - e.g. the attribute Role and all its possible values, e.g. (Role(subject) = HR-staff), must be known and interpreted by all systems in the AC security domain.
- Requires standardization:
 - e.g. for access to medical journals, medical terms must be interpreted in a consistent way by all systems
 - current international work on XML of medical terms
- Consistent interpretation of attributes and values is a major challenge for implementing ABAC.

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Meta-policies i.c.o. inconsistent policies

- Sub-domain authorities defined their own policies
- Potential for conflicting policies
 - E.g. two policies dictate different access decisions
- Meta-policy rules needed in case the ABAC logic detects policy rules that lead to opposite decisions
- Meta-policy takes priority over all other policies, e.g.
 - Meta-Policy Deny Overrides: If one policy denies access, but another policy approves access, then access is denied. This is a conservative meta-policy.
 - Meta-Policy Approve Overrides: If one policy denies access, but another policy approves access, then access is approved.
 - This is a lenient meta-policy.

ABAC: + and -

On the positive side:

•ABAC is much more flexible than DAC, MAC or RBAC - DAC, MAC and RBAC can be implemented with ABAC

•Can use any type of access policies combined with an unlimited number of attributes

•Suitable for access control in distributed environments

- e.g. national e-health networks

On the negative side:

•Requires defining business concepts in terms of XML and ontologies which is much more complex than what is required in traditional DAC, MAC or RBAC systems.

•Political alignment and legal agreements required for ABAC in distributed environments

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End of lecture

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