Digital Forensics and Incident Response

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@UIO 05.03.18

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- All opinions in this presentation are my own and all facts are based on open sources

Outline

- Incident Response

- Digital Forensics

- Finding Evidence

- Demos

Who does this?

Digital forensics is often part of an incident responder's job - "DFIR"

- Law enforcement
- CERTs (Government/industry specific/company specific)
  - In Norway: NorCERT, KraftCert, TelenorCert, FinansCert, UIOCert++
- Company IRTs
  - In Norway: DNB IRT, Statoil CSIRT++
- SysAdmins
- Consultants
  - In Norway: Watchcom Security Group, Mnemonic IRT++
- And others…

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Incident Response

Incident Management

- Incident Response Policy
- Incident Response Team

Incident Response Policy

Responsibility
- Who makes the decisions?

Asset Priority
- Which systems can be taken offline?
- Which systems can absolutely not be taken offline?

Outside Experts and Agencies
- Who you gonna call?
- At what point is Law Enforcement involved?

Incident Response Policy

As an employee, if I discover an incident, what do I do?

The policy must include information on

- Chain of escalation
- How to prevent further damage
- How to preserve evidence until the Response Team can take over

Incident Response Team

- Many names and definitions – the same principles apply to all of them (IMO)
  - IRT, SIRT, CERT, CSIRT... (Response Team being the key)
- Permanent
- Virtual
- Hybrid

Red Team – Blue Team

- Derived from military wargames
- A simulated attack using security specialists
- The Incident Response Team defends the system from the attack

Incident Response Procedures

- Detect
- Respond
- Recover

Source: Ross McRae, Microsoft (@HollisticInfoSec)

Detect

Know your assets

- If you don't know your assets, you cannot defend them

Triage

- Weed out false positives
- Categorize events
    - Type of incident
    - Source
    - Growth
    - Damage potential

ACT
TRACK
HUNT
BEHAVIORS
THREATS
TRIAGE
DETECTION
TELEMETRY
INVENTORY

"During incident response, I operate at the same tempo as the adversary to protect my business assets."

"When my red team emulates a real-world adversary, I detect their intrusion at multiple points along the kill chain."

"I detect hygiene issues and operator activity that does not follow best practices."

Source: Ross McRae, Microsoft (@HollisticInfoSec)

Respond

- Collect data
- Mitigate damage
- Isolate systems

ACT

TRACK

HUNT

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Respond (2)

- Analyze and track adversary
  - What is the root cause of the incident?
  - Who, how, when, why

- Law enforcement
  - Is it necessary?

"During incident response, I operate at the same tempo as the adversary to protect my business assets."

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
Source: Ross McRae, Microsoft (@HollisticInfoSec)

Recover

- Fix the problem
- Improve Incident Response Policy
- Disclosure

Source: Ross McRae, Microsoft (@HollisticInfoSec)

Digital Forensics

Digital Forensics in Court

The BTK Killer

- Metadata in Word file led to arrest after 30 years

Krenar Lusha

- Search of laptop led to discovery of bomb-making equipment

Matt Baker

- Suicide of wife ruled murder after incriminating google searches is discovered 4 years later

Sharon Lopatka

- Emails on her computer led to her killer

Digital Forensics

It's all the same...

- Digital forensics, computer forensics, network forensics, electronic data discovery, cyberforensics, forensic computing...

Big difference in the handing of evidence

- Law enforcement
- Corporate incidents

What is digital evidence?

"Any digital data that contains reliable information that supports or refutes a hypothesis about an incident"

Forensic Investigation Process

- Identification
- Preservation
- Collection
- Examination
- Analysis
- Presentation

At the Crime Scene

Document the crime scene
- Document who has access
- Document any contamination

Photograph everything
- Especially the screen

Locate the media
- Follow cables
- All digital devices may contain digital evidence

If the computer is running, dump the RAM

Basic Scientific Principles

1. Best evidence
2. Minimal Intrusion
3. Minimal Force
4. Minimal Interruption
5. Transparency
6. Chain of Custody
7. Primacy of the Mission
8. Impartiality
9. Documentation

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Evidence Location

- Network analysis
- Media analysis
- Software analysis
- Hardware analysis

Dealing with Evidence

R-OCITE

- **R**eturn

Or seize…

- **O**riginal

- **C**lone

- **I**mage

- **T**argeted copy

- **E**xtensive copy

Admissible Evidence

- How was it gathered?

- How was it treated?

- Who handled it?

- How reliable is it?

- Is the Chain of Custody complete?

Evidence Categories

Conclusive Evidence
- This is fact

Best Evidence
- This is it

Secondary Evidence
- This how it looks

Direct Evidence
- This is what I saw

Evidence Categories

Corroborative Evidence
- That happened, because of this

Circumstantial Evidence
- That could have happened, because of this

Opinion Evidence
- I'm an expert, this is what happened

Hearsay Evidence
- I heard this about that

Digital evidence is considered hearsay unless an expert vouches for it

Finding Evidence

Finding Evidence

- Many ways to hide
- Many ways to find

Hidden Files

- Setting the "hidden" flag on the file
  - Different for Windows and *nix
- Inconspicuous folder names

Locating Hidden Files

- The "hidden" flag is ignored by default
- Forensic software can be set to show the drive as a "flat" drive
    - Ignoring folder hierarchy

Changing File Extensions

- When opening the file, the system returns an error message
- "Oh, I guess it is corrupted. Too bad."

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Discovering Changed File Extensions

- Some forensic software will point out files with mismatched extensions
- File signatures tells us what kind of file it is
  - Also called "Magic Numbers"

File Signatures

A hexadecimal code in the file, also called file "headers" and "footers"

Examples:

25 50 44 46	= %PDF	= PDF
49 44 33	= ID3	= MP3
FF D8 FF	= ÿØÿà	= JPEG
42 4D	= BM	= BMP
4D 5A	= MZ	= EXE, COM, DLL

Obscure File Names

- Hiding files by giving them inconspicuous file names
- "Blueprints_iPhone8.jpeg" becomes "Florida vacation 001.jpeg"

File Names not an Issue

- Hash functions to look for known files
  - Lists of hash sums recognize known illicit files
  - Lists of hash sums recognize known "good" files
  - We can create our own lists

Steganography

- Hiding a file inside another file
- Hiding "Nuclear Launch Codes.txt" inside "Adorable Cat.jpeg"
- Not very common

Steganography Example

- Command & Control traffic in images
  - Known sites - imgur, Dropbox, Instagram etc.
- ZeusVM botnet malware used image files to hide configuration files

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
Discovering Steganography

- Hard to determine unless you are looking for it
- Steganography software on suspect's computer a strong indicator
- File type signatures to the rescue
  - Linux tools: binwalk, file

Encrypted Files

- This is where the problems start for the investigator
- Strong encryption algorithms almost impossible to break
- "Sorry, I've forgotten my 50 character long password."

"Breaking" Encryption

- Get access to data while unencrypted
- Recovering key from RAM
  - Mimikatz
- Brute force
- Exploiting weaknesses in the software or the algorithm used (Cryptanalysis)
- Some countries have laws that compel the suspect to give up keys

Unencrypted data – the arrest of Ross Ulbricht

Brute force (?) – San Bernadino case

TECHNOLOGY NEWS APRIL 29, 2016 / 3:30 AM / 2 YEARS AGO

FBI paid under $1 million to unlock San Bernardino iPhone: sources

Reuters Staff

2 MIN READ

(This version of the story corrects paragraph 3 to $1.3 million instead of $1.3 billion.)

iPhone 5 (c)

Exploit weaknesses

Deleting Files

- Deleting the files from the computer before law enforcement claims it
- "You can't prove anything, there is nothing there."

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How does the System Delete Files?

- Deleting a file does not actually remove it

- In Windows, the file is renamed
  - CorporateSecrets.txt
  - ~orporateSecrets.txt

- This tells the system that the space is available to be overwritten in the future

Reclaiming Deleted Files

- Data carving
  - Ignore file system – extract file directly from the media
- Renaming the file

Reclaiming Overwritten Files

- Pieces of data can be recovered from "slack space"
- File slack, RAM slack, drive slack
- Forensics software can often recover files or parts of files from slack space
- People encrypt their drives nowadays

AAAA	BBBB	CCCC	DDDD	1111	2222	3333	4444

~AAA	BBBB	CCCC	DDDD	1111	2222	3333	4444

XXXX	YYYY	ZZZZ	DDDD	1111	2222	3333	4444

Metadata

- What if we only have a file, and not the source media?

UIO_Guest_
Lecture_Dig
ital_Forensi
cs.pptx

DSC_0024.JPG

Using Metadata

- Data about the file
  - When was the file last used?
  - When was the file created?
  - Who opened it?
  - Where was it created?

- Can prove who had access to the file

Metadata Example

Metadata Example

Metadata Example

Metadata Example 2

- Red Star OS – Appends unique system identifier to all media files

It's not all theory – if you want to learn more...

CTFs

Forums (e.g. /r/forensics, /r/netsec)

Virtual machines, tools & wargames
- Sans DBIR
- Redline
- Volatility
- Sandboxed malware (be careful...)

- Books

Courses (e.g. SANS SEC504/FOR572)
- Course contents are public. Use Google to learn the goals!

- Conferences (DEFCON, DerbyCon, CCC, Paranoia)
  - Videos are often published online, freely available
  - Paranoia is held in Oslo Spektrum on the 29th and 30th of May

- Books

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Coming up

Demos:

- Using DFIR tools on an infected machine
- Red Star OS

Questions?

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