

INF3510

Information Security

Lecture 8: User Authentication




University of Oslo
Spring 2018

Outline

- Context of user authentication
 - Identity and authentication steps
- User Authentication
 - Knowledge-Based Authentication
 - Passwords
 - Ownership-Based Authentication
 - Tokens
 - Inherence-Based Authentication
 - Biometrics
- Authentication frameworks for e-Government

Taxonomy of Authentication



Identity and Access Management (IAM) Phases

Configuration phase

Operation phase

Registration of identity

Provisioning of credentials

Authorization of access

Self-Identification

Authentication

Access control



Claim identity

Prove claimed identity

Enforce access authorization policy


This lecture

User authentication credentials

- A credential is the ‘thing’ used for authentication.
- Credential categories:
 1. Knowledge-Based (Something you know): Passwords
 2. Ownership-Based (Something you have): Tokens 
 3. Inherence-Based (Something you are/do): Biometrics
 - physiological biometric characteristics
 - behavioural biometric characteristics
- Combinations, called multi-factor authentication

Knowledge-Based Authentication

Something you know: Passwords



Authentication:

Static passwords

123456

- Passwords are a simple and the most common authentication credential.
 - Something the user knows
- Problems:
 - Easy to share (intentionally or not)
 - Easy to forget
 - Often easy to guess (weak passwords)
 - Can be written down (both good and bad)
 - If written down, then “what you know” is “where to find it”
 - Often remains in computer memory and cache

RockYou Hack

- 32 million cleartext passwords stolen from RockYou database in 2009
- Posted on the Internet
- Contains accounts and passwords for websites
 - MySpace, Yahoo, Hotmail
- Analyzed by Imperva.com
 - 1% use 123456
 - 20% use password from set of 5000 different passwords

MOST POPULAR PASSWORDS

Nearly one million RockYou users chose these passwords to protect their accounts.

- | | |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| 1. 123456 | 17. michael |
| 2. 12345 | 18. ashley |
| 3. 123456789 | 19. 654321 |
| 4. password | 20. qwerty |
| 5. iloveyou | 21. iloveu |
| 6. princess | 22. michelle |
| 7. rockyou | 23. 111111 |
| 8. 1234567 | 24. 0 |
| 9. 12345678 | 25. tigger |
| 10. abc123 | 26. password1 |
| 11. nicole | 27. sunshine |
| 12. daniel | 28. chocolate |
| 13. babygirl | 29. anthony |
| 14. monkey | 30. angel |
| 15. jessica | 31. FRIENDS |
| 16. lovely | 32. soccer |

Secure password strategies

- Passwords length ≥ 13 characters
- Use ≥ 3 categories of characters
 - L-case, U-case, numbers, special characters
- Do not use ordinary words (names, dictionary wds.)
- Change typically every 3 – 13 months
- OK to reuse between low-sensitivity accounts
- Do not reuse between high-sensitivity accounts
- Store passwords securely
 - In brain memory
 - On paper, adequately protected
 - In cleartext on offline digital device, adequately protected
 - Encrypted on online digital device

Strategies for strong passwords

- User education and policies
 - Not necessarily with strict enforcement
- Proactive password checking
 - User selects a potential password which is tested
 - Weak passwords are not accepted
- Reactive password checking
 - SysAdmin periodically runs password cracking tool (also used by attackers) to detect weak passwords that must be replaced.
- Computer-generated passwords
 - Random passwords are strong but difficult to remember
 - FIPS PUB 181 <http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip181.htm> specifies automated pronounceable password generator

Password storage in OS

- `/etc/shadow` is the file where modern Linux/Unix stores its passwords
 - Earlier version stored it in `/etc/passwd`
 - Need root access to modify it
- `\windows\system32\config\sam` is the file Windows system normally stores its passwords
 - Undocumented binary format
 - Need to be Administrator to access it
- Network environments store passwords centrally
 - AD (Active Directory) on Windows servers
 - LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) on Linux


Prevent exposure of password file

- Systems verify user passwords against stored values in the password file
- Password file must be available to OS
 - This file need protection from users and applications
 - Avoid offline dictionary attacks
- Protection measures
 - Access control (only accessible by Root/Admin)
 - Hashing or encryption
- In case a password file gets stolen, then hashing/encryption provides a level of protection


Hash functions



One-way function



Collision free



- *A hash function is easy to compute but hard to invert.*
- Passwords can be stored as hash values.
- Authentication function first computes hash of received password, then compares against stored hash value

Cracking passwords


- Bruce Force
 - Trying all possible combinations
- Intelligent search
 - User name
 - Name of friends/relatives
 - Phone number
 - Birth dates
 - Dictionary attack
 - Try all words from an dictionary
 - Precomputed hashes: Rainbow tables

Hash table and rainbow table attacks

- Attackers can compute and store hash values for all possible passwords up to a certain length
- A list of password hashes is a **hash table**
- A compressed hash table is a **rainbow table**
- Comparing and finding matches between hashed passwords and hash/rainbow table is the method to determine cleartext passwords.



Password salting: Defence against password cracking




- Prepend or append random data (salt) to a user's password before hashing
 - In Unix: a randomly chosen integer from 0 to 4095.
 - Different salt for each user
 - Produces different hashes for equal passwords
 - Prevents that users with identical passwords get the same password hash value
 - Increases the amount of work required for hash table attacks and rainbow table attacks


Storing and checking passwords




MyPass
Cleartext
→ Bad security



MyPass
Hash
→ Moderate security



MyPass
Salted hash
→ Good security




Problems with using passwords in the clear

- A password sent “in clear” can be captured during transmission, so an attacker may reuse it.
- An attacker setting up a fake server can get the password from the user
 - E.g. phishing attack.
- Solutions to these problems include:
 - Encrypted communication channel
 - One-time passwords (token-based authentication)
 - Challenge-response protocols

HTTP Digest Authentication

A simple challenge-response protocol (rarely used)

- A simple challenge response protocol specified in RFC 2069
- Server sends:
 - WWW-Authenticate = Digest
 - realm="service domain"
 - nonce="some random number"
- User types Id and password in browser window
- Browser produces a password digest from nonce, Id and password using a 1-way hash function
- Browser sends Id and digest to server that validates digest




Ownership-Based Authentication

Something you have: Tokens




Taxonomy of Authentication Tokens



Synchronised OTP (One-Time-Password) Generator

- Using a password only once significantly strengthens the strength of user authentication.
- Synchronized password generators produce the same sequence of random passwords both in the token and at the host system.
 - OTP is ‘something you have’ because generated by token
- There are two general methods:
 - Clock-based tokens
 - Counter-based tokens






Clock-based OTP Tokens: Operation

- Token displays time-dependent code on display
 - User copies code from token to terminal to log in
- Possession of the token is necessary to know the correct value for the current time
- Each code computed for specific time window
- Codes from adjacent time windows are accepted
- Clocks must be synchronised
- Example: BankID and SecurID



Clock-based OTP Token Operation with (optional) input PIN



Clock-based OTP Tokens:



SafeID OTP token with PIN



ActiveID OTP token with PIN



BankID OTP token with PIN



Feitan OTP token without PIN



RSA SecurID token without PIN



BankID OTP token without PIN

Hacking OTP Tokens

- RSA was hacked in 2007.
- Secret key for OTP tokens stolen
- Hackers could generate OTP and spoof users
- Companies using RSA SecureID were vulnerable
- Lockheed Martin used RSA SecureID
- Chinese attackers spoofed Lockheed Martin staff
 - Stole plans for F-35 fighter jet





Counter-based OTP Tokens: Overview

- Counter-based tokens generate a 'password' result value as a function of an internal counter and other internal data, without external inputs.
- HOTP is a HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm described in RFC 4226 (Dec 2005)
<http://www.rfc-archive.org/getrfc.php?rfc=4226>
 - Tokens that do not support any numeric input
 - The value displayed on the token is designed to be easily read and entered by the user.




Counter-based OTP Token Operation






Challenge Response Based Tokens for User Authentication:

- A challenge is sent in response to access request
 - A legitimate user can respond to the challenge by performing a task which requires use of information only available to the user (and possibly the host)
- User sends the response to the host
 - Access is approved if response is as expected by host.
- Advantage: Since the challenge will be different each time, the response will be too – the dialogue can not be captured and used at a later time
- Could use symmetric or asymmetric crypto




Token-based User authentication Challenge Response Systems




Symmetric algorithm case

Contactless Cards: Overview



- Contactless cards, also called RFID (Radio Frequency Id) cards, consists of a chip and an antenna.
 - No need to be in physical contact with the reader.
 - Uses radio signals to communicate
 - Powered by magnetic field from reader
 - When not within the range of a reader it is not powered and remains inactive.
 - Battery powered RFID tags also exist
- Suitable for use in hot, dirty, damp, cold, foggy environments



Inherence-Based Authentication

Biometrics



Something you are

Something you do

Biometrics: Overview

- What is it?
 - Automated methods of verifying or recognizing a person based upon a physiological characteristics.
- Biometric modalities, examples:
 - fingerprint
 - facial recognition
 - eye retina/iris scanning
 - hand geometry
 - written signature
 - voice print
 - keystroke dynamics

Biometrics: Requirements

- **Universality:**
Each person should have the characteristic;
- **Distinctiveness:**
Any two persons should be sufficiently different in terms of the characteristic;
- **Permanence:**
The characteristic should be sufficiently invariant (with respect to the matching criterion) over a period of time;
- **Collectability:**
The characteristic should be measurable quantitatively.

Biometrics: Practical considerations

- **Accuracy:**
 - The correctness of a biometric system, expressed as ERR (Equal Error Rate), where a low ERR is desirable.
- **Performance:**
 - the achievable speed of analysis,
 - the resources required to achieve the desired speed,
- **Acceptability:**
 - the extent to which people are willing to accept the use of a particular biometric identifier (characteristic)
- **Circumvention resistance:**
 - The difficulty of fooling the biometric system
- **Safety:**
 - Whether the biometric system is safe to use

Biometrics Safety

- Biometric authentication can be safety risk
 - Attackers might want to “steal” body parts
 - Subjects can be put under duress to produce biometric authenticator
- Necessary to consider the physical environment where biometric authentication takes place.



Car thieves chopped off part of the driver's left index finger to start S-Class Mercedes Benz equipped with fingerprint key. Malaysia, March 2005
(NST picture by Mohd Said Samad)


Biometrics: Modes of operation

- **Enrolment:**
 - analog capture of the user's biometric attribute.
 - processing of this captured data to develop a template of the user's attribute which is stored for later use.
- **Identification** (1:N, one-to-many)
 - capture of a new biometric sample.
 - search the database of stored templates for a match based solely on the biometric.
- **Verification** of claimed identity (1:1, one-to-one):
 - capture of a new biometric sample.
 - comparison of the new sample with that of the user's stored template.


Extracting biometric features

Example fingerprints: Extracting minutia

Bifurcation



Ridge ending



Biometric

Minutia Points


Minutia Map

Data Stream




```
0101010001101000011010  
0101110011001000000110  
1001011100110010000001  
1011100110111101110100  
0010000001100001011000  
1101110100011101010110  
0001011011000110110001  
1110010010000001100110  
0110100101101110011001  
1101100101011100100111  
0000011100100110100101  
1011100111010000100000  
0110010001100001011101  
0001100001001011000010
```


Biometrics: System components




Biometrics: Enrolment



Biometrics: Verification



Biometrics: Identification



Evaluating Biometrics:


- Features from captured sample are compared against those of the stored template sample
- Score s is derived from the comparison.
 - Better match leads to higher score.
- The system decision is tuned by threshold T :
 - System gives a **match** (same person) when the sample comparison generates a score s where $s \geq T$
 - System gives **non-match** (different person) when the sample comparison generates a score s where $s < T$

Matching algorithm characteristics

- True positive
 - User's sample matches → User is accepted
- True negative
 - Stranger's sample does not match → Stranger is rejected
- False positives
 - Stranger's sample matches → Stranger is accepted
- False negatives
 - User's sample does not match → User is rejected
- False Match Rate and False Non-Match Rate
 - $FMR = (\# \text{ matching stranger samples}) / (\text{total } \# \text{ stranger samples})$
 - $FNMR = (\# \text{ non-matching user samples}) / (\text{total } \# \text{ user samples})$
- T determines tradeoff between FMR and FNMR

Evaluating Biometrics: System Errors

- Comparing biometric samples produces score s
- Acceptance threshold T determines FMR and FNMR
 - If T is set low to make the system more tolerant to input variations and noise, then FMR increases.
 - On the other hand, if T is set high to make the system more secure, then FNMR increases accordingly.
- EER (Equal Error Rate) is the rate when $FMR = FNMR$.
- Low EER is good.



Spoofting Biometrics: Presentation Attacks

- It is relatively simple to trick a biometric system
 - Terminology: *Presentation Attacks*



False finger




False face

- Biometric authentication on smartphones is insecure
- PAD (Presentation Attack Detection) is the subject of intensive research, to make biometrics more secure
- Alternative solution is to capture biometrics in controlled environments

Authentication Assurance

- Authentication assurance = robustness of authentication
- Resources have different sensitivity levels
 - High sensitivity gives high risk in case of authentication failure
- Authentication has a cost
 - Unnecessary authentication assurance is a waste of money
- Authentication assurance should balance resource sensitivity





e-Authentication Frameworks for e-Gov.

- Trust in identity is a requirement for e-Government
- Authentication assurance produces identity trust.
- Authentication depends on technology, policy, standards, practice, awareness and regulation.
- Consistent frameworks allow cross-national and cross-organisational schemes that enable convenience, efficiency and cost savings.




Alignment of e-Authentication Frameworks

Authentication Framework	User Authentication Assurance Levels				
NIST SP800-63-3 USA 2017			Some (1)	High (2)	Very High (3)
eIDAS EU 2014			Low (1)	Substantial (2)	High (3)
ISO 29115 ISO/IEC 2013	Low (Little or no) (1)		Medium (2)	High (3)	Very High (4)
e-Pramaan India 2012	None (0)	Minimal (1)	Minor (2)	Significant (3)	Substantial (4)
NeAF Australia 2009	None (0)	Minimal (1)	Low (2)	Moderate (3)	High (4)
RAU / FAD Norway 2008	Little or no assurance (1)		Low (2)	Moderate (3)	High (4)

AAL: Authentication Assurance Level

- AAL is determined by the weakest of three links:



User Identity
Registration Assurance
(UIRA) requirements

- Requirements for correct registration:
- Pre-authentication credentials, e.g.
 - birth certificate
 - biometrics

User Credential
Management Assurance
(UCMA) requirements

- Requirements for secure handling of credentials:
- Creation
 - Distribution
 - Storage

User Authentication
Method Strength
(UAMS) requirements

- Requirements for mechanism strength:
- Password length and quality
 - Cryptographic algorithm strength
 - Tamper resistance of token
 - Multiple-factor methods

eIDAS

electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services



The EU trust mark for qualified trust services

- eIDAS is EU’s regulation on e-Authentication and trust services for e-transactions.
- “Trust service” is EU jargon for PKI certification services.
- eIDAS specifies three authentication assurance levels (AALs).

Low Assurance eIDAS AAL-1	Substantial Assurance eIDAS AAL-2	High Assurance eIDAS AAL-3
Limited degree of confidence in the claimed or asserted identity of a person	substantial degree of confidence in the claimed or asserted identity of a person	higher degree of confidence in the claimed or asserted identity of a person

Risk Analysis for eAuthentication

Determining the appropriate AAL for an application

Impact of e-Authentication Failure			
	Minor	Moderate	Major
Required AAL →	Low eIDAS AAL-1	Substantial eIDAS AAL-2	High eIDAS AAL-3

- E-Authentication Failure means that an imposter is able to attack and steal somebody else's identity

Example risk matrix applied to eIDAS

RAU Norway 2008

Rammeverk for Autentisering og Uavviselighet (Framework for Authentication and Non-Repudiation)

RAU AAL-4: High authentication assurance

- E.g. two-factor, where at least one must be dynamic, and at least one is provisioned in person

RAU AAL-3: Moderate authentication assurance

- E.g. OTP calculator with PIN provisioned by mail to user's official address

RAU AAL-2: Low authentication assurance

- E.g. fixed password provisioned in person or by mail to user's official address

RAU AAL-1: Little or no authentication assurance :

- E.g. Online self-registration and self-chosen password

Norway will adopt eIDAS in 2018 (RAU will no longer be used)

Only Three AALs in Modern eAuth. Frameworks

- Early eAuthentication frameworks typically had four AALs
- In practice the very low AAL is not used
- Very low AAL is inadequate for Cross-border/Federated auth.
 - eIDAS assumes cross-border authentication
 - NIST SP800-63-3 assumes federated authentication
- Current providers of highest AAL (RAU AAL-4) in Norway
 - Commfides
 - Buypass
 - BankID
 - BankID på mobil
- Adoption of eIDAS in Norway will probably be relatively simple
 - Some authentication service providers may need to make changes to keep accreditation for the highest AAL (eIDAS AAL-3)

End of lecture