
Lecture 6 – Hash functions


TEK4500

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Håkon Jacobsen

hakon.jacobsen@its.uio.no

Basic goals of cryptography



Hash function applications

- File storage verification
- Data authentication (MACs and digital signatures)
- Certificates
- Randomness extraction and key derivation (PRFs)
- Password hashing
- Quantum-resistant signatures
- Hash chains (Bitcoin)


Hash functions

$$H : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$$

Keyless function

$$|\mathcal{M}| \gg |\mathcal{Y}|$$

Compressing



Examples:

- ~~• MD5 : $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{128}$~~
- ~~• SHA1 : $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{160}$~~
- SHA2-256 : $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{256}$
- SHA2-512 : $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{512}$

Possible security goals:

- Hard to find *pre-images*
- Hard to find *collisions*

Collision resistance

Exp_H^{cr}(A)

1. $(X, X') \leftarrow A$
2. **return** $H(X) \stackrel{?}{=} H(X')$ and $X \stackrel{?}{\neq} X'$

Since $|\mathcal{M}| \gg |\mathcal{Y}|$, there exists $X \neq X'$ s.t. $H(X) = H(X')$

A

1. Output $X \neq X'$

Adv_H^{cr}(A) = 1

...but how do we actually find X, X' ?

Doesn't work!

There always exists a very efficient A with **Adv_H^{cr}(A) = 1!**

~~Wanted intuitive idea:
 H is **collision resistant** if
Adv_H^{cr}(A) is "small" for all
"practical" A~~


Definition: The **CR-advantage** of an adversary A against H is

$$\mathbf{Adv}_H^{\text{cr}}(A) = \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_H^{\text{cr}}(A) \Rightarrow 1]$$

One-way / pre-image security

$\mathbf{Exp}_H^{\text{ow}}(A)$

1. $X \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$
2. $Y \leftarrow H(X)$
3. $X' \leftarrow A(Y)$
4. **return** $H(X') \stackrel{?}{=} Y$



Definition: The **OW-advantage** of an adversary A against H is

$$\mathbf{Adv}_H^{\text{ow}}(A) = \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}_H^{\text{ow}}(A) \Rightarrow 1]$$

Collision resistance vs. one-wayness

Exp_H^{cr}(A)

1. $(X, X') \leftarrow A$
2. **return** $H(X) \stackrel{?}{=} H(X')$ and $X \stackrel{?}{\neq} X'$

Exp_H^{ow}(A)

1. $X \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{M}$
2. $Y \leftarrow H(X)$
3. $X' \leftarrow A(Y)$
4. **return** $H(X') \stackrel{?}{=} Y$

Theorem: Collision-resistance \Rightarrow One-wayness

Proof idea: suppose A_{ow} is an algorithm that breaks one-wayness

1. Pick $X \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{M}$ and give $Y \leftarrow H(X)$ to A_{ow}
2. A_{ow} outputs X' s.t. $H(X') = Y$
3. output (X, X') as a collision

Problem: what if $X' = X$?

Very unlikely assuming $|\mathcal{M}| \gg |\mathcal{Y}|$

Collision resistance vs. one-wayness

$\text{Exp}_H^{\text{cr}}(A)$

1. $(X, X') \leftarrow A$
2. **return** $H(X) \stackrel{?}{=} H(X')$ and $X \stackrel{?}{\neq} X'$

$\text{Exp}_H^{\text{ow}}(A)$

1. $X \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{M}$
2. $Y \leftarrow H(X)$
3. $X' \leftarrow A(Y)$
4. **return** $H(X') \stackrel{?}{=} Y$

Theorem: Collision-resistance \Rightarrow One-wayness

Theorem: Collision-resistance $\not\Leftarrow$ One-wayness


Suppose $H : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{256}$ is one-way. Define

$$H'(X) = \begin{cases} 0^{256} & \text{if } X \in \{0,1\} \\ H(X) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


H' is one-way (if $|\mathcal{M}|$ is large)

H' is **not** collision-resistant


Hash function applications – password storage




Username	Password
Alice	cat1234
Bob	dog
Charlie	password1234
Dave	batman
...	...




Hash function applications – password storage




Username	Password
Alice	H(cat1234)
Bob	H(dog)
Charlie	H(password1234)
Dave	H(batman)
...	...



Hash function applications – password storage



Username	Password
Alice	0x1b383a798bc2c5
Bob	0x512df2a1e63860
Charlie	0x26c540082d18cd
Dave	0xe33805da40919f
...	...



Hash function applications – MAC domain extension

$$\text{MAC} : \mathcal{K} \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$$

$$H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

$$\text{MAC}' : \mathcal{K} \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$$

$$\text{MAC}'(K, M) = \text{MAC}(K, H(M)) \quad \leftarrow \text{Hash-then-MAC paradigm}$$

Theorem: If H is collision-resistant and MAC is UF-CMA secure, then MAC' is UF-CMA secure

Example:

$$\text{SHA2-256} : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{256}$$

$$\text{AES-CBC-MAC} : \mathcal{K} \times \{0,1\}^{2 \times 128} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{128}$$


$$\text{MAC}'(K, M) = \text{AES-CBC-MAC}(K, \text{SHA2-256}(M))$$

Collision-resistance is *necessary*:

Suppose you can find a collision (X, X') for H

1. Ask for MAC tag on X (receive back T)
2. Output (X', T) as forgery


Hash function applications – commitment schemes




Hash function applications – commitment schemes




"Bob: Waldo is at pos. ..."



0x59d67




"Alice: Waldo is at pos. ..."



0x4fb04



"Charlie: Waldo is at pos. ..."



0xf2200




The birthday paradox

Attacks on hash functions

- Specific attacks: exploit **internal design** of hash function
- Generic attacks: work **for all** hash functions $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$
 - Brute-force: hash $1, 2, 3, \dots, 2^n + 1$ $\text{Adv}_H^{\text{cr}}(A) = 1$
 - Output must be long enough
 - $n = 10$ requires only $2^{10} + 1 = 1025$ values
 - $n = 100$ enough?
 - Attacker B
 1. pick *distinct* values X_1, X_2, \dots, X_q $q \ll 2^n$
 2. hash every value
 3. look for collisions

What's $\text{Adv}_H^{\text{cr}}(B)$?

Birthday attack



$$Y_1 \leftarrow H(X_1)$$

$$Y_2 \leftarrow H(X_2)$$

$$Y_3 \leftarrow H(X_3)$$

$$Y_4 \leftarrow H(X_4)$$

$$Y_5 \leftarrow H(X_5)$$


$$Y_6 \leftarrow H(X_6)$$

$$Y_i \leftarrow H(X_i)$$

$$Y_q \leftarrow H(X_q)$$

$$\mathbf{Adv}_H^{\text{cr}}(B) = \Pr[\text{coll}] = \Pr[\exists i \neq j : H(X_i) = H(X_j)]$$

Birthday attack



$$Y_1 \leftarrow \rho(X_1)$$

$$Y_2 \leftarrow \rho(X_2)$$

$$Y_3 \leftarrow \rho(X_3)$$

$$Y_4 \leftarrow \rho(X_4)$$

$$Y_5 \leftarrow \rho(X_5)$$

$$Y_6 \leftarrow \rho(X_6)$$


$$\mathbf{Adv}_H^{\text{cr}}(B) = \Pr[\text{coll}] = \Pr[\exists i \neq j : H(X_i) = H(X_j)]$$

X_1, X_2, \dots, X_q are *distinct*

$$Y_i \leftarrow \rho(X_i)$$

$$Y_q \leftarrow \rho(X_q)$$

Birthday attack



$$Y_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{Y}$$

$$Y_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{Y}$$

$$Y_3 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{Y}$$

$$Y_4 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{Y}$$

$$Y_5 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{Y}$$

$$Y_6 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{Y}$$


$$\mathbf{Adv}_H^{\text{cr}}(B) = \Pr[\text{coll}] = \Pr[\exists i \neq j : H(X_i) = H(X_j)]$$

X_1, X_2, \dots, X_q are *distinct*

$$Y_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{Y}$$

$$Y_q \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{Y}$$

Birthday attack



$$\Pr[\text{coll}] = 1 - \Pr[\text{no-coll}] \geq 1 - e^{-q(q-1)/2N}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{no-coll}] &= 1 \times \frac{N-1}{N} \times \frac{N-2}{N} \times \frac{N-3}{N} \cdots \times \frac{N-(q-1)}{N} \\ &= 1 \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \times \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) \times \left(1 - \frac{3}{N}\right) \cdots \times \left(1 - \frac{q-1}{N}\right) \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^{q-1} \left(1 - \frac{i}{N}\right) \\ &\leq \prod_{i=1}^{q-1} e^{-i/N} = e^{-(1+2+\cdots+q-1)/N} = e^{-q(q-1)/2N} \end{aligned}$$

$$(1-x) \leq e^{-x} \quad x \geq 0$$


$$(1-x) = \left(1 - \frac{i}{N}\right)$$

$$e^{-x} = 1 - \frac{x}{1!} + \frac{x^2}{2!} - \frac{x^3}{3!} + \frac{x^4}{4!} + \cdots$$


Birthday attack

0 1 ...

N




$$\Pr[\text{coll}] = 1 - \Pr[\text{no-coll}] \geq 1 - e^{-q(q-1)/2N} \geq 0.6 \times \frac{q(q-1)}{2N}$$




$$q < \sqrt{2N}$$

Birthday attack



$$\begin{aligned} 0.6 \times \frac{q(q-1)}{2N} &\leq \Pr[\text{coll}] = \Pr[Y_1 \vee Y_2 \vee \dots \vee Y_q] \\ &\leq \Pr[Y_1] + \Pr[Y_2] + \dots + \Pr[Y_q] \\ &\leq \frac{0}{N} + \frac{1}{N} + \dots + \frac{q-1}{N} \\ &= \frac{q(q-1)}{2N} \end{aligned}$$

Birthday attack



$$0.6 \times \frac{q(q-1)}{2N} \leq \Pr[\text{coll}] \leq \frac{q(q-1)}{2N}$$


$\Pr[\text{coll}] = 0.5:$

$$q \approx \sqrt{N}$$

Birthday bound:

$$\Pr[\text{coll}] \approx \frac{q^2}{2N} \quad (q \leq \sqrt{2N})$$


N	q
365	23
10^6	1000
2^{64}	2^{32}
2^{80}	2^{40}
2^{256}	2^{128}
2^{512}	2^{256}



Attacks on hash functions

- Specific attacks: exploit internal design of hash function
- Generic attacks: work for all hash functions $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$
 - Brute-force: hash $1, 2, 3, \dots, 2^n + 1$
 - Output must be long enough
 $n = 10$ requires only $2^{10} + 1 = 1025$ values
 - $n = 100$ enough? **No! Must take birthday attack into account: $n / 2$ must be large enough**
 - Attacker B
 1. pick *distinct* values X_1, X_2, \dots, X_q $q \ll 2^n$
 2. hash every value
 3. look for collisions

What's $\text{Adv}_H^{\text{cr}}(B)$?



Designing hash functions


Merkle-Damgård

- Suppose we have a **compression function** $h : \{0,1\}^{n+b} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ which is collision-resistant
- Want to create a hash function $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$
- Solution: iterate h

Merkle-Damgård

$$H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

$$H(M) = h(h(\dots h(h(IV \parallel M_1) \parallel M_2) \dots \parallel M_{n-1}) \parallel M_n)$$




$$h : \{0,1\}^{n+b} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

Merkle-Damgård

$$H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

$$H(M) = h(h(\dots h(h(IV \parallel M_1) \parallel M_2) \dots \parallel M_{n-1}) \parallel M_n)$$




$$h : \{0,1\}^{n+b} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

Merkle-Damgård

$$H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

$$H(M) = h(h(\dots h(h(IV \parallel M_1) \parallel M_2) \dots \parallel M_{n-1}) \parallel M_n)$$



$$h : \{0,1\}^{n+b} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$

Merkle-Damgård – security

Theorem: If $h : \{0,1\}^{n+b} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is collision resistant then $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is collision resistant


Proof idea:

Collision on $H \Rightarrow$ collision on h

If $H(X) = H(Y)$ then we can construct X', Y' such that $h(X') = h(Y')$



Merkle-Damgård – security

Assumption: $H(X) = H(Y) = Z$





Merkle-Damgård – security

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

Merkle-Damgård – security

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
Merkle-Damgård – security

Assumption: $H(X) = H(Y) = Z$




Merkle-Damgård – security

Assumption: $H(X) = H(Y) = Z$




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Assumption: $H(X) = H(Y) = Z$




Merkle-Damgård – security

Assumption: $H(X) = H(Y) = Z$





Merkle-Damgård – security

Assumption: $H(X) = H(Y) = Z$




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
Merkle-Damgård – security

Assumption: $H(X) = H(Y) = Z$



Merkle-Damgård – security

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
Compression function designs

- Merkle-Damgård creates collision resistant $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ from collision resistant $h : \{0,1\}^{b+n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$

- Need only focus on compression function

$$h : \{0,1\}^{b+n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$


- Many design options for h
 - Ad-hoc
 - Structured



Compression functions from block ciphers – Davies-Meyer

$k + n$ bits


$$M = M_1 || M_2$$



Compression functions from block ciphers – Davies-Meyer

$k + n$ bits

$$M = M_1 || M_2$$




$$\text{DM}(M) = E_{M_1}(M_2) \oplus M_2$$

Theorem: $\text{DM} : \{0,1\}^{k+n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is a collision resistance compression function in the *ideal cipher model*

Alternatives...

Davies-Mayer



Black, Rogaway & Shrimpton: Black-Box Analysis of the Block-Cipher-Based Hash-Function Constructions from PGV; [CRYPTO'02](#)


SHA – Secure Hash Algorithm

- Family of hash functions published by NIST
 - SHA1 in 1995
 - SHA2-256 and SHA2-512 in 2001
 - Also truncated versions: SHA2-224, SHA2-384
 - SHA3-256 and SHA3-512 in 2015

- SHA1 and SHA2 designed by NSA
 - Merkle-Damgård + Davies-Meyer designs

- SHA3 designed by Belgian cryptographers
 - Sponge design

SHA1



$$E : \{0,1\}^{512} \times \{0,1\}^{160} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{160}$$


IV = 67452301 || EFCDAB89 || 98BADCFE || 10325476 || C3D2E1F0

$$E(M_i, V_i)$$


$A_1 \leftarrow V_{i,1}$
 $B_1 \leftarrow V_{i,2}$
 $C_1 \leftarrow V_{i,3}$
 $D_1 \leftarrow V_{i,4}$
 $E_1 \leftarrow V_{i,5}$

for $j = 1 \dots 16$ **do**
 $W_j \leftarrow M_{i,j}$

for $j = 17 \dots 80$ **do**
 $W_j \leftarrow (W_{j-16} \oplus W_{j-14} \oplus W_{j-8} \oplus W_{j-3}) \lll 1$



Repeat 80 times



$$\text{frac}_{32}(\sqrt{2})$$


$$\text{frac}_{32}(\sqrt{3})$$

$$\text{frac}_{32}(\sqrt{5})$$

$$\text{frac}_{32}(\sqrt{10})$$

j	K_j	$F_j(B, C, D)$
1 ... 20	5A827999	$(B \wedge C) \vee (\bar{B} \wedge D)$
21 ... 40	6ED9EBA1	$B \oplus C \oplus D$
41 ... 60	8F1BBCDC	$(B \wedge C) \vee (B \wedge D) \vee (C \wedge D)$
61 ... 80	CA62C1D6	$B \oplus C \oplus D$

SHA0



$$E : \{0,1\}^{512} \times \{0,1\}^{160} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{160}$$


IV = 67452301 || EFCDAB89 || 98BADCFE || 10325476 || C3D2E1F0

$$E(M_i, V_i)$$


$A_1 \leftarrow V_{i,1}$
 $B_1 \leftarrow V_{i,2}$
 $C_1 \leftarrow V_{i,3}$
 $D_1 \leftarrow V_{i,4}$
 $E_1 \leftarrow V_{i,5}$

for $j = 1 \dots 16$ **do**
 $W_j \leftarrow M_{i,j}$

for $j = 17 \dots 80$ **do**
 $W_j \leftarrow (W_{j-16} \oplus W_{j-14} \oplus W_{j-8} \oplus W_{j-3}) \lll 1$



Repeat
80 times




SHA1

j	K_j	$F_j(B, C, D)$
1 ... 20	5A827999	$(B \wedge C) \vee (\bar{B} \wedge D)$
21 ... 40	6ED9EBA1	$B \oplus C \oplus D$
41 ... 60	8F1BBCDC	$(B \wedge C) \vee (B \wedge D) \vee (C \wedge D)$
61 ... 80	CA62C1D6	$B \oplus C \oplus D$

Attacks against SHA1

- 2004: First SHA0 collision found (Wang *et al.*)
- 2005: Theoretical attack on SHA1 (2^{69} ops.)
- **2017**: First SHA1 collision found ($2^{63.1}$ ops.) (Stevens & Karpman + Google 2017)



PDF 1 | PDF 2


The first collision for full SHA-1

Marc Stevens¹, Elie Bursztein², Pierre Karpman¹, Ange Albertini², Yarik Markov²

¹ CWI Amsterdam
² Google Research
info@shattered.io
<https://shattered.io>

Abstract. SHA-1 is a widely used 1995 NIST cryptographic hash function standard that was officially deprecated by NIST in 2011 due to fundamental security weaknesses demonstrated in various analyses and theoretical attacks. Despite its deprecation, SHA-1 remains widely used in 2017 for document and TLS certificate signatures, and also in many software such as the GIT versioning system for integrity and backup purposes. A key reason behind the reluctance of many industry players to replace SHA-1 with a safer alternative is the fact that finding an actual collision has seemed to be impractical for the past eleven years due to the high complexity and computational cost of the attack. In this paper, we demonstrate that SHA-1 collision attacks have finally become practical by providing the first known instance of a collision. Furthermore, the prefix of the colliding messages was carefully chosen so that they allow an attacker to forge two PDF documents with the same SHA-1 hash yet that display arbitrarily-chosen distinct visual contents.

SHA2



$$E : \{0,1\}^{512} \times \{0,1\}^{256} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{256} \quad \text{SHA2-256}$$

$$E : \{0,1\}^{1024} \times \{0,1\}^{512} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{512} \quad \text{SHA2-512}$$


Repeat
64 times


$E(M_i, V_i)$

```

A1 ← Vi,1
B1 ← Vi,2
C1 ← Vi,3
D1 ← Vi,4
E1 ← Vi,5
F1 ← Vi,6
G1 ← Vi,7
H1 ← Vi,8
    
```


for $j = 1 \dots 16$ **do**
 $W_j \leftarrow M_{i,j}$

for $j = 17 \dots 64$ **do**
 $\sigma_0 \leftarrow \text{ROTR}^7(W_{j-15}) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{18}(W_{j-15}) \oplus \text{SHR}^3(W_{j-15})$
 $\sigma_1 \leftarrow \text{ROTR}^{17}(W_{j-2}) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{19}(W_{j-2}) \oplus \text{SHR}^{10}(W_{j-2})$
 $W_j \leftarrow W_{j-16} + \sigma_0 + W_{j-7} + \sigma_1$




MACs from hash functions – $H(K || M)$

- Doesn't work in general
- **Length-extension attacks** on Merkle-Damgård hash functions




MACs from hash functions – $H(K || M)$

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


MACs from hash functions – $H(K || M)$

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
NMAC



Theorem (Gaži, Pietrzak, Rybár '2014):

If $h : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^b \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is a secure PRF then $\text{NMAC} : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is a secure PRF.

HMAC




$$K_1 = K \oplus \text{ipad}$$

$$K_2 = K \oplus \text{opad}$$

$$\text{HMAC}(K, M) = H(K \oplus \text{opad} || H(K \oplus \text{ipad} || M))$$

HMAC

- Very widely used
 - TLS
 - IPsec
 - SSH
 - LTE
 - ...




- Standardized by NIST and IETF (RFC 2104)

$$\text{HMAC}(K, M) = H(K \oplus \text{opad} || H(K \oplus \text{ipad} || M))$$

- Security proof for NMAC can be lifted to HMAC:
 - + assume h is a secure **dual** PRF (h keyed through the message is also a secure PRF)
 - + assume h is secure against **related-key attacks** (since K_1, K_2 are derived from K)
 - very tricky proof; controversies

SHA3

$$f : \{0,1\}^{1600} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{1600}$$



Midterm exam

- Available next week (Wednesday 5. October)
- Due: **two weeks** later (Thursday 20. October, 23:59)
- **Take-home** exam
- **Individual:** collaboration is *not* allowed
- **Mandatory:** need to pass in order to be eligible for the exam
- All sources allowed (save for explicitly searching for the solution)
- Submission: Canvas (file type = PDF; strongly prefer if you use provided LaTeX template)
- Start early! The assignment may be more challenging than you expect