

Question 1

In this exercise agents are bargaining for resource allocations given by $\langle Ag, \mathcal{Z}, v_1, \dots, v_N \rangle$. The set of goods $\mathcal{Z} = \{z_1, z_2\}$ are distributed between the set of agents $Ag = \{1, 2\}$. The initial endowment of the goods is given by $Ag_1 = \{z_2\}$ and $Ag_2 = \{z_1\}$. The valuation functions are given by:

$$v_1(\{z_1\}) = 4$$

$$v_1(\{z_2\}) = 1$$

$$v_2(\{z_1\}) = 5$$

$$v_2(\{z_2\}) = 7$$

- a) What would be a suitable protocol for bargaining in this case? Specify the needed requirements.
- b) What is the set of possible allocations? Could you calculate the social welfare of the different allocations? What allocations are Pareto optimal if no side payments are allowed?
- c) What would be allocation if agent 1 is selected to give the first bargaining proposal and side payments are allowed?
- d) What would be allocation if agent 2 is selected for first proposal instead?
- e) Comment on your findings.