

TEK5010 MAS

Lecture 2: Agents, com & coop

Exercise: Decision theory

Question 1

- a) Is this a decision-making problem or a problem of strategic interaction?
Explain the variables used.
What are the requirements for maximizing expected utility?

This is a decision-making problem since:

- 1) Optimisation does not take other agents action into account
- 2) Environment is static
- 3) One shot/round

Definition of expected utility

$$\hat{u}(A_g, E_w) = \sum_{r \in R(A_g, E_w)} u(r) p(r | A_g, E_w)$$

where $\sum p(r) = 1$ makes it a proper density function

We must decide stakeholders, agents A_1 and A_2 , and their corresponding available states e , with outcomes u and probabilities p of ending up in u from different runs r .

$E_w = \langle E, e_0, \gamma \rangle$ is the environment

where $E = \{e_0, e_1, \dots, e_b\}$ is the set of possible states,
 e_0 is the initial state

$T(e_0^{\alpha_0}) = \{e_1, e_2, e_3\}$ is state transform function for action α_0 .

$T(e_0^{\alpha_1}) = \{e_4, e_5, e_6\}$ is state transform function for action α_1 .

So, we have two agents;
 A_{g_1} uses action α_0 and
 A_{g_2} uses action α_1

By example, we have probability of ending up in another state

$$P(e_0^{\alpha_0} \rightarrow e_1 | A_{g_1}, E_{hw}) = 0.3$$

The corresponding utility of ending up in that state is, by example

$$u(e_0^{\alpha_0} \rightarrow e_1) > 4$$

lets calculate if $\mathbb{E} p(\alpha) = 1$


$$\left. \begin{array}{l} p(e_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_0} e_1 | A_{S_1}, E_{\text{nu}}) = 0,3 \\ p(e_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_0} e_2 | A_{S_1}, E_{\text{nu}}) = 0,4 \\ p(e_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_0} e_3 | A_{S_1}, E_{\text{nu}}) = 0,3 \end{array} \right\} = 1$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} p(e_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} e_4 | A_{S_2}, E_{\text{nu}}) = 0,8 \\ p(e_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} e_5 | A_{S_2}, E_{\text{nu}}) = 0,1 \\ p(e_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} e_6 | A_{S_3}, E_{\text{nu}}) = 0,1 \end{array} \right\} = 1$$

b) Given these definitions, determine the expected utility of agent A_{S_1} and A_{S_2} with respect to E_{nu} and u , and explain which agent is optimal with respect to E_{nu} and u .


We need to calculate the expected utility of both agents using their actions.

A₅₁:



$$\begin{aligned} \bar{u}_{A_{51}} &= E(u) = p_1 u_1 + p_2 u_2 + p_3 u_3 \\ &= 0.3 \cdot 4 + 0.4 \cdot 6 + 0.3 \cdot 5 = \underline{\underline{5.1}} \end{aligned}$$

A₅₂:



$$\begin{aligned} \bar{u}_{A_{52}} &= E(u) = p_4 u_4 + p_5 u_5 + p_6 u_6 \\ &= 0.8 \cdot 1 + 0.1 \cdot 4 + 0.1 \cdot 10 = \underline{\underline{2.2}} \end{aligned}$$

$\Rightarrow A_g$, using action a_g is optimal in this environment

$$\hat{u}(A_g, E_w) > \hat{u}(A_{g_2}, E_w)$$