# UNIVERSITY OF OSLO <br> Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences 

Examination in: MAT-INF3600 - Mathematical logic.
Day of examination: Wednesday, December 18, 2019.
Examination hours: 14:30-18:30.
This problem set consists of 6 pages.
Appendices: None.
Permitted aids: None.

Please make sure that your copy of the problem set is complete before you attempt to answer anything.

## Part I

Let $P$ and $Q$ be unary relation symbols. Let $R$ be a binary relation symbol. Let $c$ be a constant symbol. Let $f$ be a unary function symbol. Furthermore, $x$ and $y$ denote variables.

## Problem 1 (weight $10 \%$ )

Let $\Sigma=\{\neg Q c, \forall x[P x \rightarrow Q x]\}$. Give a full $\Sigma$-deduction of $\neg \forall x[P x]$. Name all the logical axioms and inference rules involved in the deduction.
$\qquad$

1. $\forall x[P x \rightarrow Q x] \quad \Sigma$
2. $\forall x[P x \rightarrow Q x] \rightarrow[P c \rightarrow Q c] \quad$ (Q1)
3. $P c \rightarrow Q c \quad 1,2,(\mathrm{PC})$
4. $\neg Q c \quad \Sigma$
5. $\neg P c \quad 3,4,(\mathrm{PC})$
6. $\forall x[P x] \rightarrow P c$
7. $\neg \forall x[P x]$
$5,6,(\mathrm{PC})$

## Problem 2 (weight $10 \%$ )

Let $\Sigma^{\prime}=\{\neg Q c, \forall x[P x \rightarrow Q x], \forall x[P x]\}$. Is $\Sigma^{\prime}$ consistent? Does $\Sigma^{\prime}$ have a model? Give a brief justification of your answers.

Solution:

By the previous problem, we have $\Sigma^{\prime} \vdash \neg \forall x[P x]$. Thus it is easy to see that $\Sigma^{\prime} \vdash \perp$, and hence $\Sigma^{\prime}$ is not consistent. By the Soundness Theorem, $\Sigma^{\prime}$ does not have a model.

## Problem 3 (weight $20 \%$ )

Twenty Questions: Answer each question with a YES or a NO (and nothing else). If you do not answer a question, your answer to that question will be considered as wrong.

1. Does $\forall x[Q x]$ follow tautologically from $\{\forall x[P x] \rightarrow \forall x[Q x], \forall x[P x]\}$ ? YES
2. Does $\forall x[Q x]$ follow logically from $\{\forall x[P x] \rightarrow \forall x[Q x], \forall x[P x]\}$ ? YES
3. Does $Q c$ follow tautologically from $\{\forall x[P x] \rightarrow \forall x[Q x], \forall x[P x]\}$ ? NO
4. Does $Q c$ follow logically from $\{\forall x[P x] \rightarrow \forall x[Q x], \forall x[P x]\}$ ? YES
5. Does $\forall x[P x \rightarrow Q x]$ follow logically from $\{\forall x[P x] \rightarrow \forall x[Q x], \forall x[P x]\}$ ? YES
6. Does $\forall x[P x] \rightarrow \forall x[Q x]$ follow logically from $\{\forall x[P x \rightarrow Q x], \forall x[P x]\}$ ? YES
7. Does $\forall x[P x \rightarrow Q x]$ follow logically from $\{\forall x[P x] \rightarrow \forall x[Q x]\}$ ? NO
8. Does $\forall x[P x] \rightarrow \forall x[Q x]$ follow logically from $\{\forall x[P x \rightarrow Q x]\}$ ? YES
9. Does $\exists y \forall x[R x y]$ follow logically from $\{\forall x[R x f x]\}$ ? NO
10. Does $\forall x \exists y[R x y]$ follow logically from $\{\forall x[R x f x]\}$ ? YES
11. Does $\exists y \forall x[R x y]$ follow logically from $\{\forall x[R x c]\}$ ? YES
12. Does $\forall x \exists y[R x y]$ follow logically from $\{\forall x[R x c]\}$ ? YES
13. Does $Q f(c)$ follow tautologically from $\{\forall x[P x \rightarrow Q x], \forall x[P x] \rightarrow \forall x[Q x]\}$ ? NO
14. Does $Q f(c)$ follow logically from $\{\forall x[P x \rightarrow Q x], \forall x[P x] \rightarrow \forall x[Q x]\}$ ? NO
15. Does $P c \rightarrow \forall x[Q x]$ follow logically from $\{P c \rightarrow Q x\}$ ? YES
16. Does $P x \rightarrow \forall x[Q x]$ follow logically from $\{P x \rightarrow Q x\}$ ? NO
17. Does $\exists x[P x] \rightarrow \forall x[Q x]$ follow logically from $\{P x \rightarrow \forall x[Q x]\}$ ? YES
18. Does $x=x$ follow logically from $\emptyset$ ? YES
19. Does $x=y$ follow logically from $\emptyset$ ? NO
20. Does $\neg x=y$ follow logically from $\emptyset$ ? NO

## Part II

Let $\mathcal{L}$ be the first-order language $\{\preceq, f, c\}$ where $\preceq$ is a binary relation symbol, $f$ is a binary function symbol and $c$ is a constant symbol. Let $T$ be the $\mathcal{L}$-theory consisting of the non-logical axioms
$\left(T_{1}\right) \forall x y[\neg c=f(x, y)]$
$\left(T_{2}\right) \forall x_{1} x_{2} y_{1} y_{2}\left[f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)=f\left(y_{1}, y_{2}\right) \rightarrow\left(x_{1}=y_{1} \wedge x_{2}=y_{2}\right)\right]$
$\left(T_{3}\right) \forall x[x \preceq c \leftrightarrow x=c]$
$\left(T_{4}\right) \forall x y_{1} y_{2}\left[x \preceq f\left(y_{1}, y_{2}\right) \leftrightarrow\left(x=f\left(y_{1}, y_{2}\right) \vee x \preceq y_{1} \vee x \preceq y_{2}\right)\right]$.

Problem 4 (weight $10 \%$ )

Show that

$$
T \vdash \neg f(c, c)=f(f(c, c), c)
$$

Sketch a formal deduction.
——Solution:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { 1. } \forall x y[\neg c=f(x, y)] \rightarrow \forall y[\neg c=f(c, y)] \\
\text { 2. } \forall y[\neg c=f(c, y)] \rightarrow \neg c=f(c, c) & (\mathrm{Q} 1) \\
\text { 3. } \forall x y[\neg c=f(x, y)]  \tag{1}\\
\text { 4. } \neg c=f(c, c) & 1,2,3 \text { and }(\mathrm{PC})
\end{array}
$$

This shows that

$$
\begin{equation*}
T \vdash \neg c=f(c, c) \tag{*}
\end{equation*}
$$

In a similar way, by using $\left(T_{2}\right)$, (Q1) and (PC), we can show that

$$
\begin{equation*}
T \vdash f(c, c)=f(f(c, c), c) \rightarrow(c=f(c, c) \wedge c=c) . \tag{**}
\end{equation*}
$$

By $\left({ }^{*}\right),\left({ }^{* *}\right)$ and $(\mathrm{PC})$, we have

$$
T \vdash \neg f(c, c)=f(f(c, c), c)
$$

## Problem 5 (weight $10 \%$ )

Show that

$$
T \vdash \neg s=t
$$

for any variable-free $\mathcal{L}$-terms $s, t$ where $s \neq t$ (so $s$ and $t$ are not syntactically equal). Use induction on the structure of $s$.

Solution:
The proof splits into the cases: $s: \equiv c$ and $s: \equiv f\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)$.

Case $s: \equiv c$. Assume $s \neq t$. Then $t: \equiv f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$. By $\left(T_{1}\right)$, we have $T \vdash \neg s=t$.

Case $s: \equiv f\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)$. Assume $s \neq t$. The proof splits into the subcases $t: \equiv c$ and $t: \equiv f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$.
If $t:=\equiv c$, we have $T \vdash \neg s=t$ by $\left(T_{1}\right)$.
We turn to the case $t: \equiv f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$. As $s$ and $t$ are different terms, we can conclude that $s_{1}$ is different from $t_{1}$ or $s_{2}$ is different from $t_{2}$. We can without loss of generality assume that $s_{1}$ is differ net from $t_{1}$ (so the case when $s_{2}$ is different from $t_{2}$ is similar). By our induction hypothesis we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
T \vdash \neg s_{1}=t_{1} \tag{i}
\end{equation*}
$$

By $\left(T_{2}\right)$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
T \vdash f\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)=f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right) \rightarrow\left(s_{1}=t_{1} \wedge s_{2}=t_{2}\right) \tag{ii}
\end{equation*}
$$

By (i), (ii) and (PC), we have $T \vdash \neg f\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right)=f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$.

Lemma 1. For any variable-free $\mathcal{L}$-terms $s$ and $t$, we have $T \vdash s \preceq t$ or $T \vdash \neg s \preceq t$.

## Problem 6 (weight $10 \%$ )

Prove Lemma 1. Use induction on the structure of $t$.

## Solution:

The proof splits into the cases $t: \equiv c$ and $t: \equiv f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$.

Case $t: \equiv c$. If $s: \equiv c$, then we have $T \vdash s \preceq t$ by $\left(T_{3}\right)$. If $s: \not \equiv c$, then we have $T \vdash \neg s \preceq t$ by $\left(T_{3}\right)$ and Problem 5.

Case $t: \equiv f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$. First we observe that we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
T \vdash s \preceq f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right) \leftrightarrow\left(s=f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right) \vee s \preceq t_{1} \vee s \preceq t_{2}\right) \tag{iii}
\end{equation*}
$$

by $\left(T_{4}\right)$. Next we observe that if $s$ is the same term as $f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$, then we have $T \vdash s \preceq f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$ by (iii), (E1) and (PC). A short explanation: we have $\vdash t=t$, and thus also $T \vdash t=t$, for any term $t$.
Thus, we conclude that the theorem holds when $s$ and $f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$ are the same term. We are left to prove that the theorem holds when $s$ and $f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$ are different terms. So we assume that $s$ and $f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$ are different terms. By Problem 5 we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
T \vdash \neg s=f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right) \tag{iv}
\end{equation*}
$$

The induction hypothesis applied to $t_{1}$ yields

$$
T \vdash s \preceq t_{1} \quad \text { or } \quad T \vdash \neg s \preceq t_{1} .
$$

The induction hypothesis applied to $t_{2}$ yields

$$
T \vdash s \preceq t_{2} \quad \text { or } \quad T \vdash \neg s \preceq t_{2} .
$$

The proof splits into the two cases

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { at least one of } T \vdash s \preceq t_{1} \text { and } T \vdash s \preceq t_{2} \text { holds } \tag{A}
\end{equation*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { neither } T \vdash s \preceq t_{1} \text { nor } T \vdash s \preceq t_{2} \text { holds. } \tag{B}
\end{equation*}
$$

In case (A), we have $T \vdash s \preceq f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$ by (iii) and (PC).
We turn to case (B). Since we neither $T \vdash s \preceq t_{1}$ nor $T \vdash s \preceq t_{2}$, it must be the case that both $T \vdash \neg s \preceq t_{1}$ and $T \vdash \neg s \preceq t_{2}$ holds. By (iii), (iv) and (PC), we have $T \vdash \neg s \preceq f\left(t_{1}, t_{2}\right)$.

## Problem 7 (weight $10 \%$ )

Let $\phi$ be a quantifier-free and variable-free $\mathcal{L}$-formula. Prove that we have $T \vdash \phi$ or $T \vdash \neg \phi$. Use Lemma 1.

## Solution:

Assume $\phi$ is an atomic formula, that is, $\phi$ is of the form $s=t$ or of the form $s \preceq t$. Then we have $T \vdash \phi$ or $T \vdash \neg \phi$ by Problem 5 and Problem 6. (If $s$ and $t$ are the same term, then we have $T \vdash s=t$ by (E1) and other logical axioms.)

Assume $\phi: \equiv \alpha \vee \beta$. By our induction hypothesis, we have

$$
T \vdash \alpha \quad \text { or } \quad T \vdash \neg \alpha
$$

and

$$
T \vdash \beta \quad \text { or } \quad T \vdash \neg \beta .
$$

If $T \vdash \alpha$, we have $T \vdash \alpha \vee \beta$ by (PC). If $T \vdash \beta$, we have $T \vdash \alpha \vee \beta$ by (PC). Otherwise, that is, if we neither have $T \vdash \alpha$ nor $T \vdash \beta$, then we have both $T \vdash \neg \alpha$ and $T \vdash \neg \beta$, and thus, by ( PC ), we have $\neg(\alpha \vee \beta)$.
Assume $\phi: \equiv \neg \alpha$. By our induction hypothesis, we have

$$
T \vdash \alpha \quad \text { or } \quad T \vdash \neg \alpha
$$

and thus, by (PC), we have

$$
T \vdash \neg \neg \alpha \quad \text { or } \quad T \vdash \neg \alpha .
$$

## Problem 8 (weight $10 \%$ )

Do we have $T \vdash \forall x[\neg x=f(x, x)]$ ? Justify your answer.
We say that an $\mathcal{L}$-structure $\mathfrak{A}$ is ill-founded if its universe contains elements $a_{0}, a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots$ such that $a_{i+1} \neq a_{i}$ and $a_{i+1} \preceq^{\mathfrak{A}} a_{i}$ (for all $i \in \mathbb{N}$ ).

## Problem 9 (weight $10 \%$ )

Explain why any consistent extension of $T$ has an ill-founded model.

- Solution:

Let $T^{\prime}$ be a consistent extension of $T$. By the Completeness Theorem, $T^{\prime}$ has a model $\mathfrak{B}$. Let $t_{0}: \equiv c$ and $t_{n+1}: \equiv f\left(t_{n}, c\right)$. By the problems above, we have $T \vdash t_{i} \preceq t_{i+1}$ and $T \vdash \neg t_{i}=t_{i+1}$ (for all $i$ ), and thus, by the Soundness Theorem, we have $\mathfrak{B} \models t_{i} \preceq t_{i+1}$ and $\mathfrak{B} \models \neg t_{i}=t_{i+1}$.
Let $\mathcal{L}_{*}$ be $\mathcal{L}$ extended by infinitely many fresh constant symbols $c_{0}, c_{1}, c_{2}, \ldots$ Let $\Gamma_{0}=$ $T h(\mathfrak{B})$ and $\Gamma_{n+1}=\Gamma_{n} \cup\left\{c_{n+1} \preceq c_{n}\right\}$. Furthermore, let $\Gamma=\bigcup_{i} \Gamma_{i}$.
First we argue that $\Gamma_{n}$ has a model $\mathfrak{A}_{n}$.
Let $\mathfrak{A}_{n}$ be $\mathfrak{B}$ extended by $c_{i}^{\mathfrak{A}_{n}}=t_{n-i}^{\mathfrak{B}}$, for $i=0, \ldots, n$, and $c_{j}^{\mathfrak{A}_{n}}=t_{0}^{\mathfrak{B}}$, for $j>n$. Then $\mathfrak{A}_{n} \models \Gamma_{n}$.
Next we argue that every finite subset of $\Gamma$ has a model: Let $\Omega$ be a finite subset of $\Gamma$. Then we have $\Omega \subseteq \Gamma_{n}$ for some sufficiently large $n$, and hence, $\mathfrak{A}_{n} \models \Omega$.
This proves that every finite subset of $\Gamma$ has a model. By the Compactness Theorem, $\Gamma$ has a model $\mathfrak{A}$. The reduct of $\mathfrak{A}$ to the language $\mathcal{L}$ is an ill-founded model for $T^{\prime}$. The model is ill-founded as we have $c_{i+1}^{\mathfrak{A}} \preceq^{\mathfrak{A}} c_{i}^{\mathfrak{A}}$ and $c_{i+1}^{\mathfrak{A}} \neq c_{i}^{\mathfrak{A}}$ (for all $i \in \mathbb{N}$ ).

