

Exercises, Week 9. Matrix Games

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

row player choose $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$
column " " $j \in \{1, 2, 3\}$

Then row player pays a_{ij} to
column player.

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & -2 \\ -3 & 0 & 4 \end{bmatrix}.$$

L5 - 6 0 J

Column player chooses a prob. distribution $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$, $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i = 1$
 $x_1, \dots, x_n \geq 0$. Row player choose y

payoff = $y^T A x$ (expected)

Column player: $\max_x \min_y y^T A x$

LP problem.

Simplification $\min_y y^T A x = \min_i e_i^T A x$
 $= \min (A x)$:

Row player:

$$\min_y \max_x y^T A x$$

$$= \min_y \max_j (y^T A)_j$$

Dual problem.

Strong Duality Theorem \Rightarrow
the two optimal values are
same.

$v =$ Optimal value $=$ pay off of the game.

Cases

- (i) $\eta > 0$ column player wins
- (ii) $\eta = 0$ fair game
- (iii) $\eta < 0$ row player wins

Exercise 11.3.

$A \in \mathbb{R}^{m,n}$. Suppose column s is dominated by column r : means

$$a_{ir} \geq a_{is} \quad \text{for all } i = 1 \dots m.$$

Then show $x_s^* = 0$.

So can throw away column s .

$$\begin{aligned}
& \min_i \left(\sum_j a_{ij} x_j \right) = \min_i \left(\sum_{j \neq r, s} a_{ij} x_j + a_{ir} x_r + a_{is} x_s \right) \\
& \leq \min_i \left(\sum_{j \neq r, s} a_{ij} x_j + a_{ir} (x_r + x_s) \right) \\
& = \min_i \left(\sum_{j \neq s} a_{ij} y_j \right),
\end{aligned}$$

$$y_j = x_j, \quad j \neq r, \quad y_r = x_r + x_s.$$

Then $y = (y_1, \dots, y_{s-1}, y_{s+1}, \dots, y_n)$

is a rand. strat. for B ,

Permutation remaining columns

row i in A is dominated by row i in B .
from A . Let y^* opt. for B .

$$\min_i \sum a_{ij} y_j \leq \min_i \sum a_{ij} y_j^*$$

$$\text{So } \min_i (Ax)_i \leq \min_i (By)_i.$$

So $x^* = (y_1^* \dots y_{s-1}^*, 0, y_{s+1}^* \dots y_n^*)$
is optimal for A .

Conclude: can remove a column
if \leq same other column.

can remove a row if

\geq same row.

$$a_4 \leq a_3$$

Consider

$$A = \left[\begin{array}{ccc|c|c} -6 & 2 & -4 & -7 & -5 \\ 0 & 4 & -2 & -9 & 1 \\ -7 & 3 & -3 & -8 & 2 \\ 2 & -3 & 6 & 0 & 3 \end{array} \right]$$

row 2 \geq row 1

$$\left[\begin{array}{cc} 2 & -4 \\ -3 & 6 \end{array} \right]$$

col play, $x^* = (0, x_2^*, x_3^*, 0, 0)$

row, $y^* = (y_1^*, 0, 0, y_4^*)$

Exercise 11.2

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & -1 & -1 & -1 & \dots & \vdots \\ -1 & 0 & 1 & -1 & -1 & & \\ 1 & -1 & 0 & 1 & -1 & & \\ \hline 1 & 1 & -1 & 0 & -1 & & \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & 0 & & \vdots \end{bmatrix}$$

$\in \mathbb{R}^{100,100}$

L

Columns 4-100 dominated by col 1.

Rows 4-100 dominate row 1

$$B = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & -1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{paper rock} \\ \text{scissors.} \end{array}$$

$$\vec{x}^* = \left(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3} \right) \quad \text{opt for B}$$

$$\vec{y}^* = \left(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3} \right)$$

$$\Rightarrow \vec{x}^* = \left(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, 0, \dots, 0 \right) \in \mathbb{R}^{100}$$

$$\vec{y}^* = \left(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, 0, \dots, 0 \right) \dots$$

How to solve LP?

Column player.

$$\max_x \min_i (Ax)_i$$

$$\text{subj. } \sum x_j = 1, \quad x_j \geq 0.$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \max v$$
$$\text{subj. } v \leq (Ax)_i, \quad i=1, \dots, m$$

$$\sum x_j = 1$$

$$x_1, \dots, x_j \geq 0$$

Variables x and v

x_1, \dots, x_n, v

$m+1$ constraints

$$x_1, \dots, x_n \geq 0, \quad v \in \mathbb{R}$$

Standard form?

$$v = v_+ - v_-, \quad v_-, v_+ \geq 0$$

$$\max \quad v_+ - v_-$$

$$\text{subj} \quad v_+ - v_- \leq (Ax)_i = \sum_j a_{ij} x_j$$

$$\sum_j x_j \leq 1, \quad -\sum_j x_j \leq -1,$$

$$x_1, \dots, x_n, v_-, v_+ \geq 0$$

$n+2$ variables

$m+2$ constraints.

Exercise 11.5

Pure strategy: always choose
same row (row player)

$$\text{payoff } \max_x (Ax)_r = \min_y (Ay)_s$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \max_{j=1..n} a_{rj} = \min_{i=1..m} a_{is}$$

Exercise 11.6

Use Minimax Theorem to show

$$\max_x \min_y y^T Ax = \min_y \max_x y^T Ax.$$

$$f(x) = \min_y y^T A x$$

$$g(y) = \max_x y^T A x$$

max. f dual min. g .

W.D.T. $f(x) \leq g(y)$, \Rightarrow
all feasible x, y . $\max_x f(x) \leq \min_y g(y)$

Minimax: \exists feasible x^*, y^*

s.t. $\max_x (y^*)^T A x = \min_y y^T A x^*$

This implies $g(y^*) = f(x^*)$.

So no gap:

$$\max_x f(x) = \min_y g(y)$$