

- X-axis: consumers are located uniformly from 0 to 1.
- Y-axis: consumer's utility from buying from firm 1 and firm 2 respectively
- Locations:
 - Firm 1 is located at a
 - Firm 2 is located at 1-b



- Consumers have a reservation utility s
- Utility decreases quatratically in the distance to the firm:
 - $u_1 = s p_1 t(x a)^2$ • $u_2 = s - p_2 - t(1 - b - x)^2$
- Consumers who are located at the same place as a store, utility is s-p
- From there, utility decreases in distance.
- Demand is determined by the indifferent consumer \tilde{x} :
 - Firm 1: $D_1(p_1, p_2, a, b) = \tilde{x}$
 - Firm 2: $D_2(p_1, p_2, a, b) = 1 \tilde{x}$



- Timing of the game:
 - Firms choose location this moves the «umbrellas» left/right

4 Seminar 2 ECON3820/ECON4820 - Strategic competition



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- Timing of the game:
 - Firms choose location this moves the «umbrellas» left/right
 - 2. Firms choose prices
- What location is the optimal choice?
 - Solution: Backward induction
 1.Step: Solve the price game:
 - What are the optimal prices <u>given</u> a and b?
 - Prices become functions of a and b:

$$p_1 = p_1(a, b)$$
$$p_2 = p_2(a, b)$$

2.Step: Solve the location game.

• What are the optimal locations a and b?