

## Max/min - conceptual

$\vec{x}^*$  (global) maximum:

$$f(\vec{x}^*) \geq f(\vec{x}), \text{ all } \vec{x} \text{ in the domain of } f$$

strict:  $\rightarrow$  whenever  $\vec{x} \neq \vec{x}^*$ .

Min: analogous.

Local version:

To speak about "local", we need open sets.

In  $\mathbb{R}^n$ : open balls  $\{\vec{x}; \|\vec{x} - \vec{a}\| < r\}$ , but  
could also use e.g.  $\{\vec{x}; \max_{i=1..n} |x_i - a_i| < r\}$ :

important is, "some open  $U \ni \vec{x}^*$ " means

"everywhere that is sufficiently close to  $\vec{x}^*$ "

(and "open" guarantees against  $\vec{x}^*$  being a boundary point)

Def:  $\vec{x}^*$  local max if there is some open  $U \ni \vec{x}^*$   
such that  $f(\vec{x}^*) \geq f(\vec{x})$  for all  $\vec{x} \in U$   
for which  $f$  is defined.

Strict version, and loc. min: as you can think.

Max/min - open domains.

First-order condition for  $C^1$  functions:

$$\nabla f(\vec{x}^*) = \vec{0} \quad (\text{really: } \vec{0}^T)$$

Have we covered anything that enables us to generalize?

- Well: if  $\vec{0}$  is a supergradient for  $f$  at  $\vec{x}^*$  ... max. Subgradient ... min.
- Allows us to decide for "known convex/concave" functions, but you already knew that  $\|\vec{x}\|$  has strict global min at  $\vec{x} = \vec{0}$ .
- We have "uniqueness" results:  
If  $f$  is quasiconcave, then the set of global maxima is convex (possibly empty!).  
Strict quasiconvexity: unique (if exists)

Second-order cond's for  $C^2$  functions

Suppose that  $\nabla f(\vec{x}^*) = \vec{0}$ .

We have the implications: ( $\vec{H}$  = Hessian matrix)

$\vec{H}(\vec{x}^*)$  neg. def

$\Downarrow$

$\vec{H}(\vec{x})$  neg. def on some  
open  $\mathcal{U} \ni \vec{x}^*$

$\Downarrow$

... same, except possibly  
at some isolated points  
(cf.  $x^4$ )

$\Downarrow$

strict local max

[ pos. ... min ... likewise ]

And:

$\vec{H}(\vec{x}^*)$  indefinite  $\Rightarrow$  neither loc. max nor loc min  
 $=$  "saddle point".

$\vec{H}(\vec{x})$  neg. semidef  
on some open  $\mathcal{U} \ni \vec{x}^*$

$\Downarrow$

$f$  strictly  
concave on  
 $\mathcal{U}$ .

loc. max. &  
 $f$  concave on  $\mathcal{U}$ .

So local 2<sup>nd</sup> order cond's are  
just "localized" concavity/convexity  
tests; if the "some open  $U \ni \bar{x}^*$ " part  
can be replaced by "everywhere", then  
 $f$  is concave.

# Lagrange's method:

$$\min/\max f(\vec{x}) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \vec{g}(\vec{x}) = \vec{b}$$

$\vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$                        $m < n$  constraints       $\vec{b}$  Const.

Lagrangian:

$$L(\vec{x}) = f(\vec{x}) - \vec{\lambda}^T (\vec{g}(\vec{x}) - \vec{b})$$

Lagrange cond's:

$$\begin{aligned} \nabla f(\vec{x}^*) &= \vec{\lambda}^T \frac{\partial \vec{g}}{\partial \vec{x}}(\vec{x}^*) \\ \vec{g}(\vec{x}^*) &= \vec{b} \end{aligned}$$

Example:

$$\min \vec{x}^T \vec{A} \vec{x} + \vec{\beta}^T \vec{x} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \vec{F} \vec{x} = \vec{c}$$

constants

Cond's:

$$\vec{x}^T (\vec{A} + \vec{A}^T) + \vec{\beta}^T = \vec{\lambda}^T \vec{F}, \quad \vec{F} \vec{x} = \vec{c}$$

Rewrite:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \vec{0} & \vec{F} \\ \vec{F}^T & \vec{M} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \vec{\lambda} \\ \vec{x} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \vec{c} \\ \vec{\beta} \end{pmatrix}$$

where  $\vec{M} = -(\vec{A} + \vec{A}^T)$

$\begin{pmatrix} \vec{\lambda} \\ \vec{x} \end{pmatrix}$  notation for  $\begin{pmatrix} \lambda_1 \\ \vdots \\ \lambda_m \\ x_1 \\ \vdots \\ x_n \end{pmatrix}$  etc.

Not curricular; if  $|\vec{M}| \neq 0$ , the determinant is  $|\vec{M}| \cdot \underbrace{|\vec{F} \vec{M}^{-1} \vec{F}^T|}_{\neq 0 \text{ if the leftmost } m \times m \text{ block of } \vec{F} \text{ is invertible.}} \cdot (-1)^{m+n}$ .

\* Ineq. constraints:

$$\max f(\vec{x}) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad g_i(\vec{x}) \leq b_i \quad i = 1, \dots, m$$

↑

$$L = f(\vec{x}) - \vec{\lambda}^T (\vec{g}(\vec{x}) - \vec{b})$$

Kuhn - Tucker cond's:

$$\begin{aligned} \nabla L(\vec{x}^*) &= 0^T \\ \lambda_j &\geq 0 \quad \text{and,} \\ &\text{if } g_j(\vec{x}^*) < b_j: \lambda_j = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, the constraints hold.

So: for each  $i$ ,

$$\underbrace{-\lambda_j}_{\leq 0} \underbrace{(g_j(\vec{x}^*) - b_j)}_{\leq 0}$$

Product of two nonneg's, of which  
at least one is zero.

\* Mixed constraints:      some  $g_i \leq b_i$   
   some  $h_j = c_j$

$$L = f(\vec{x}) - \vec{\lambda}^T (\vec{g}(\vec{x}) - \vec{b}) - \vec{\mu}^T (\vec{h}(\vec{x}) - \vec{c})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \nabla L(\vec{x}^*) &= 0^T \\ \lambda_j &\geq 0 \quad (=0 \text{ if } g_j < b_j) \\ \vec{h}(\vec{x}^*) &= \vec{c} \end{aligned}$$

\* The Lagrange / K-T cond's are "close to necessary". Precise necessary cond's will be given after the teaching-free week.

\* What about sufficiency?

Suppose that  $\vec{x}^*$  satisfies the Lagrange / K-T cond's, producing multipliers  $\vec{\lambda}$  (and  $\vec{\mu}$  for that case)

Fact:

If  $\vec{x}^*$  maximizes  $L$  s.t. the constraints

then  $\vec{x}^*$  maximizes  $f$  ————

(Here  $\vec{\lambda}$  (&  $\vec{\mu}$ ) are these given numbers.

For the Lagrange case: "min" works likewise.)

Why? Suppose  $L(\vec{x}^*) \geq L(\vec{x})$ . Then

$$0 \leq L(\vec{x}^*) - L(\vec{x}) = f(\vec{x}^*) - f(\vec{x}) - \sum_{j: \lambda_j > 0} \lambda_j (g_j(\vec{x}^*) - g_j(\vec{x}))$$

$$\text{So } f(\vec{x}^*) \geq f(\vec{x}) + \sum_{j: \lambda_j > 0} \lambda_j \cdot [\text{nonneg}] \geq f(\vec{x}).$$

Example: Fix  $\vec{v}$  s.t.  $\|\vec{v}\|=1$ .

$$\begin{array}{l} \max / \\ \min \end{array} \quad \vec{x}^T \vec{v} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \vec{x}^T \vec{x} = 1.$$

$$L = \vec{v}^T \vec{x} - 2\lambda(\vec{x}^T \vec{x} - 1)$$

$$\text{cond's:} \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \vec{v}^T = \lambda \vec{x}^T \\ \vec{x}^T \vec{x} = 1 \end{array} \right\} \text{ so } \underbrace{\|2\lambda \vec{x}\|^2}_{4\lambda^2 \vec{x}^T \vec{x}} = \|\vec{v}\|^2 = 1 \text{ so } \lambda = \pm 1/2$$

Two points:  $\vec{x} = \pm \vec{v}$  with  $\lambda = \pm 1/2$  respectively

$$\vec{x} = \vec{v}: \quad \lambda = 1/2 \text{ so } L \text{ is concave, } \underline{\text{max}}$$


$$\vec{x} = -\vec{v}: \quad \lambda = -1/2 \text{ so } L \text{ is convex, } \underline{\text{min}}.$$



- \* Sufficient for  $\vec{x}^*$  to maximize  $L$   
 (recall that  $\vec{x}^*$  is a stationary point for  $L$ )  
 is that  $L(\vec{x})$  is concave in  $\vec{x}$  (when the numbers are inserted for the multipliers)

- \* We can consider local versions:  
 | If the Hessian of  $L$  at  $\vec{x}^*$  is neg. def.,  
 | then  $\vec{x}^*$  is a local max

- \* This is not so powerful if the constraints are equalities. Sketch:





What about ineq. constraints?

Suppose that  $\bar{x}^*$  satisfies the KKT conditions; can we

→ impose equality for those constraints active at  $\bar{x}^*$

(i.e.: if  $g_j(\bar{x}^*) = b_j$ , impose  $g_j(x) = b_j$ )

→ disregard the others

→ then we have a Lagrange problem to test with the previous cond's  $\checkmark$   
e

Answer: nearly so - it is ok if  $\lambda_j > 0$  for all active constraints.

(I.e.: none have  $\lambda_j = g(\bar{x}^*) - b = 0$ .)

[Next example: not the local cond's!]

# Example/application: The mutual fund theorem

a.k.a. two-fund (monetary) separation

Model for risk-averse agent with

- one safe investment opportunity,
- $n$  risky, excess returns distributed  
 [no above risk-free rate,  
 "r - r<sub>f</sub>" in CAPM lingo  
 with mean =  $\vec{m}$ , covariance matrix  $\vec{A}$

- $\vec{A}$  assumed invertible.  
 (Were it not, there would either be redundant opportunities - leave out & re-specify! - or there would be a free lunch...)

Model: whatever the expected excess return  $\vec{\eta}^T \vec{x}$  is, the agent minimizes variance  $\vec{x}^T \vec{A} \vec{x}$

⊗  $\min \vec{x}^T \vec{A} \vec{x}$  subject to  $\vec{\eta}^T \vec{x} = d$

[Exercise: what would be the interpretation if the constraint were  $\vec{\eta}^T \vec{x} \geq d$ ? What difference would it make?]

Rewrite to  $\max (-\vec{x}^T \vec{A} \vec{x})$  s.t.  $d - \vec{\eta}^T \vec{x} \begin{cases} = 0 \\ \leq 0 \end{cases}$  or  
 $L(\vec{x}) = -\vec{x}^T \vec{A} \vec{x} - \lambda (d - \vec{\eta}^T \vec{x})$ .

Stationarity:  $2\vec{x}^T \vec{A} = \lambda \vec{\eta}^T$   
 so  $\vec{x} = \vec{A}^{-1} \frac{\lambda}{2} \vec{\eta}$  ✓  
 $\uparrow$   
 $= \vec{A}^{-1}$ , why?

$\vec{x} = \frac{\lambda}{2} \vec{A}^{-1} \vec{\eta}$  means that all agents  
 choose the same - up to scaling - risky  
 portfolio (= the "market portfolio" in CAPM lingo)  
 ("Two"-fund separation: the other is the  
 riskless.)

Once calculated out, we know (because  
 $\max_{\vec{x}} \underbrace{-\vec{x}^T \vec{A} \vec{x}}_{\text{concave}}$  s.t. [linear] is a  
 concave program) that it solves  
 the problem:

$$d = \vec{\eta}^T \vec{x} = \frac{\lambda}{2} \underbrace{\vec{\eta}^T \vec{A}^{-1} \vec{\eta}}_{1 \cdot 1} \text{ yields}$$

$$\frac{\lambda}{2} = \frac{d}{\vec{\eta}^T \vec{A}^{-1} \vec{\eta}} \quad \text{and} \quad \vec{x} = \frac{1}{\vec{\eta}^T \vec{A}^{-1} \vec{\eta}} \vec{A}^{-1} \vec{\eta}$$

"Discussion": an agent that is not risk-averse,  
 might rather wish to maximize excess  
 return subject to risk:

$$\max_{\vec{x}} \vec{\eta}^T \vec{x} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \vec{x}^T \vec{A} \vec{x} = R^2.$$

More general, but has some technical quirks;  
which?