Content
The following general questions are addressed:
- Why do firms exist?
- And why do some firms cease to exist?
- How are firms financed?
- How are firms managed?
These questions are analysed by using various models based on various information problems within the firm, or between the firm and its stakeholders (owners, creditors, etc.)
Literature
Required book:
Hart, O.: Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press, 1995 (kap. 2-5 og 7-8).
Additional required readings:
References marked with K will be part of a compendium and for sale at Kopiutsalget, Akademika. For the other references, a link to the Internet is given to find them by looking at http://www.jstor.org/browse
Brander, J.A.; Lewis, T.R.: Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited Liability Effect, American Economic Review vol 76 (1986), s. 956-970. http://www.jstor.org/browse
Burkart, M.; Gromb, D.: Panunzi, F.: Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics vol 112 (1997), 693-728. http://www.jstor.org/browse
Daniel, K.; Titman, S.: Financing Investment under Asymmetric Information, Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol 9: Finance (R.A. Jarrow, V. Maksimovic og W.T. Ziemba, red.), Amsterdam: North-Holland (1995), s. 721-766. K
Grant, S.; King, S.; Polak, B.: Information Externalities, Share-Price Based Incentives and Managerial Behaviour, Journal of Economic Surveys vol 10 (1996), s. 1-21. K
Hirshleifer, D.: Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions, Financial Management (Summer 1993), s. 145-160. K
Hirshleifer, D.: Mergers and Acquisitions: Strategic and Informational Issues, Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol 9: Finance (R.A. Jarrow, V. Maksimovic og W.T. Ziemba, red.), Amsterdam: North-Holland (1995), s. 839-885. K
Scharfstein, D.; Stein, J.: Herd Behavior and Investment, American Economic Review vol 80 (1990), s. 465-479. http://www.jstor.org/browse
Stein, J.: Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, Journal of Political Economy vol 96 (1988), s. 61-80.
Stulz, R.M.: Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies, Journal of Financial Economics vol 26 (1990), s. 3-27. K
Tirole, J.: Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization vol 2 (1986), s. 181-214. K
White, M.J.: The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, Journal of Economic Perspectives vol 3 nr 2 (1989), s. 129-152. http://www.jstor.org/browse