

## Seminar 8

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Question 1. etc. Then in this case it  
has to be equal.

1) Expected relation between the interest rates  
on central bank deposits, T-bills, F-loans  
and interbank loans.

Deposits at the central bank as liquidity

T-bills vs. central bank deposits:

The interest rate given from the central bank  
and from T-bills must be equal or else  
the banks would substitute towards the best  
alternative: the one with the highest interest rate.  
Because the bank knows the interest rate on  
the T-bills, there may be a hedge opportunity  
since the bank knows the interest rate at  
maturity. As a result the policy rate is set  
for a certain period, and the hedge  
advantage of investing in the T-bills  
disappears.

Central bank vs. the interbank market:

The interest rate at the central bank is  
slightly less than the interbank interest  
rate. If the interest rate at the central bank  
were above, no bank would lend in the  
interbank market. When the interbank  
market has a higher interest rate than

the central bank, the bank will prefer the interbank market. Therefore in this case it has to be equal. bank is able to buy all the bonds.

2.) Banks want to keep T-bills and deposits at the central bank as liquidity reserves in fixed proportion to their customer deposits:  $(1-\varnothing)D_{cb} + B_b = D_h + B_b = B_{cb}$

$$(1) D_{cb} + B_b = \varnothing D_h \quad 0 < \varnothing < 1$$

$$D_h = (1-\varnothing)(D_{cb} + B_b) + L - W_b$$

From the balance sheet we have:

(2)  $D_{cb} - L_{cb} - D_h + L + B_b = W_b$  enough  
in this way the banks will be forced to which gives:  $H\text{-loans} - H\text{-loans}$  the bank can obtain in the amount they want, but the interest  $\varnothing D_h - L_{cb} - D_h + L = W_b$  say etc. Here, H loans are normally not used, but here the

$$(3) D_h = [L - W_b - L_{cb}] \frac{1}{1-\varnothing}$$

be interest rate  
on the F-loans will increase because of

Insert (3) in (1):

$$\underline{\underline{D_{cb} + B_b = \frac{\varnothing}{1-\varnothing} [L - W_b - L_{cb}]}}$$

### 3.) Minimum value of F-loans ( $L_{cb}$ ) needed:

We assume the bank is able to buy all the bonds.

$$D_b = F_b - W_b - L_{cb} \quad | \quad \downarrow$$

From the balance sheet:

$$-W_b = B \quad (\text{do not include})$$

Demand function:

$$L_{cb} = \frac{(1-\varnothing)}{\varnothing} [D_{cb} + B_b - B_h - B_{cb}] + L - W_b$$

$$\underline{L_{cb} = \frac{1-\varnothing}{\varnothing} (D_{cb} + B_b) + L - W_b}$$

If the central bank does not lend enough in this way, the banks will be forced to borrow the H-loans. H-loans the banks can get in the amount they want, but the interest rate is far above the policy rate. Hence, H-loans are normally not used, but here the banks have no choice. The interest rate on the F-loan will increase because of high demand.

FBI  
rule

## Question 2

- 1) Borrowing is increased by  $\Delta L$ :

The flow of funds is given by

$$S_p + \Delta L = Q\Delta K + \Delta D + \Delta B_h$$

The change in  $L$  will increase real capital ( $QK$ ) which will result in a real return for the firms. Since the firms and the banks earnings are distributed to the households their wealth ( $W_h$ ) will increase.

From the balance sheet we can see that

$$W_h = D_h + B_h \rightarrow \Delta W_h = \Delta D_h + \Delta B_h$$

- 2) (1)  $C = C + (1 - s(i_d)) Y \quad 0 < s(i_d) < 1 \quad s' > 0$   
(2)  $I = I(i_l) \quad I' < 0$   
(3)  $Y = C + I$   
(4)  $Q = Q(i_l) \quad Q' < 0$

Solving the system for  $Y$ :

$$Y = C + (1 - s(i_d)) Y + I(i_l)$$

$$Y = (C + I(i_l))/s(i_d)$$

If the interest rate is increased, investments will be reduced (due to higher  $i_l$ ,  $I'(i_l) < 0$ ), which will reduce  $Y$ .

Households are more eager to save since  $s'(i_d) > 0$ , which reduces consumption and will therefore reduce  $Y$ .

$I \downarrow$  and  $C \downarrow$  leads to  $Y \downarrow$ , which makes  $sY \downarrow$  holding  $s$  constant.

Since investment  $\downarrow$ ,  $sY \downarrow$  as well, since we are in a closed economy.

- 3) Increase in interest rate affect the balance sheet at the end of period 1:

- 4) If banks increase  $i_l$  without changing  $i_d$  we will get a slightly different result:

$$Y = (C + I(i_l))/s(i_d)$$

Since  $s(i_d)$  doesn't change we will have a larger impact on  $Y$ , decreasing it even more. Investment will also go  $\downarrow$  even more.

Question 3. In the household sector, the balance held do are risk-free and their required margin increase.

1.) We have: (from question 1) higher values

$$D_h = [L - W_b - L_{cb}] \frac{1}{1-\phi}$$

Demand function:

2.) After banks charge to give,  $i_b$ , this

$$D = g(i_a - i_b - x) W_h$$


liquidity excess. This will result in less

We get: a bank-run, which will push up the required interest rate on deposits from

$$D_h = g(i_a - i_b - x) W_h = \frac{1}{1-\phi} (L - W_b - L_{cb})$$

to reduce their lending using liquidity

The relationship between the interest rate on deposits,  $i_a$ , and the demand for deposits from the household sector is shown in the graph:



By assumption, the households are risk-averse and their required margin increase in  $i_d$  will be higher for higher values of  $D_h$  (from the graph) due to the default risk of banks which they want to hedge against.

2.) If the banks choose to raise  $\delta$ , this means that they will demand more liquidity reserves. This will result in less risk of a bank-run, which will push the required interest rate on deposits down. At the same time the banks may want to reduce their lending/raising liquidity reserves by selling lending rates higher. This leads to higher interest rate margins.