Note: Symbols and equation numbering are the same as in Grossman, chapter 7 in Handbook, with the exception that I replace G_t for ϕ_t (since $G_t \equiv \partial h_t/H_t$ the use of ϕ_t is superfluous).

Health capital (H) at time t the result of

history (H_{t-1}) depreciation $(\delta_t H_{t-1})$ – age, accident, disease ... investments in health (I_{t-1}) , exercise, medical care ... Note: H the stock of health at the beginning of the period.

As with investments in general: There is a cost today (later we denote this π_{t-1}), and a later gain (that lasts for some time), in terms of an increase in $H_t, H_{t+1}, H_{t+2}, \dots$ and associated benefits.

Benefits from good health

Let Ω be the total number of days (full time), TL be number of sick days, h the number of healthy days. The higher health (H): the more of healthy days, $h_t = G_t H_t$, where $G_t > 0$, and the fewer number of sick days $TL = \Omega - h_t$. In the model, all the effects of H goes through h.

1. Direct utility:

$$U(h_t, Z_t)$$

where $\partial U/\partial h_t = uh_t \cdot \frac{\partial h_t}{\partial H_t} = uh_t \cdot G_t$

2. More time for work (and leisure). (Non-sick leisure time is exogenous, so if $H \nearrow$, then more time for work at home or in the marketplace \longrightarrow higher consumption.)

Household production functions

(3) $I = i(M_t, TH_t; E_t)$ – investments in health (4) $Z = z(X_t, T_t; E_t)$ – other consumption goods with inputs: market goods (M_t, X_t) and own time (TH_t, T_t) . You may think of M_t as medical care.

Resource constraints:

The time constraint

$$\Omega_{\text{full time}} = TW_t + \underbrace{TH_t + T_t}_{\text{time spent on household production}} + \underbrace{TL_t}_{\text{time sick}}$$

How does $H \nearrow$ improve production/earnings opportunities? Only by reducing TL_t .

Using $h_t = \Omega - TL_t$, the time constraint can be written as

$$TW_t = h_t - TH_t - T_t$$

The income constraint

$$\Sigma_t \left(P_t M_t + Q_t X_t \right) / (1+r)^t = \Sigma \left(W_t T W_t \right) / (1+r)^t + A_0$$

Combining the time and the income constraints gives

$$\Sigma_t \left(P_t M_t + Q_t X_t \right) / (1+r)^t = \Sigma \left(W_t \left(h_t - T H_t - T_t \right) \right) / (1+r)^t + A_0$$
(5')

Some (restrictive?) assumptions

No uncertainty

Perfect knowledge

Constant preferences

No joint production. For example, $\partial I/\partial X = \partial Z/\partial M = 0$. The actions that affect health, do not matter for other consumption goods. Can freely choose TH, TW, M and X given (5').

The individual as a **rational** producer of own health chooses to: Maximize (1') given (5') and using equations (2-4).

$$L(...) \equiv \Sigma_{t=0}^{n} u(h_{t}, Z_{t}) + (*)$$

$$\lambda \Sigma_{t=0}^{n} \frac{1}{(1+r)^{t}} \left[W_{t}(h_{t} - TH_{t} - T_{t}) - (P_{t}M_{t} + Q_{t}X_{t}) \right]$$

- Discounts future income streams a krone today (t-1) is more valuable than a krone later (t, t+1, t+2, ...) because of r > 0.
- **Maximization** of interest to us: the determinants of I: M and TH (cf. equation 3).
- The first order condition for gross health investment in period t-1, equations (9) and (10) follow from two first order conditions, one for M and one for TH.

Differentiate L wrt I, thinking of M as a function of I.

Differentiate L wrt I, thinking of TH as a function of I.

When using M_t as the choice variable:

$$\frac{1}{(1+r)^{t-1}}P_{t-1}\frac{\partial M_{t-1}}{\partial I_{t-1}} = \frac{W_t G_t}{(1+r)^{t-1}} + \dots + \frac{Uh_t}{\lambda}G_t + (1-\delta_t)\dots(1-\delta_{n-1})\frac{Uh_n}{\lambda}G_n$$

Define $\pi_{t-1} = P_{t-1} \frac{\partial M_{t-1}}{\partial I_{t-1}}$. In equilibrium:

$$\pi_{t-1} = P_{t-1} \frac{\partial M_{t-1}}{\partial I_{t-1}} = W_{t-1} \frac{\partial T H_{t-1}}{\partial I_{t-1}}.$$
 (10)

The derivation of the user cost of health

Then it is convenient to look at the optimal health stock in period t (H_t) rather than the gross investments.

The relation between H_t and $I_1, ..., I_n$:

$$I_{t-1} = H_t - (1 - \delta_{t-1}) H_{t-1},$$

$$I_t = H_{t+1} - (1 - \delta_t) H_t$$

while H_t does not enter in the expression for I_{t-j} , for $j \neq 0, 1$. That is, $\partial I_{t-1}/\partial H_t = 1$, and $\partial I_t/\partial H_t = -(1 - \delta_t)$ (and $\partial I_{t-j}/\partial H_t = 0$ for $j \neq 0, 1$).

$$\partial L_t / \partial H_t = \lambda \frac{1}{(1+r)^{t-1}} \left(\underbrace{-\underbrace{P_{t-1} \frac{\partial M_{t-1}}{\partial I_{t-1}}}_{\pi_{t-1}} \frac{\partial I_{t-1}}{\partial H_t}}_{=1} \right) + uh_t G_t + \lambda \frac{1}{(1+r)^t} \left(G_t W_t - \underbrace{P_t \frac{\partial M_t}{\partial I_t}}_{\pi_t} \underbrace{\frac{\partial I_t}{\partial H_t}}_{=-(1-\delta_t)} \right) = 0$$
$$\frac{\lambda}{(1+r)^{t-1}} \pi_{t-1} = uh_t G_t + \frac{\lambda}{(1+r)^t} \left(G_t W_t + \pi_t \left(1 - \delta_t\right) \right)$$

multiply by $(1+r)^t / \lambda$ and rearrange right hand side (RHS):

$$\pi_{t-1} (1+r) = G_t W_t + \frac{uh_t}{\lambda} G_t (1+r)^t + \pi_t (1-\delta_t)$$
$$\pi_{t-1} (1+r) - \pi_t (1-\delta_t) = G_t W_t + \frac{uh_t}{\lambda} G_t (1+r)^t$$

Rearrangeing the LHS: $\pi_{t-1} (1+r) - \pi_t (1-\delta_t) = \pi_{t-1} \left(1+r - \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t-1}} + \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t-1}} \delta_t\right) = \pi_{t-1} \left(\frac{\pi_{t-1}}{\pi_{t-1}} + r - \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t-1}} + \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t-1}} \delta_t\right) = \pi_{t-1} \left(r - \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t-1}} - \frac{\pi_{t-1}}{\pi_{t-1}}\right) + \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t-1}} \delta_t\right) = \pi_{t-1} \left(r - \tilde{\pi}_{t-1} + \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t-1}} \delta_t\right),$ where $\tilde{\pi}_{t-1} = \frac{\pi_t - \pi_{t-1}}{\pi_{t-1}}$. Grossman assumes that $\delta \tilde{\pi}_{t-1}$ is very close to zero, then $\frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t-1}} \delta_t \approx \delta_t$, and we arrive at equation (11):

$$\pi_{t-1}\left(r - \widetilde{\pi}_{t-1} + \delta_t\right) = G_t W_t + \frac{uh_t}{\lambda} G_t \left(1 + r\right)^t \tag{11}$$

The RHS in (11) is the gain from a marginal increase in health stock in period t, H_t . The LHS in (11), $\pi_{t-1} (r - \tilde{\pi}_{t-1} + \delta_t)$, is the cost of a marginal increase in H_t . For (11) to maximize utility, the optimal gross investments in all periods t = 0, ..., n - 1, must be positive. (There must be an inner solution to the Lagrange problem (*).) \Leftrightarrow The individual would never want to reduce his health by $\delta_t H_t$ or more.

Even if health capital cannot be sold (there is no second-hand market for health, in contrast to physical capital), one may then think of the LHS in eq 11 as a user cost of capital.

The true cost is not π_{t-1} (the monetary expense in period t-1 of investing in H_t), but the sum of the following cost components

- foregone income, $\pi_{t-1} \times r$, from not placing an amount π_{t-1} in the capital market,
- and the monetary loss from depreciation $\pi_{t-1} \times \delta$,
- and, possibly, price changes from t 1 to t. Price increases (P or W) from t 1 to t, that is $\tilde{\pi}_{t-1} > 0$, reduce the user cost of H_t .

Dividing by π_{t-1} on both sides of eq. 11,

$$r - \widetilde{\pi}_{t-1} + \delta_t = \underbrace{G_t W_t / \pi_{t-1}}_{\gamma_t} + \underbrace{\frac{uh_t}{\lambda} G_t \left(1 + r\right)^t / \pi_{t-1}}_{a_t}.$$
(24)

 $r - \widetilde{\pi}_{t-1} + \delta_t$ is the user cost per krone spent on H_t , and $\gamma_t + a_t$ the marginal gain per krone. γ_t is the productive value of more healthy days, and a_t the direct utility gain from better health.

Grossman derives two models from equation 24,

in the **investment model**, health only matters for the individual's productive capacity (the number of days she can work), thus $a_t = 0$,

in the **consumption model**, health has only a direct utility effect ($\gamma_t = 0$).

Comparative statistics: We will mainly use graphs, and concentrate on the investment model.