- 1. Short true, false or uncertain statements, explain briefly your answer (40% in total, same weight on each)
 - (a) The Corlett-Hague rule says that you should impose a higher tax on the commodity that is more complementary with leisure.
 - (b) The Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem can be used to argue that a commodity tax should supplement an optimally set tax on labor income, because it weakens the self-selection constraint (information constraint).
 - (c) A tax on annual wealth has the same distributional effects and economic efficiency effects as a tax on capital income.
 - (d) The top of the Laffer-curve shows the tax level for which one derives the maximum welfare in a society.
 - (e) When taxation of a commodity is changed, the consumers (and not the suppliers) bear the burden of the tax change when the consumer demand is inelastic.

2. Taxation of intergenerational transfer (40%)

The accidental, the altruistic, the egoistic (joy-of-giving) and the exchange models are all models which explain intergenerational transfers.

- (a) We have that Y^P is the parent's earnings and the child earnings is Y^C . The parent recieves inheritance at the start of period 1, I^P . One period later the parent provides a transfer (inheritance) to the child, I^C . The altruistic model implies that the parents maximize $\{U\left(Y^P+I^P-I^C\right)+\lambda\cdot V\left(Y^C+I^C\right)\}$ with respect to the transfer to the child I^C , where $U\left(.\right)$ measures the parent's utility from its own lifetime consumption, $V\left(.\right)$ measures parental utility from the child's consumption, and λ is a parameter representing the strength of the parent's altruistic sentiments. Explain how, according to this altruistic model, a transfer to the child depends on the income of the parent and income of the child, and why a tax on the transfer (an inheritance tax) is distortive.
- (b) If there is more than one child in the family, how will the parent divide the transfer between the two children: do they get identical shares?
- (c) Discuss to what extent a tax on intergenerational transfers (an inheritance tax) is distortive under the other models of intergenerational transfers (as referred to above)?

3. Insurance (20%)

Consider a population of workers. Each of them earns w and are identical in all aspects except that they have different probabilities $p_i \in [0, 1]$ of

loosing their work capacity. Workers are risk averse and want to insure against this potential loss.

- (a) What is meant with adverse selection in insurance?
- (b) Explain why the marginal cost curve for the provision of insurance is downward sloping.
- (c) Explain why adverse selection can be an argument for having public provision of social insurance.