Syllabus/achievement requirements

Reading list

Main text

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini: Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy, 2000. Cambridge, MA: MIT. Ch. 1-7 and 13.

Articles

Acemoglu, D., and J. Robinson: Inefficient Redistribution, 2001. American Political Science Review 95(3). pp. 649-661.

Alesina, A., and G. Tabellini, 1990, A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 403-414.

Andersen, J. J., Fiva, J. H. and G. J. Natvik (2014), Voting When the Stakes are High, Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming.

Besley T. and S. Coate, 1997, An Economic Model Of Representative Democracy”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. 85-114.

Brunner, Eric, Stephen L. Ross, and Ebonya Washington: Economics and Policy Preferences: Causal Evidence of the Impact of Economic Conditions on Support for Redistribution and Other Ballot Proposals. Review of Economics and Statistics 2011 93:3, pp. 888-906.

Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duflo: Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India, 2004. Econometrica 72(5). pp.1409-1443.

Fisman, Raymond: Estimating the Value of Political Connections, 2001. American Economic Review 91 (4). pp. 1095-1102.

Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman : Protection for sale, 1994. American Economic Review 84(4). pp. 833-850.

Hassler, J., Rodrigugez Mora, J.V., Storesletten, K., and Zilibotti, F., 2003, The Survival of the Welfare State, American Economic Review, 93, 87-112.

Khwaja, Asim Ijaz and Atif Mian: Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market, 2005. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (4). pp. 1371-1411.

Krusell, P., and J.V. Rios Rull,1999, On the Size of the US Government: Political Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model, American Economic Review, 89, pp. 1156-1181.

Lind, J. T. : Why is there so little redistribution?, 2005. Nordic Journal of Political Economy 31. pp. 111-125.

Lind, J. T.: Fractionalization and the size of government. 2007, Journal of Public Economics 91, pp. 51-76.

Persson, T., and L. E. O., Svensson, 1989, Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time- Inconsistent Preferences, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, No. 2, pp. 325-345.

 Pettersson-Lidbom, P.: Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach, 2008. Journal of the European Economic Association 6(5). pp. 1037-1056.

Willumsen, Fredrik: The value of political experience: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design, 2011. Mimeo, University of Oslo. 

Published Nov. 19, 2013 1:29 PM - Last modified Nov. 23, 2020 1:23 PM