

Table 1


Relationship between preferences for redistribution and racial relations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
African American	0.142 (0.005)***	-0.082 (0.056)		
Other race	0.017 (0.010)*			
Close feeling to race:				
Respondent black, how close to white		-0.010 (0.006)*		
Respondent black, how close to black		0.030 (0.006)***		
Respondent white, how close to black		0.004 (0.003)		
Respondent white, how close to white		-0.002 (0.003)		
Not object to African American at home			0.030 (0.006)***	
Had African American at home recently				0.027 (0.005)***
Sample	All	African American, White	White	White
Period	1972-2002	1996-2002	1972-2002	1972-2002
Observations	36948	3738	30932	30932
R ²	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.04


Dependent variable is a dummy for preferring to spend more on welfare. All regressions include log household income, age, age squared, years of education, years of education squared, and dummies for sex, marital status, region of residence, and year.

Standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence.


Fractionalization




Total inequality




Within group inequality



Between group inequality



Fraction expenditure on welfare



Share of transfers to disp. inc.




Fig. 2. Geographical presentation of the data. All measured in 2000, inequality measure is generalized entropy measure with parameter 0.

Table 4
 Inequality and redistribution measured by average fraction of transfers in disposable income

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Fraction above 65	0.498*** (0.037)	0.407*** (0.045)	0.485*** (0.038)	0.404*** (0.045)	0.479*** (0.054)	0.470*** (0.051)	0.361*** (0.033)
Log per capita income	-0.088*** (0.006)	-0.121*** (0.011)	-0.091*** (0.006)	-0.121*** (0.011)	-0.080*** (0.008)	-0.083*** (0.008)	-0.106*** (0.006)
Fractionalization	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.022 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.022 (0.028)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.009)
Total inequality	0.127*** (0.011)	0.103*** (0.011)			0.128*** (0.016)		
Within group inequality			0.130*** (0.011)	0.106*** (0.012)		0.129*** (0.015)	0.115*** (0.010)
Between group inequality			-0.046 (0.106)	-0.004 (0.104)		0.032 (0.142)	-0.105 (0.080)
Constant	0.936*** (0.059)	1.308*** (0.112)	0.958*** (0.061)	1.302*** (0.112)	0.853*** (0.085)	0.883*** (0.081)	1.150*** (0.059)
Different			2.68 [0.10]	1.07 [0.30]		0.45 [0.50]	7.30 [0.01]
Observations	300	300	300	300	300	300	300
R-squared	0.80	0.74	0.81	0.74	0.58	0.58	0.64
Ind. effects		States		States			Regions
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	LS	LS	LS	LS	Median	Median	Median

All inequalities refer to the generalized entropy measure with parameter 0. Estimator is either least squares (LS) or least absolute deviations (Med). Different is the F -test of the parameters on between and within group inequality being different. R^2 is overall R^2 for fixed effects models and pseudo- R^2 for median regressions. Omitted categories are 2000 for year-dummies and East North Central for regional dummies. District of Columbia not included. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence. p -values in square brackets.


Table 3

Inequality and redistribution measured by fraction of state welfare expenditure in state personal income

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Fraction above 65	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.037** (0.018)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.034*** (0.010)	-0.050** (0.022)
Log per capita income	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.003)
Fractionalization	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.013* (0.008)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.015* (0.008)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.005)
Total inequality	0.015*** (0.005)	0.005 (0.003)			0.021*** (0.004)		
Within group inequality			0.019*** (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)		0.023*** (0.003)	0.009 (0.006)
Between group inequality			-0.018 (0.016)	0.018* (0.011)		0.003 (0.006)	0.010 (0.012)
Constant	0.034 (0.027)	0.095*** (0.032)	0.033 (0.027)	0.098*** (0.032)	0.033 (0.023)	0.030* (0.016)	0.164*** (0.038)
Different			4.62 [0.03]	1.63 [0.20]		9.39 [0.00]	0.01 [0.91]
Observations	350	350	350	350	350	350	350
R^2	0.46	0.72	0.46	0.72	0.32	0.32	0.42
Ind. effects		States		States			Regions
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	LS	LS	LS	LS	Median	Median	Median


All inequalities refer to the generalized entropy measure with parameter 0. Estimator is either least squares (LS) or least absolute deviations (Med). Different is the F -test of the parameters on between and within group inequality being different. R^2 is pseudo- R^2 for median regressions. District of Columbia not included.

Standard errors in parenthesis, p -values in square brackets. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95%**), and 99% (***) confidence.



Note: The histogram shows the density of observations as a function of the difference in electoral participation at the local relative to the regional election. The width of each bar is one percentage point. The data are from elections held September 9–10, 2007. Electoral participation is the percentage of eligible voters who cast a vote in the election.

Fig. 2. Density of observations as a function of the participation difference.



Note: The scatterplot shows the relation between the difference in participation rates at the local relative to the regional elections and hydropower income. The data are from elections held September 9–10, 2007.

Fig. 4. Participation difference and hydropower income.

Table 3

The relationship between hydropower income and the participation difference.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
HydroPowerIncome	0.14 ^{***}	0.16 ^{***}	0.11 ^{***}	0.13 ^{***}	0.12 ^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
LogVotingPopulation			-1.26 ^{***}	-1.35 ^{***}	-1.53 ^{***}
			(0.19)	(0.35)	(0.38)
ShareInRuralAreas				0.09	-0.31
				(0.97)	(1.02)
RecentImmigrants				-19.50	-19.17
				(16.86)	(16.75)
ShareVotersAged18to37				1.70	4.41
				(20.32)	(21.58)
ShareVotersAged38to57				-15.11	-16.05
				(16.26)	(15.99)
ShareVotersAged58to77				2.39	3.99
				(15.87)	(17.15)
ShareWomen				-0.80	-2.28
				(23.97)	(23.70)
ShareUnMarried				-1.09	-0.00
				(9.58)	(9.34)
ShareWidow				-1.88	-2.07
				(25.38)	(26.20)
ShareDivorced				2.48	1.38
				(14.15)	(14.73)
ShareLowerSecondary				4.40	6.28
				(5.29)	(5.10)
ShareUpperSecondary				-3.76	0.16
				(5.45)	(5.59)
CharityDonations				-0.02	-0.02
				(0.02)	(0.02)
ChurchServiceAttendance				-0.53	-0.53
				(0.32)	(0.34)
GrossWageMen				-0.28	-0.30
				(0.52)	(0.56)
GrossWageWomen				0.11	0.46
				(1.84)	(1.93)
DirectElectionMayor					0.04
					(0.37)
TwoVotingDays					-0.09
					(0.38)
PartyFragmentation					2.19
					(1.93)
PartyIndepLists					0.77 ^{**}
					(0.33)
N	426	426	426	422	420
adj. R ²	0.071	0.363	0.511	0.530	0.541
Labor Market Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: The dependent variable is the difference between participation rates at the local and the regional elections. The data are from elections held in 2007. Standard errors clustered at the labor market region level are in parentheses.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4

First-stage estimates: altitude as instrument for hydropower income.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Altitude600to899	6.43*	8.27*	6.70	8.22**	7.45**
	(3.40)	(4.48)	(4.18)	(3.44)	(3.58)
Altitude900to1199	5.46	15.67**	15.57**	14.54**	15.25**
	(6.62)	(7.75)	(7.63)	(5.89)	(6.07)
Altitude1200	10.31	14.31***	13.67***	12.48***	11.78***
	(6.63)	(4.91)	(4.89)	(3.86)	(3.76)
LogVotingPopulation			-1.03**	-0.71	-0.62
			(0.46)	(1.29)	(0.81)
ShareInRuralAreas				3.91	3.83
				(2.85)	(3.22)
N	424	424	424	420	420
Labor Market Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population Characteristics	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Institutional Characteristics	No	No	No	No	Yes

Note: The dependent variable is hydropower income. The excluded instruments capture the fractions of the local government area that are, respectively, 600 to 899 m, 900 to 1199 m, and above 1200 m, above sea level. Standard errors clustered at the labor market region level are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$.** $p < 0.05$.*** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5

Second-stage estimates: hydropower income and the participation difference.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
HydroPowerIncome	0.31** (0.13)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.17*** (0.06)
LogVotingPopulation			-1.20*** (0.17)	-1.31*** (0.32)	-1.49*** (0.32)
ShareInRuralAreas				-0.08 (0.78)	-0.41 (0.81)
N	424	424	424	420	420
Labor Market Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population Characteristics	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Institutional Characteristics	No	No	No	No	Yes
F-statistic from 1st.	8.416	7.274	7.565	11.36	10.43

Note: The dependent variable is the difference between participation rates at the local and the regional elections. The data are from elections held in 2007. The excluded instruments capture the fractions of the local government area that are, respectively, 600 to 899 m, 900 to 1199 m, and above 1200 m, above sea level. Standard errors clustered at the labor market region level are in parentheses.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8

The relationship between shares of total public spending (percent) and hydropower income.

Coefficient of variation	0.27	0.31	0.48	0.50	0.51	0.56	0.58	0.73	0.88	0.94	1.21	1.36
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	School	Elderly	Child	Social	Health	Infra	Admin	Fire	Planning	Roads	Culture	Industry
HydroPowerIncome	-0.25*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)
Population	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01** (0.01)
ShareInRuralAreas	-2.38** (0.97)	2.96*** (1.00)	-3.15*** (0.57)	-1.28** (0.50)	1.30*** (0.33)	-1.86*** (0.43)	3.51*** (0.68)	-0.02 (0.14)	0.58** (0.23)	-0.24 (0.43)	-1.19* (0.65)	1.77*** (0.41)
Constant	25.66*** (0.63)	26.45*** (0.64)	10.03*** (0.39)	7.66*** (0.29)	3.80*** (0.19)	6.51*** (0.29)	7.49*** (0.43)	1.41*** (0.08)	1.27*** (0.13)	2.99*** (0.29)	5.26*** (0.45)	1.47*** (0.26)
N	426	426	426	426	426	426	426	426	426	426	426	426
adj. R ²	0.121	0.091	0.208	0.092	0.118	0.032	0.230	-0.005	0.082	0.051	0.065	0.267

Note: The dependent variables are the shares of public spending, measured in percent. Each spending category is placed according to its coefficient of variation (c.v.), which is reported in the top line of the table. HydroPowerIncome is measured in NOK 1000 per capita. Population is measured in 1000s.

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$.

** $p < 0.05$.

*** $p < 0.01$.