

Fig. 1. Resources and Institutions (a) all resource rich countries (b) with bad institutions (c) with good institutions

Regression 1

-0.79*

(-3.80)

3.06*

(7.23)

-6.16*

(-4.02)

87

0.50

Dependent variable: GDP growth.

Initial income level

Resource abundance

Institutional quality

Openness

Investments

Observations

Adjusted R²

level.

Interaction term

Regression Results I

Table 1

Regression 3

-1.28*

1.45*

(3.36)

-6.69*

(-5.43)

0.6

(0.64)

0.15*

(6.73)

0.69

87

(-6.65)

Regression 4

-1.26*

1.66*

(3.87)

-14.34*

(-4.21)

(-1.13)

0.16*

(7.15)

15.4* (2.40)

0.71

87

-1.3

(-6.70)

Regression 2

-1.02*

(-4.38)

2.49*

(4.99)

-5.74*

(-3.78)

2.2*

(2.04)

87

Note: The numbers in brackets are t-values. A star (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 5-%

0.52

Table 2 Regression Results II

				`	_		
_	_	_		_			
_	_	_	-	_			

Dependent variable: GDP growth.

-1.33*

(-6.26)

1.87*

(3.77)

-17.71*(-3.16)

-0.20

(-0.22)

0.15*

(6.25)

99.43*

(2.66)

no

87

0.63

Initial income level

Resource abundance

Mineral abundance

Institutional quality

Investments

Secondary

Ethnic frac.

Language frac.

Africa exluded

Observations

Adjusted R²

level.

Interaction term

Openness

-1.88*

1.34*

(3.20)

-10.92*

(-3.16)

1.83

0.11*

(4.09)

(1.84)

yes

59

0.79

11.01

(-1.35)

(-7.95)

Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6

-1.33*

1.60*

(3.47)

-16.35*

(-3.71)

-0.90

(-0.69)

0.15*

(5.56)

18.31*

(2.34)

-0.60

(-0.44)

no

76

Note: The numbers in brackets are t-values. A star (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 5-%

0.70

(-5.90)

-1.34*

(-6.97)

1.59*

(3.73)

-13.70*

(-4.00)

-1.15

(-0.96)

0.15*

(6.51)

15.86*

(2.45)

-0.88

no

86

0.71

(1.69)

-1.36*

1.63*

(3.76)

14.78*

(-4.26)

-1.18

(-0.94)

0.15*

(6.76)

16.84*

(2.55)

-0.36

no

84

(0.75)

0.70

(-6.13)

-1.45*

1.56*

(3.36)

-16.25*

(-3.60)

-0.78

(-0.56)

0.14*

(4.91)

19.01*

(2.41)

-0.57

(-0.41)

-0.77

(1.12)

-0.11*

(0.18)

0.70

no

74

(-5.45)




Table 2: Conflicts and mineral prices

Estimator	(1)	(2)	(3) LF	(4) PM	(5)	(6)	
Dep. var.	Conflict incidence						
Sample	All	$\mathbb{V}(\mathbf{M}_{kt}) = 0$		All	$\mathbb{V}(\mathbf{M}_{kt}) = 0$		
mine > 0	0.112^{c} (0.065)					0.048 (0.065)	
ln price main mineral	-0.029 (0.032)					0.028 (0.019)	
$\label{eq:local_price} \mbox{ln price} \times \mbox{mines} > 0$	0.086^{b} (0.034)	0.072^a (0.020)	0.060^{a} (0.021)		0.085^{a} (0.024)	0.108^a (0.041)	
$\label{eq:local_problem} \mbox{ln price} \times \mbox{mines} > 0 \mbox{ (neighbouring cells)}$			0.021^a (0.006)				
$\label{eq:local_price} \mbox{ln price} \times \mbox{mines} > 0 \mbox{ (ever)}$				0.045^{a} (0.014)			
Country×year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	
Year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	
Cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
Neighborhood FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	
Observations	143768	142296	127974	143864	142296	17360	

LPM estimations. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 500km radius and for infinite serial correlation. mine > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is active in the cell in year t. mines > 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is recorded in the cell at any point over the 1997-2010 period. mines > 0 (neighbouring cells) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is recorded in neighbouring cells of degree 1 and 2 in year t. $\mathbb{V}(M_{kt}) = 0$ means that we consider only cells in which the mine dummy (or dummies in column (3)) takes always the same value over the period. Column (6) is estimated on a sample containing only mining cells and their immediate neighboring cells. In columns (1) to (5), In price main mineral is the World price of the mineral with the highest production over the period (evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for non-mining cells. In column (6) In price main mineral takes the same value for the mining cell and its immediate neighbours. Estimations (1) and (6) include controls for the average level of mineral World price interacted with the mine dummy.

Table 5: Minerals price and types of conflict events

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	()		LPM			
Sample	$\mathbb{V}(\mathbf{M}_{kt}) = 0$	All	$\mathbb{V}(\mathbf{M}_{kt}) = 0$	All	$\mathbb{V}(\mathbf{M}_{kt}) = 0$	All
Conflict incidence var.	Battles		Violence against civ.		Riots / Protests	
$ln price \times mines > 0$	0.016^{b}		0.040^{a}		0.044^{b}	
	(0.008)		(0.014)		(0.018)	
$\ln \text{ price} \times \text{mines} > 0 \text{ (ever)}$		0.002		0.034^{a}		0.038^{a}
		(0.006)		(0.010)		(0.011)
Country×year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	142296	143864	142296	143864	142296	143864

LPM estimations. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. Conley (1999) standard errors in parentheses, allowing for spatial correlation within a 500km radius and for infinite serial correlation. mine > 0 is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is active in the cell in year t. mines > 0 (ever) is a dummy taking the value 1 if at least 1 mine is recorded in the cell at any point over the 1997-2010 period. $\mathbb{V}(M_{kt}) = 0$ means that we consider only cells in which the mine dummy takes always the same value over the period. In price main mineral is the World price of the mineral with the highest production over the period (evaluated at 1997 prices) for mining cells, and zero for non-mining cells.