ECON 4921: Lecture 5

Jon Fiva, 2009

Roadmap

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Institutions and Economic Performance
- 3. The Firm
- 4. Organized Interest and Ownership
- 5. Complementarity of Institutions
- 6. Institutions and Commitment
- 7. Agency problems: Voters- Politicians-Bureaucrats
- 8. Fiscal Federalism
- 9. System Competition

Cooperatives

- A cooperative is a firm where:
 - workers own the means of production
 - ... and have full control over all economic decisions

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- A cooperative is a firm where:
 - workers own the means of production
 - ... and have full control over all economic decisions
- Conventional firms:
 - a) Suppliers of capital and labor are distinct indivudals
 - b) Capitalists hold residual claimancy and right of control.
- Worker cooperatives (coops):
 - a) member-owners supply both labor and capital
 - b) ... and hold residual claimancy and rights of control.

Examples

- Mondragon Corporation in Spain are the biggest group of cooperatives in the world.
 - Account for 4 percent of local GDP in the Basque country.
 - Interests in various sectors: supermarkets, finance, white goods and car parts.
- Norway
 - Coops are rare. One example: Kantega
- US
 - More common
 - Craig and Pencavel study plywood firms in Washington

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mondrag%C3%B3n_Cooperative_Corporation

Moene and Wallerstein (1993)

• How does the economic impacts of unions differ from that of coops?

Assumptions

- a) Unions and coops maximize income of members
- b) ... are internally egalitarian
- c) ... and do not have any impact on productivity (other than through changes in capital intensity)
- d) Industry with large number of (possibly heterogenous) firms produce homogenous product
- e) Free entry
- f) Industry is small relative to aggregate economy

Unions vs. coops

- 1. Competitive capitalist equilibrium
- 2. Competitive equilibrium with worker ownership
- 3. Competitive equilibrium with collective bargaining

Competitive capitalist equilibrium

• Two types of firms, differ only in their relative efficiency:

$$\pi_{1} = p\beta_{1}F(L_{1}) - w_{1}L_{1} - C$$

$$\pi_{2} = p\beta_{2}F(L_{2}) - w_{2}L_{2} - C$$

$$\beta_{1} > \beta_{2}$$
(1)

 $F'(\,\cdot\,)>0\quad F''(\,\cdot\,)<0$

- Fixed number of productive firms: n₁
- Free entry of less productive firms: n₂

Competitive capitalist equilibrium

• Price determined by aggregate production:

 $p = p[n_1\beta_1F(L_1) + n_2\beta_2F(L_2)] \qquad p'(\,\cdot\,) < 0 \tag{2}$

• Competitive labor market:

$$w_1 = w_2 = r. \tag{3}$$

Competitive capitalist equilibrium

• Firms max profit wrt L:

$$p\beta_1 F'(L_1) = r \tag{4}$$

$$p\beta_2(F'(L_2) = r.$$
(5)

Free entry → Type2-firms earn zero profits:

$$p\beta_2 F(L_2) - rL_2 - C = 0. ag{6}$$

• (2),(4),(5),(6) determine p, L_1, L_2 and n_2

Unions vs. coops

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Competitive equilibrium with worker ownership

• Income per worker in type i firm:

$$y_i = \max_{L_i} \left[\frac{p\beta_i F(L_i) - C}{L_i} \right].$$
(7)

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• FOC:

$$p\beta_1 F'(L_1) = \frac{p\beta_1 F(L_1) - C}{L_1}$$
(8)

$$p\beta_2 F'(L_2) = \frac{p\beta_2 F(L_2) - C}{L_2}.$$
(9)

Competitive equilibrium with worker ownership

- Free entry → type 2 coops will enter as long as average income per member>r.
- In equilibrium: y₂=r,

$$\frac{p\beta_2 F(L_2) - C}{L_2} = r.$$
 (10)

• (2),(8),(9),(10) determine p, L_1, L_2 and n_2

- Assume that prior capitalist firms are not compensated, then:
 - a) Price and output do not change
 - b) L_1 do not change
 - c) L_1 decrease
 - d) n_2 increase

- a) Price and output do not change
 b) L₂ do not change
- Follow from free entry and exog. Res. Wage.
- Type2 firms with worker ownership (9,10):

$$p\beta_2 F'(L_2) = \frac{p\beta_2 F(L_2) - C}{L_2} = r$$

• Type2 firms with capitalist ownership (5):

$$p\beta_2(F'(L_2)=r$$

c) L_1 decrease

- Follow from comparison of employment setting conditions:
- Type1 firms with worker ownership (8):

$$p\beta_1 F'(L_1) = \frac{p\beta_1 F(L_1) - C}{L_1}$$

• Type1 firms with capitalist ownership (4):

 $p\beta_1F'(L_1)=r$

- Differentiate employment setting conditions wrt β and L:
- Capitalist ownership: $\frac{dL}{d\beta} > 0$ More eff. Firms hire more!
- Worker ownership: $\frac{dL}{d\beta} < 0$ Less eff. Firms hire more!

Since L₂ is unaltered (from b)), L₁ must decrease.

d) N_2 increase

- L1 decrease
- L_2 unchanged

- Number of type2 firms increase.
- Output unchanged
- Total employment in industry may go up or down. Why?
- Are workers better off in coops?

•What if coops have to fully compensate previous owners?

Then there is no effect on price, output, income or employment.
Workers and employers neither gain, nor lose.

•Why not?

Unions vs. coops

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Competitive equilibrium with collective bargaining

- Assume:
 - New entrants will be unionized
 - Workers earn more than reservation wage

$$w_1 = w_2 = w \quad \text{with} \quad w > r. \tag{11}$$

• Each firm max profits wrt L, given w: $p\beta_1 F'(L_1) = w$ (12)

$$p\beta_2 F'(L_2) = w. ag{13}$$

• Type2 firm, zero profits:

 $p\beta_2 F(L_2) - wL_2 - C = 0. \tag{14}$

Collective bargaining vs. Capitalist firms


a) Price increase, output decrease
b) L₁ decrease, L₂ decrease
c) Effect on N₂ ambigous

Collective bargaining vs. Capitalist firms

a) Price increase, output decrease

• From (14):
$$\frac{dp}{dw} = \frac{L_2}{\beta_2 F(L_2)} > 0$$

Collective bargaining vs. capitalist firms



 Elasticity of price wrt to wage less than one → w/p increase.

• From (12):
$$\beta_1 F'(L_1) = \frac{w}{p} \rightarrow L_1$$
 decrease

Collective bargaining vs. capitalist firms

c) Effect on N₂ ambigous

- More attractive to enter since fixed costs become smaller relative to price
- More attractive to enter since unions crate monopoly rents
- Less attractive to enter since demand decreases

• Are workers better off in unions or coops?

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- "Weak unions": $w \rightarrow r$, better off in coop

- Are workers better off in unions or coops?
 - Type 2 firms: always better off since, w>r
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- "Weak unions": $w \rightarrow r$, better off in coop
- "Strong unions": $w \rightarrow \bar{w}$, better off in union \bar{w} :wage level where type1 firm makes zero profits

Intuition:

collective bargaining \rightarrow monopoly rents \rightarrow price incr \rightarrow workers income increase

- Cooperatives
 - Workers obtain entire pie
 - But rents limited to intrinsic advantage of some firms , i.e. Firm specific rents
- Unions
 - Enforce floor on wages througout industry
 - Monopoly rents, i.e. industry specific rents

- Cooperatives
 - Workers obtain entire pie
 - But rents limited to intrinsic advantage of some firms , i.e. Firm specific rents
- Unions
 - Enforce floor on wages througout industry
 - Monopoly rents, i.e. industry specific rents
- Strong unions
 - Capture entire pie & get monopoly rents
 - All workers better off
- Weak unions
 - Capture small share of a larger pie

- These conclusion hinges on the assumptions:
 - New entrants also organized through unions
 - Coops do not enter unionized industry
 - Productivity unaffected by ownership