Figure 1: World prices of coltan and gold





Figure 2: Local prices of coltan and gold






Figure 6: Demand shock for coltan and presence of stationary bandits

Notes: This figure plots the average number of stationary bandits on year. I take the variable stationary bandit from the site survey, in which the specialists are asked to list past "organizations of security" in the site. A stationary bandit ("organization of security" in the survey) is defined as an armed actor who holds the monopoly of violence in a given site for at least 6 months (approximately). Stationary bandits most frequently are alone when they occupy a site. In some cases, multiple stationary bandits collude (this is mostly the case for the Mayi-Mayis and the FDLR in some cases), and in some, fewer cases, more than one stationary bandit may alternate in one location in a given year. The solid line graphs the average number of stationary bandits per year for mining sites that are endowed with coltan deposits, and the dashed line reports the same quantity for mining sites not endowed with coltan deposits.

Table 2: Effects of price shocks, presence of stationary bandit									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
VARIABLES									
Coltan(i) X pc(t)	0.07^{**}	0.10^{***}	0.17^{***}	0.21^{***}	0.11^{***}	0.20***	0.12^{***}	0.13^{**}	0.28^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Coltan(i) X pc(t) X D road(i)			-0.08						-0.07
			(0.07)						(0.07)
$pc(t) \ge D road(i)$			0.03						0.03
			(0.03)						(0.04)
$Gold(i) \ge pg(t)$	-0.03								
	(0.03)								
Coltan(i) X pc(t) X D airport(i)	. ,			-0.13**					-0.10
				(0.06)					(0.06)
pc(t) X D airport(i)				0.01					0.00
				(0.02)					(0.04)
$Coltan(i) \ge pc(t+1)$						0.06**			()
						(0.03)			
Constant	0.27**	0.29***	0.17^{*}	0.20***	0.27***	-0.03	0.00	41.97	91.16*
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.00)	(46.28)	(49.25)
	(0)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.20)	(0.00)	(10120)	()
Observations	2,134	388	360	360	388	582	388	582	540
R-squared	0.68	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.88	0.76		0.79	0.82
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Village FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Region [*] Year FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES
Arellano-Bond	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Coltan time trends	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Sample	98-08	99-00	99-00	99-00	99-00	98-00	98-00	98-00	98-00

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Table 2:	Effects	of pric	e shocks.	presence	of stationary	bandit
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


Figure 7: Effect of the price of gold on stationary bandits at gold sites, all time intervals

Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients on gold endowment, interacted with the world price of gold, from the baseline specification using all possible time intervals. Intervals indicate 95% confidence intervals.





Figure 8: Effect of the price of coltan on stationary bandits at coltan sites, all time intervals

Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients on coltan endowment, interacted with the world price of coltan, from the baseline specification using all possible time intervals. Intervals indicate 95% confidence intervals.



Notes: This figure plots the average number of sites where an armed actor collects taxes regularly on years. I take this variable from the site survey, in which the specialists are asked to list past taxes in the site. Taxes by an armed actor are defined in the survey as a mandatory payment on mining activity which is regular (sporadic expropriation is excluded), stable (rates of expropriation are stable) and anticipated (villagers make investment decisions with knowledge of these expropriation rates and that these will be respected). The solid line graphs the average number of mining sites where an armed actor collects regular taxes for mining sites that are endowed with available coltan deposits, and the dashed line reports the same quantity for mining sites that are not endowed with coltan deposits.

Table 3: Effects of price shocks, presence of taxation									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
VARIABLES									
Coltan(i) X pc(t)	0.15^{***} (0.03)	0.17^{***} (0.04)	0.19^{***} (0.05)	0.29^{***} (0.06)	0.18^{***} (0.04)	0.23^{***} (0.03)	0.07^{***} (0.01)	0.16^{***} (0.06)	0.29^{***} (0.08)
Coltan(i) X pc(t) X D road(i)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00) -0.01 (0.08)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00) (0.01) (0.07)
pc(t) X D road(i)			(0.00) (0.01) (0.02)						-0.02 (0.03)
Gold(i) X pg(t)	0.01 (0.03)		(0.0_)						(0.00)
Coltan(i) X $pc(t)$ X D $airport(i)$	(0.00)			-0.17^{**} (0.08)					-0.22^{***} (0.06)
pc(t) X D airport(i)				-0.00 (0.03)					(0.07) (0.05)
$Coltan(i) \ge pc(t+1)$				(0.00)		0.05 (0.03)			(0.00)
Constant	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.36^{***} (0.12)	$0.00 \\ (0.00)$	-28.71 (54.65)	-11.57 (57.61)
Observations	1,417	258	240	240	258	385	256	385	358
R-squared	0.71	0.84	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.77		0.77	0.82
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Village FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Region [*] Year FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES
Arellano-Bond	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Coltan time trends	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Sample	98-08	99-00	99-00	99-00	99-00	98-00	98-00	98-00	98-00

Table 4: Effects of price shocks by type of tax

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Output	Labor	Poll	Food	Transit	Mill	Pillage
VARIABLES	Tax	Tax	Tax	Tax	Tax	Tax	
$Coltan(i) \ge pc(t)$	0.12^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.10^{***}	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.20***	-0.06	0.28^{***}	0.11^{**}	0.13^{**}	0.01	0.24^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.09)
Observations	1,521	1,599	1,690	1,463	1,729	1,729	1,729
R-squared	0.60	0.72	0.56	0.61	0.59	0.72	0.12
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Village FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Location	MINE	MINE	VILLAGE	MARKET	VILLAGE	VILLAGE	VILLAGE
Sample	99-00	99-00	99-00	99-00	99-00	99-00	99-00