Alesina A et al.: Political Parties, Institutions, and Budget Deficits, 1997. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT-Press. I: A Alesina et al.: Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. 25 s.
Baumol W.: Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis, 1967. American Economic Review 57:415-26. 11 s.
Goldsmith M. : The Groth of Government, 1995. Oxford: Oxford University Press. i O. Borre & E. Scarbrough (eds.) Beliefs in Government. Volume III. 27 s.
Brendemoen A. og H. Vennemo: Hva koster det å øke skattene?, 1993. Økonomiske analyser 8/93 Oslo: SSB. 7 s.
Downs A. : Why the Budget Government Budget is Too Small in a Democracy, 1960. World Politics 12:541-63. 22 s.
Ferejohn J. & K. Krebihel: The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget, 1987. American Journal of Political Science 2:296-319. 23 s.
Franzese R. Jr.: Electoral and Partisan Manipulation of Public Debt in Developed Democracies, 1956-90, 2000. London: Klüwer Academic Publishers. i R Strauch & J von Hagen (eds) Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy. 22 s.
Grilli V et al.: Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries, 1994. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT-Press. i T Persson & G Tabellini (eds.) Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Volume 2: Politics. Sidene 345-61. 48 s.
Helland L. : Grenser for segmentering? Modellresonnementer og empiri, 2000. Makt- og demokratiutredningen 1998 - 2003. Rapportserien Nr. 14. Sidene 1-64. 65 s.
Helland L.: Byrdefordelingskonflikter og budsjettpolitisk handlingslammelse, 2001. Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning (kommer). 22 s.
Huseby B.: Attitudes towards the Size of Government, 1995. Oxford: Oxford University Press. i O. Borre & E. Scarbrough (eds.) Beliefs in Government. Volume III. 32 s.
Inman R & D Rubinfeld: The Political Economy of Federalism, 1997. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. i D. Mueller (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice. 33 s.
Larkey P. et al.: Theorizing about the Growth of Government: A Research Assessment, 1981. Journal of Public Policy 1:154-220. 66 s.
McLean I.: Public Choice: An Introduction, 1987. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Kapittel 5. 21 s.
Mitchell W & M Munger: Economic Models of Intrest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 1991. American Journal of Political Science 35:512-46. 34 s.
Molander P.: Motiv för offetliga åtaganden, 1994. Ds. 1994: 53. Finansdepartementet.Stockholm: Regjeringskanseliets offsetcentral. 46 s.
Mueller D.: The Size of Government, 1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kap. 17 i: Public Choice II. 28 s.
Musgrave A & P Musgrave: Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 1984. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Sidene 3-21. 18 s.
Oats W.: On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 1981. American Economic Review 71:93-8. 5 s.
Olson M.: The Logic of Collective Action. Kapittel I, 1965. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 49 s.
Paldam M. : Political Business Cycles, 1997. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. i D Mueller (ed.) Perspectives on Public Choice. 29 s.
Persson T & G Tabellini: Introduction, 1994. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT-Press. I: T Persson & G Tabellini (eds.) Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Volume 2: Politics. 26 s.
Rasmusen E.: Games and Information, 1994. Oxford: Blackwell. (2nd ed.). Sidene 72-5. 3 s.
Vinell L.: Statsskulden, budgetunderskottet och finansmarnaderna, 1994. Stockholm: Näringslivets Ekonomifakta. Sidene 31-6. 5 s.
Weingast B et al.: The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neocalssical Approach to Distributive Politics, 1994. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT-Press. i T Persson & G Tabellini (eds.) Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Volume 2: Politics. Sidene 345-61. 16 s.
Wildawsky Aa. & N. Caiden: The New Politics of The Budgetary Process , 1997. New York: Longman. (3rd ed.). Sidene 1-66. 66 s.
Sum pensum: 749 s.
Anbefalt litteratur
Alesina A. & N. Roubini: Political Cycles in the OECD Economies, 1994. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT-Press. i T Persson & G Tabellini (eds.) Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Volume 2: Politics.
Alesina A. & S. Ardagna: Fiscal Adjustments: Why they Can be Expansionary, 1998. Economic Policy (October): 489-544.
Borge L. & J. Rattsø: Spending Growth With Vertical Fiscal Imbalance: Decentralized Government Spending in Norway 1880-1990, 1999. Institutt for Økonomi. NTNU: Upublisert.
Cook B.: Pricipal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy: A Comment on Dan Wood, 1989. American Political Science Review 83:965-70.
Eklund K. et al.: Budgetunderskott och Statsskuld - Hur farliga är de?, 1994. Stockholm: ESO-Rapport 38/94.
Isaak R. et al.: Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations, 1993. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. i D Kinder & T Palfrey (eds.): Experimental Foundations of Political Science.
Krebihel K.: Information and Legislative Organization, 1992. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Krebihel K.: Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?, 1990. American Political Science Review 84:149-63.
Gilligan T. & K. Krebihel: The Gains from Exchage Hypothesis of Legislative Organization, 1995. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. i K Shepsle & B Weingast (eds.) Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions.
Hansen T.: Transforming Needs into Expenditure Decisions, 1981. London: Frances Pinter. i K. Newton (ed.) Urban Political Economy.
Helland L.: Preferanser, prosedyrer og informasjon: Betingelser for budsjettdisiplin, 2000b. Dr.avhandling. Oslo: Institutt for statsvitenskap.
Helland L.: Fiscal Constitutions, Fiscal Preferences, Information and Deficits: An Evaluation of 13 West European Countries 1978 - 95, 2000c. London: Klüwer Academic Publishers. i R Strauch & J von Hagen (eds) Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy.
Helland L.: Begrenset rasjonalitet: Hva er det, og hva leder det til?, 2001b. Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift (kommer).
Johansen L.: Offentlig Økonomikk , 1988. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (6. opplag). .
Londregan J. & J. Snyder: Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences, 1995. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. i K Shepsle & B Weingast (eds.) Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions.
Lupia A. & M. McCubbins: The Democratic Dilemma, 1998. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Meltzer & Richard: A Rational Theory of the Size of Government, 1994. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT-Press. i T Persson & G Tabellini (eds.) Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Volume 2: Politics.
Morrow J.: Game Theory for Political Scientists, 1994. Princeton Princeton University Press.
Oats W.: Fiscal Federalism, 1972. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich.
Olson M.: The Logic of Collective Action, 1965. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Sidene 53-66.
Rasch B.: Parlamentariske instrumenter og minoritetsparlamentarisme, 2000. Makt- og demokratiutredningen 1998 - 2003. Rapportserien 13.
Rasch B.: Består Stortingets fagkomiteer av 'sektorentusiaster'?, 1997. Stat og styring 3:25-9.
Roubini N. & J. Sachs: Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Countries, 1989. Journal of Public Economics 4:163-85.
Sandler T. & J. Tschirhardt: Club Theory: Thirty years later, 1995. Public Choice 93:335-55.
Sandler T. & J. Tschirhardt: The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey, 1980. Journal of Economic Litterature. XVIII: 1481-1521.
Strauch R. & J. von Hagen: Introduction, 2000. London: Klüwer Academic Publishers. i R Strauch & J von Hagen (eds) Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy.
Sørensen R. et.al: Effektivitet I offentlig tjenesteyting, 1999. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
Wood B.: Pricipal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy: A reply to Brian Cook, 1989. American Political Science Review 83:970-77.